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 Synopsis 
This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the impact of electronic screen 
trading in futures markets.  The research provides empirical evidence on increasingly 
significant issues given the rapid global advances in technology used in securities 
markets.  Each essay addresses the scarcity of conclusive research in order to aid 
researchers, regulators, exchange policy makers and systems builders as they confront 
issues related to electronic trading systems.   
 
The first essay evaluates the liquidity of electronically traded futures markets by 
examining the transition from floor to electronic trading for stock index futures traded 
on the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE), 
Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) and Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE).  These 
three changes in trading systems provide unique natural experiments to assess the 
relative liquidity of open outcry and electronic markets.  After controlling for price 
volatility and trading volume, bid-ask spreads are found to be narrower under the 
electronic trading regimes implemented by all three exchanges.  This provides 
evidence that electronic trading can facilitate higher levels of liquidity relative to floor 
traded markets.  However, bid-ask spreads appear to become wider in response to 
higher price volatility under electronic trading.  This indicates that the relative 
performance of electronic trading systems deteriorates during periods of higher price 
volatility.   
 
As electronic screen trading can facilitate different levels of transparency through the 
electronic limit order book, the second essay analyses the impact of electronic limit 
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order book transparency on market depth.  The study exploits a unique institutional 
difference offered by the trading systems adopted by the SFE and New Zealand 
Futures and Options Exchange (NZFOE) in order to provide the first empirical 
evidence on this issue.  The SFE’s electronic trading system disclosed limit order 
depth at the highest bid price and the lowest ask price only, while the NZFOE 
disclosed limit order depth at the three highest bid and three lowest ask prices.  The 
proportion of the limit order book placed at the second and third best prices on the 
NZFOE is found to be thicker relative to the SFE.  This result is robust to differences 
in trading volume, price volatility and the size of bid-ask spreads across the two 
exchanges.  It is concluded that lower transparency on the SFE imparts additional 
execution risks and costs on limit order traders, which may discourage traders from 
placing limit orders at the second and third best prices.  
 
Electronic trading systems have also facilitated the introduction of extended trading 
hours or overnight trading sessions on many exchanges.  Hence the final essay in this 
dissertation examines overnight or ‘intranight’ trading behaviour.  This is the first 
study to document intranight trading behaviour and, consistent with intraday research, 
provides evidence that there are at least three significant determinants of intranight 
trading behaviour: (i) information drawn from price behaviour in overseas markets 
(contagion effects); (ii) overseas information releases; and (iii) strategic behaviour by 
informed and liquidity traders.  This implies that in order to facilitate price discovery 
and liquidity, it is important for markets to be open overnight when related markets 
are open or when overseas macroeconomic information is released.  This study also 
documents a gradual widening in the quoted bid-ask spread during the overnight 
trading session, which is contrary to existing theory and prior research. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1  Background and Overview 
During the past decade there has been a dramatic increase in the number of futures 
exchanges employing electronic screen trading systems.  Recent examples include the 
transfer from floor to electronic trading on the London International Financial Futures 
and Options Exchange (LIFFE) in 1999, Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) in 1999 and 
the Hong Kong Futures Exchange (HKFE) in 2000.  However, open outcry is still 
used by key markets such as the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) and Chicago 
Mercantile Exchange (CME).  This diversity in practice leads to fundamental 
questions about the comparative market quality of floor traded and electronic screen 
traded futures markets and is of particular importance to regulators, exchange policy 
makers and systems builders.  Prior literature is generally limited to an analysis of 
electronic trading on the Deutsche Terminbourse (DTB) in Germany due to the 
absence of a suitable ‘natural’ experiment.  The evidence on market liquidity from 
these tests is inconclusive and analysis of the different elements of electronic trading 
systems is absent.1  Hence the key objective of this dissertation is to abridge this gap 
in the academic literature.  This gap is addressed in the dissertation by, firstly, 
evaluating the impact of electronically traded futures markets on liquidity and, 
secondly, assessing the impact of different system designs facilitated by electronic 
                                                 
1 For example, Pirrong (1996) and Breedon and Holland (1998) find bid-ask spreads of the 
electronically traded DTB to be no wider than bid-ask spreads on the floor traded system of the LIFFE.  
In contrast, Shyy and Lee (1995) and Breedon and Holland (1998) find bid-ask spreads to be narrower 
on the floor traded system.   
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screen trading on market quality. 
 
The debate concerning electronic screen trading and its impact on market quality and 
efficiency has been at the forefront of securities markets design forums for decades.  
Domowitz and Steil (1999) trace the earliest conceptual arguments regarding the 
introduction of computerised markets and their market quality relative to floor trading 
as far back as a report entitled Special Study of Securities Markets, Report of the 
Special Study of the SEC (1963).2  The Commodity Futures Trading Commission 
organised a conference around the issue in 1977, summarised in Proceedings of the 
CFTC Conference on Automation in the Futures Industry, CFTC (1977).  The 
significance of electronic trading has also induced a number of seminal academic 
articles documenting the advantages and disadvantages of electronic trading (see 
Domowitz, 1990, 1993a, 1993b).  In addition, several papers have attempted to 
empirically test the impact of electronic trading relative to floor trading.  However, as 
the review of this literature in Chapter 2 identifies, this empirical evidence is 
inconclusive and does not examine the impact of different system designs facilitated 
by electronic screen trading.3 
 
This dissertation brings further evidence to bear on the impact of electronic screen 
trading.  The three essays comprising this dissertation examine the market quality and 
design of electronically traded futures markets.  The first essay examines the impact 
                                                 
2 See H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Congress, 1st Session, pt. 2 at 358 and 678. 
3 Two exceptions that examine issues related to electronic screen trading systems design include 
Appendix B and Appendix C to this dissertation. 
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of electronic screen trading on liquidity.  The second essay explores one design 
feature facilitated by electronic trading through an examination of the impact of 
electronic limit order book transparency on market depth.  The final essay provides 
evidence on another design feature of electronic markets by examining overnight or 
‘intranight’ trading behaviour, which is facilitated by the introduction of electronic 
trading systems.  The motivations for each essay are discussed separately below. 
 
1.1.1 Impact of Electronic Screen Trading 
Prior academic literature has argued that electronic screen trading can hinder market 
liquidity for at least three reasons.  First, electronic trading systems deprive local 
traders and market makers of some of their trading advantage and deter their 
participation and ability to provide liquidity (Massimb and Phelps, 1994; Pirrong, 
1996).  Second, most electronic trading systems do not reveal the identity of traders, 
which can result in a higher degree of information asymmetry (Pirrong, 1996; 
Kofman and Moser, 1997).  Finally, electronic trading systems do not appear to 
handle periods of intense trading as well as floor traded systems (Franke and Hess, 
1995; Frino et al., 1998a).  
 
The global trend towards electronic systems implies that electronic trading is being 
recognised as more cost effective than floor trading and can lead to faster price 
discovery (see Domowitz, 1990; Grünbichler et al., 1994).  Grünbichler et al. (1994) 
and Pirrong (1996) highlight that electronic trading systems may reduce the cost of 
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trading and hence the cost of supplying liquidity to the market.  It is also possible that 
electronic trading may lower adverse selection costs through increased information 
(see Grünbichler et al. 1994; Pirrong, 1996) and transparency of the limit order book 
(see Shyy and Lee, 1995; Pirrong, 1996; Martens, 1998).  The few papers that have 
attempted empirical analysis of these issues are generally limited to a comparison of 
simultaneous electronic trading on the DTB and floor trading on the LIFFE in the 
absence of a suitable ‘natural’ experiment.  Furthermore, this literature has provided 
conflicting results (for example, Shyy and Lee, 1995; Pirrong, 1996; Breedon and 
Holland, 1998).  The first essay in this dissertation aims to provide new evidence on 
the liquidity of electronically traded markets by examining the change in trading 
systems used by three major futures exchanges. 
 
The first essay brings new evidence to bear on the liquidity of electronic trading by 
examining the introduction of electronic screen trading for stock index futures traded 
on the LIFFE, SFE and HKFE.  The LIFFE is the world’s third-largest derivatives 
exchange and is the most recent significant exchange to employ open outcry trading in 
Europe.  Electronic trading on LIFFE CONNECT began on 30 November 1998 with 
equity options.  The SFE is the largest futures exchange in the Asia-Pacific region and 
daytime electronic trading on SYCOM IV began on 4 October 1999.  The HKFE is 
also a leading derivatives market in the Asia-Pacific region and full electronic trading 
on the Hong Kong Futures Automated Trading System (HKATS) was implemented 
on 5 June 2000.  These three changes provide unprecedented, unique and timely 
‘natural experiments’ for examining the impact of electronic trading on futures market 
behaviour. 
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Prior research in this area, discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, analyses futures 
contracts that are traded simultaneously across two different market structures or 
compares daytime floor traded and overnight electronically traded markets.  This 
essay extends the literature by comparing liquidity across two different trading 
systems for the same market, providing for a more rigorous experiment.  The results 
reported in this research are auspicious to researchers, regulators and exchange policy 
makers facing increasing computerisation of securities markets internationally. 
 
1.1.2 Electronic Limit Order Book Transparency 
Questions pertaining to the quest for the most efficient trading system do not finish 
with the issue of floor versus electronic trading.  The second essay in this dissertation 
looks more closely at the impact of electronic system design on market quality.  
Unlike trading by open outcry, electronic trading systems are able to deliver distinct 
levels of quote and depth transparency through the degree of limit order book 
information made available to users.  The controversy surrounding the level of 
information from the electronic limit order book that is revealed to traders is clearly 
evident from diverse practices across exchanges.  For example, some markets 
(including the SFE) have adopted electronic trading systems that restrict the 
transparency of the limit order book to the best bid and ask prices, while markets such 
as the Toronto Stock Exchange publicly disseminate information for the five best bid 
and ask prices.  The Paris Bourse and CME’s electronic system - Globex - reveal 
quote and depth information for the five best bid and ask prices, however they also 
allow traders to view all outstanding individual orders.   
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Other exchanges have adopted systems that display market interest at all price levels, 
including the LIFFE, Eurex and CBOT’s electronic system - a/c/e.  In addition, the 
ability to access market depth information at each price from the Tokyo International 
Financial Futures Exchange was extended from members to customers on 2 April 
2001.4  Finally, at a recent Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) sponsored 
roundtable held in Washington DC on 4 May 2000, market and regulatory participants 
agreed that limit order book transparency is inevitable and beneficial for securities 
markets, however how much information should be made publicly available and the 
best method for displaying this information was in dispute.5 
 
The small amount of theoretical and experimental literature touching on this issue 
suggests that the expected impact of limit order or quote transparency on market 
liquidity is an open issue.  Glosten (1999) identifies that the impact of quote 
transparency on market behaviour is unlikely to be empirically tested as “the 
opportunity for a clear test with an exogenous change in institution is rare if not non-
existent” (Glosten, 1999, pp. 2).  Research explicitly examining this issue, discussed 
in more detail in the next chapter, is limited to a theoretical paper by Biais (1993) and 
experimental papers by Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) and Flood et al. (1999).  The 
second essay in this dissertation extends the literature on limit order transparency by 
bringing new and empirical evidence to bear on this issue.  This essay tests whether 
                                                 
4 See “TIFFE discloses market depth information from April 2, 2001”, TIFFE Press Release, 2 April 
2001. 
5 See “SEC asks: Book ‘em? SIA-ICI committee formed to weight limit order issue”, Security Industry 
News, 8 May 2000. 
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limit order disclosure influences quote setting behaviour by exploiting a ‘rare’ 
institutional difference.  
 
The SFE and New Zealand Futures and Options Exchange (NZFOE) are the only 
futures exchanges in Australia and New Zealand, respectively, and the NZFOE is 
fully owned and operated by the SFE.  Contracts on both exchanges currently trade on 
an electronic trading system called SYCOM IV that operates electronic open limit 
order books for both exchanges, which were identical in every respect except one.  
The transparency of the limit order book on the SFE was restricted to orders at the 
best bid and ask prices, while limit orders on NZFOE were transparent up to the three 
best prices.6,7  The data provided by the SFE include a list of every order entered and 
trade executed on the SFE and NZFOE and hence enable a reconstruction of the limit 
order book.  As similar contracts are traded on both exchanges, this provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the impact of limit order transparency on market behaviour.  
Evidence regarding the impact of limit order book transparency on market depth is 
particularly important for researchers, exchange regulators and policy makers as it is 
likely that different levels of transparency impose additional costs and execution risks 
on limit order traders which may discourage them from placing more competitively 
priced orders. 
 
                                                 
6 On 19 January 2001, the SFE increased transparency to orders at the three best bid and ask prices. 
7 The best bid and best ask prices refer to the highest bid and lowest ask price, respectively. 
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1.1.3 Intranight Electronic Screen Trading Behaviour 
Electronic screen trading has facilitated extended trading hour sessions or overnight 
trading sessions for many of the world’s most prominent exchanges, including the 
CME (Globex), CBOT (a/c/e) and New York Mercantile Exchange (ACCESS).  Both 
the NYSE and Nasdaq have proposed the introduction of overnight trading sessions to 
complement daytime trading and the Chicago Stock Exchange (CHX) and Chicago 
Board Options Exchange (CBOE) have suggested they are likely to introduce 
overnight trading in response to such moves by the NYSE and Nasdaq.8  In addition, 
both Nasdaq and CHX introduced extended trading hour sessions during 1999, with 
the CBOE scheduled to launch an electronic trading system, CBOEdirect, to facilitate 
extended trading hour sessions on 1 June 2001.9  This trend towards overnight 
electronic trading is in response to competition from electronic exchanges offering 
after-hours trading, as well as socio-economic pressure from the larger and more 
diverse group of stockowners existing today, together with the internationalisation of 
securities markets.10  Therefore, the third essay in this dissertation provides evidence 
relevant to understanding the role, sources and economic significance of such 
overnight trading facilitated by electronic screen traded systems.   
 
The plethora of research providing evidence on intraday market behaviour is largely 
                                                 
8 Refer “Big board sees only limited demand for night trading, but feels compelled” and “Night trading 
on Nasdaq heads for vote”, The Wall Street Journal, 25 and 27 May 1999, and “Trading into the night” 
and “Ideas of longer hours generates no celebration in Chicago’s pits”, Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1999. 
9 See “NASD’s Frank Zarb asks securities industry to embrace change”, NASD Press Release, 23 June 
1999, “Light CHX E-session volume in line with expectations”, CHX Press Release, 29 October 1999 
and “CBOE to launch CBOEdirect screen-based trading system June 1, 2001”, CBOE Press Release, 1 
March 2001. 
10 Approximately 50% of America’s households now own stocks with many preferring to trade outside 
traditional trading hours.  Refer “Trading into the night”, Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1999. 
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due to its significance to researchers and market participants such as regulators and 
exchange policy makers.  That is, the findings of intraday research provide insights 
into the economic role of securities trading (see Gerety and Mulherin, 1994) and have 
formed the basis for subsequent inquiry into securities market behaviour centred 
around issues such as information assimilation (see Ederington and Lee, 1993, 1995) 
and the influence of different market designs (see Chan et al., 1995a).  
Notwithstanding the prevalence of extended trading hour sessions existing on 
electronic trading systems, analysis of intraday market behaviour has not yet been 
extended to such a market environment.  The third essay in this dissertation provides 
the first analysis of ‘intranight’ trading behaviour in overnight electronic screen 
trading sessions. 
 
While the overnight trading sessions in Europe and North America are relatively short 
and thinly traded, trading in the major contracts on the overnight market of the 
Sydney Futures Exchange is sufficiently liquid to allow a meaningful analysis of 
intranight trading behaviour.  For example, in 1998, SYCOM volume represented 
18.9% of total exchange volume.  In contrast, Globex averaged 4.3% of CME trading 
and Project A, 4.4% of CBOT trading volume.11  The third essay in this dissertation 
examines ‘intranight’ patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading 
volume and compares these to existing theory and prior research.  A number of tests 
are carried out to determine whether the patterns are consistent with the effects of 
contagion from overseas markets, overseas macroeconomic information releases and 
                                                 
11 Source: SFE, CME and CBOT Annual Reports for 1998.  The CBOT has since replaced Project A 
with a/c/e (alliance/CBOT/eurex). 
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strategic trading by informed and uninformed traders.  Hence the final essay in this 
dissertation has significant implications for the design of electronic trading systems 
for overnight or ‘24-hour’ trading sessions and extends the extant literature. 
 
1.2  Summary  
The research essays in this dissertation provide evidence regarding the market quality 
and design of electronically traded futures markets.  This chapter motivates each essay 
by illustrating the importance of this evidence to researchers, regulators, exchange 
policy makers and systems builders faced with the dichotomy of inconclusive extant 
literature and the global trend towards electronic trading.   
 
The remainder of the dissertation is organised as follows.  In Chapter 2, prior 
literature that has broached issues relating to the relative market quality of floor and 
electronic screen trading, market transparency and intranight trading behaviour is 
reviewed.  Chapters 3, 4 and 5 present the three research essays discussed in this 
chapter.  Each essay contains sections describing institutional detail, theory, data, 
method, results, conclusions and suggestions for future research.  Chapter 6 concludes 
by highlighting how the evidence presented in this dissertation, regarding the market 
quality and design of electronically traded futures markets, can assist market 
participants, regulators, exchange policy makers and systems builders. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
2.1  Introduction 
Chapter 1 identified that the main objective of this dissertation is to provide empirical 
evidence on the impact of electronic screen traded futures markets, an area of security 
market microstructure research which is largely undeveloped.  This chapter provides 
an overview of the literature related to the three essays presented in this dissertation, 
in order to provide further motivation for the empirical analyses to follow.  The next 
section examines literature comparing floor and electronic screen trading, Section 2.3 
reviews literature concerning market transparency and Section 2.4 explores literature 
related to intranight trading behaviour. 
 
2.2  Floor Versus Electronic Screen Trading 
In addition to papers providing taxonomies of the advantages and disadvantages of 
electronic trading (see Domowitz, 1990, 1993a, 1993b), there are three main branches 
of literature that empirically evaluate the performance of electronic screen trading 
relative to floor trading.  By far the most extensive area of research focuses on 
examining market settings where one security is traded simultaneously on floor and 
electronically traded markets.  The second branch of literature evaluates the 
performance of overnight electronic trading systems in comparison to daytime floor 
traded markets.  The final branch of literature provides some evidence on the impact 
of the introduction of electronic trading in equities markets.  These three areas of prior 
research are discussed in this section. 
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2.2.1 Simultaneous Floor and Electronic Screen Trading 
The first branch of literature reviewed is profiled in Table 2-1 and provides the most 
comprehensive evidence evaluating the performance of electronic trading in futures 
markets.  This literature analyses market settings where one security is traded 
simultaneously in floor and electronic screen traded markets.  Sandmann and Vila 
(1995) and Vila and Bacha (1996) compare trading in Nikkei stock index futures on 
the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE), which is electronically traded, and the 
Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX), which is floor traded.  With 
respect to liquidity, Sandmann and Vila (1995) report substantially larger bid-ask 
spreads in the electronically traded Osaka market relative to floor trading on SIMEX.  
However, the authors conclude that such differences may be attributed to institutional 
features unique to the OSE, such as its higher commissions and larger minimum tick 
size.  Vila and Bacha (1996) find that trading volume in Nikkei stock index futures is 
concentrated on the OSE, however they also find that mispricing on the OSE is 
slightly higher than on SIMEX.  Similar to Sandmann and Vila (1995), the authors 
argue that institutional features such as the larger number of trading restrictions on the 
OSE may influence these results. 
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Table 2-1: Literature examining simultaneous floor and electronic screen trading 
Author(s) Period Markets Observation 
Interval 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Impact of Electronic 
Trading 
Franke & Hess (1995) 1991-1992 LIFFE/DTB Daily 
3-min 
Market share Falls with ↑ 
volatility & volume
Shyy & Lee (1995) 1993 LIFFE/DTB 1-min Quoted spread Wider 
Pirrong (1996) 1992-1993 LIFFE/DTB 15-min Realised spread Equal/Narrower 
Sandmann & Vila (1995) 1993 SIMEX/OSE 1-min Realised spread Wider 
Vila & Bacha (1996) 1986-1991 SIMEX/OSE Daily Mispricing 
Volume 
Higher 
Roll (1984) spread Narrower Kofman & Moser (1997) 1992 LIFFE/DTB 1-min 
George et. al 
(1991) spread 
Wider 
Realised spread Narrower Breedon & Holland (1998) 1995 LIFFE/DTB 1-min 
Quoted spread Wider 
Frino et al. (1998a) 1997 LIFFE/DTB 5-min Quoted spread Narrower 
Martens (1998) 1995 LIFFE/DTB 1-min 
5-min 
Price discovery Faster with ↓ 
volatility 
 
Prior literature examining simultaneous trading of German Bund futures on the 
LIFFE, which used to be floor traded, and the DTB, which was electronically traded, 
benefits from the overlap of trading times and the close similarity of contracts.12  This 
market setting has been examined by Franke and Hess (1995), Shyy and Lee (1995), 
Pirrong (1996), Kofman and Moser (1997), Breedon and Holland (1998), Frino et al. 
(1998a) and Martens (1998) and has produced conflicting results with respect to 
liquidity.  Shyy and Lee (1995) examine a limited sample period, covering six trading 
days, and find quoted bid-ask spreads are wider on the electronic trading system.  
Pirrong (1996) examines a longer period of time and sales data and finds that the 
Thompson-Waller (1988) and Roll (1984) estimates of the bid-ask spread for the DTB 
are not greater than, and sometimes significantly smaller than, estimates of the bid-ask 
spread for the LIFFE.  However, Kofman and Moser (1997) find that although the 
Roll (1984) estimation of bid-ask spreads suggests that electronic trading leads to 
narrower bid-ask spreads than floor trading, the more efficient George et al. (1991) 
                                                 
12 LIFFE is now electronically traded on LIFFE CONNECT and Eurex has replaced the DTB. 
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estimator finds bid-ask spreads on the electronic trading system to be wider, albeit 
insignificantly.   
 
Breedon and Holland (1998) analyse a minute-by-minute quote series and full 
transaction record and find that quoted bid-ask spreads are wider on the DTB, 
whereas various estimates of realised bid-ask spreads are narrower on the DTB in 
comparison to the LIFFE.  The authors find that more trades were executed inside the 
quote data series on the DTB than on LIFFE and suggest that this may explain why 
quoted bid-ask spreads appear to be wider on the DTB, while other measures of the 
bid-ask spread show them to be equal or narrower.  However, Breedon and Holland 
(1998) also acknowledge that this may reflect the non-synchronous nature of their 
data.  Finally, Frino et al. (1998a) use intraday data from a period in which each 
exchange’s share of total Bund futures trading was more comparable than in previous 
research and find quoted bid-ask spreads are narrower on the electronically traded 
system. 
  
Franke and Hess (1995), Pirrong (1996), Breedon and Holland (1998), Frino et al. 
(1998a) and Martens (1998) further compare the performance of electronic to floor 
trading during periods of higher volatility, finding a deterioration in the market 
quality of electronic trading during these periods.  Franke and Hess (1995) examine 
whether the electronic system’s market share of trading activity declines during 
periods of high information intensity by regressing DTB market share on various 
volatility and trading volume measures.  They document an inverse relationship 
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between the DTB’s market share and volatility and trading volume.13  Breedon and 
Holland (1998) confirm this relationship, however find additional evidence that 
although LIFFE quoted bid-ask spreads do not increase as much as those on the DTB 
during volatile periods, the effective spreads on both markets increase similarly 
during volatile times.  In a related study, Martens (1998) uses a Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) to estimate the share in the price discovery process of the 
LIFFE and DTB, during both high and low volatility periods.  Martens (1988) finds 
that in high volatility periods the floor traded LIFFE has the largest share of the price 
discovery process, whereas in low volatility periods the electronically traded DTB 
contributes most to price discovery.  Finally, Frino et al. (1998a) find, using a 
regression approach, that quoted bid-ask spreads of the DTB widen at a faster rate 
than bid-ask spreads of the LIFFE as volatility increases.   
 
In support of this evidence, both Franke and Hess (1995) and Martens (1998) argue 
that in periods of low information intensity, trade volume is low and hence 
information on the last trade is relatively old.  Therefore, during such periods, 
information in the limit order book information of an electronic system is expected to 
provide a more timely indicator of market developments.  During periods of 
information arrival, risk-averse traders are expected to reduce their submission of 
limit orders to the order book or shorten the average time span of orders, for fear of 
adverse selection in the electronic trading environment where the identity of the 
trading partner is generally unknown.  
                                                 
13 In contrast, Pirrong (1996) finds that volume shocks have a less pronounced effect on DTB price 
volatility than on LIFFE volatility, providing evidence that the electronic system is deeper than the 
LIFFE. 
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2.2.2 Daytime Floor Versus Overnight Electronic Screen Trading 
Table 2-2: Literature comparing daytime versus overnight markets 
Author(s) Period Markets Observation 
Interval 
Dependent 
variable 
Impact of 
Electronic 
Trading 
Chow et al. (1996) 1993-1994 MATIF/Globex 30-min Volume Lower 
Gwilym & Thomas (1998) 1992-1995 LIFFE/APT 5-min Quoted spread Wider 
Coppejans & Domowitz (1999) 1994 CME/Globex Hourly Realised spread Similar 
Wang (1999) 1994 SFE/SYCOM Daily Realised spread Wider 
 
The second branch of literature that empirically analyses the impact of electronic 
trading is outlined in Table 2-2.  This literature compares the performance of 
overnight electronic trading systems to daytime floor traded markets.  These papers 
include Chow et al. (1996), Gwilym and Thomas (1998), Coppejans and Domowitz 
(1999) and Wang (1999).  Chow et al. (1996) examine data pertaining to the MATIF 
which, prior to 1998, offered daytime floor trading and overnight trading on Globex.  
The authors examine the switch from daytime floor trading to overnight electronic 
trading and find that trading volume is higher on the floor around the switch.  
However, they suggest that this may be driven by factors other than the type of 
trading system.  Gwilym and Thomas (1998) compare the floor traded LIFFE to the 
LIFFE’s overnight electronic trading system, Automated Pit Trading (APT), and find 
that quoted bid-ask spreads are consistently wider on APT.14  They also argue, 
however, that elements of the overnight trading environment of APT, such as lower 
trading activity, the use of APT for closing out daytime positions and the deterrence 
of locals via high set-up costs, may influence the results.   
 
                                                 
14 APT has since been replaced by LIFFE CONNECT. 
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More recently, Coppejans and Domowitz (1999) evaluate the performance of the 
Globex overnight trading system relative to the floor traded market of the CME.  
They find that the electronically traded market operates well in a relatively illiquid 
setting, whereby the bid-ask spread of the S&P futures contract is approximately the 
same on both the floor and Globex.15  Finally, Wang (1999) compares the degree of 
asymmetric information in floor and electronic screen traded environments using data 
from the SFE.  Wang (1999) finds that bid-ask spreads from floor trading have a 
smaller adverse information component but a larger order processing cost component 
relative to electronic trading.  By examining the response of the bid-ask spread to the 
trade-by-trade standard deviation of returns, he also provides evidence that screen 
traders are more sensitive to market volatility than floor traders.  Wang (1999) argues 
that differences in the daytime and overnight market environments, such as different 
traders with divergent information and motivations, may alter the results.16  Hence it 
is likely that the results from this second branch of literature are subject to an internal 
validity problem resulting from the comparison of overnight and daytime markets, 
which are subject to distinctly different institutional characteristics. 
 
2.2.3 Floor Versus Electronic Screen Traded Equities Markets 
The third branch of literature, profiled in Table 2-3, examines the impact of electronic 
trading in equities markets.  Naidu and Rozeff (1994) examine a number of liquidity 
measures around the introduction of electronic trading on the Singapore Stock 
                                                 
15 Coppejans and Domowitz (1999) find wider bid-ask spreads on Globex for currency futures, but 
explain this by increased adverse selection costs due to the operation of the overnight interbank 
currency market. 
16 Wang (1999) attempts to control for this using trade size and frequency. 
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Exchange (SSE).  They find evidence of an increase in liquidity, proxied by volume 
and the ratio of volume to volatility, however they also find that price volatility and 
bid-ask spreads increase.  Shah and Thomas (1996) examine the introduction of 
electronic trading on the Bombay Stock Exchange and find, similar to Naidu and 
Rozeff (1994), that trading volume increases along with improvements in market 
efficiency (through reduced serial correlations of returns), with some evidence of 
increased volatility.  This experiment is complicated, however, by the change from 
one dominant open outcry market comprising the Bombay Stock Exchange to two 
competing electronic exchanges.   
 
Table 2-3: Literature examining floor versus electronic screen trading in equities 
markets 
Authors Period Market Observation 
Interval 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Impact of 
Electronic 
Trading 
Naidu & Rozeff (1994) 1988-1989 SSE Daily Spreads 
Volatility 
Wider 
Higher 
Shah & Thomas (1996) 1994-1995 BSE Daily Volume 
Volatility 
Higher 
Volume Higher Ferris et al. (1997) 1986-1991 VSE Daily 
Volatility Lower 
Freund et al. (1997) 1976-1981 TSE Daily Market 
efficiency 
Similar 
Blennerhassett & Bowman (1998) 1991 NZSE Daily Spreads Narrower 
 
In a related study, Ferris et al. (1997) examine the introduction of electronic trading 
for the Vancouver Stock Exchange. They also find that electronic trading has a 
positive impact on trading activity, however find no evidence to support the argument 
that electronic trading increases volatility.  Freund et al. (1997) follow a different 
approach to analysing the impact of electronic trading on market efficiency by 
examining departures from a random walk model and technical trading strategies.  
They find no significant change in market efficiency around the introduction of 
electronic trading at the Toronto Stock Exchange.  Finally, Blennerhassett and 
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Bowman (1998) examine the introduction of electronic screen trading on the New 
Zealand Stock Exchange.  The authors provide evidence of a reduction in transaction 
costs, with a significant reduction in the bid-ask spread posted at the close.   
 
Subrahmanyam (1991) demonstrates that markets in stock index futures have 
typically lower adverse selection costs (reflected in bid-ask spreads) than in markets 
for individual securities.  This is because the security-specific component of adverse 
selection tends to get diversified away in ‘baskets of securities’.  Hence liquidity 
traders in these baskets of securities incur lower losses to informed traders and are 
able to realise their trades more efficiently than in markets for individual securities.  
As electronic trading is likely to have an impact on adverse selection (see Chapter 3) 
it is possible that electronic trading may have a differential impact on equities and 
futures markets.  Hence the first essay of this dissertation examines the impact of the 
introduction of electronic trading in futures markets. 
 
2.3  Market Transparency 
Market transparency, defined by O’Hara (1995) as the “ability of market participants 
to observe the information in the trading process” (O’Hara, 1995, pp.252) has many 
dimensions that are generally classified in prior literature as either pre- or post-trade 
transparency.  Pre-trade transparency reflects information about the size and direction 
of the current order flow and may refer to the dissemination of current bid and ask 
quotes, depths and information about limit orders away from the best prices.  
However it is post-trade transparency, which describes the public and timely 
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transmission of information on past trades, that forms the basis of much of the extant 
literature.   
 
2.3.1 Post-Trade Transparency 
Table 2-4: Literature examining post-trade transparency 
Author(s) Period Market(s) Research Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Impact of Greater 
Transparency 
Chowdhry & Nanda (1991) n/a Multiple 
dealer 
Theoretical Market survival Market makers voluntarily 
disclose price information
Madhavan (1995) n/a Centralised/ 
Fragmented 
Theoretical Price efficiency Improves 
Board & Sutcliffe (1995) 1992-
1994 
LSE/ 
Paris Bourse 
Empirical Price efficiency Delayed reporting benefits 
market makers & 
decreases price efficiency
Board & Sutcliffe (1996) 1995-
1996 
LSE Empirical Quoted spread Narrower  
Price efficiency Improves  Pagano & Röell (1996) n/a Auction/ 
Dealer 
Theoretical 
Quoted spread Narrower  
Lyons (1996) n/a Foreign 
exchange 
Theoretical Price efficiency Improves  
Gemmill (1996) 1987-
1992 
LSE/ 
Paris Bourse 
Empirical Price efficiency/ 
Quoted spread 
Equal 
Porter & Weaver (1998) 1990 Nasdaq Empirical Information 
release 
Managed with late trade 
reporting 
Price efficiency Improves  Bloomfield & O’Hara 
(1999) 
n/a 2-dealer Experimental
Quoted spread Wider opening spreads 
Naik et al. (1999) n/a Multiple 
dealer 
Theoretical Trader welfare Improves quantity risk 
sharing but not price 
revision risk sharing 
Saporta et al. (1999) 1995-
1996 
LSE Empirical Realised spread Equal 
Bloomfield & O’Hara 
(2000) 
n/a Multiple 
dealer 
Theoretical/ 
Experimental
Market survival Transparent markets 
suffer 
 
Table 2-4 profiles prior literature examining post-trade transparency.  Chowdhry and 
Nanda (1991), Madhavan (1995), Pagano and Röell (1996), Lyons (1996), Bloomfield 
and O’Hara (1999, 2000), and Naik et al. (1999) implement theoretical and/or 
experimental (laboratory) research on post-trade transparency.17  While Chowdhry 
and Nanda (1991) predict that competing market makers in a multi-market setting will 
                                                 
17 Pagano and Röell (1996) also introduce elements of pre-trade transparency to their model, where 
knowledge of order flow is varied amongst the stylised markets they examine. 
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voluntarily disclose prices to deter informed trading on this information, Lyons (1996) 
and Bloomfield and O’Hara (2000) predict an equilibrium with incomplete post-trade 
transparency.  Madhavan (1995), Pagano and Röell (1996), Lyons (1996), Bloomfield 
and O’Hara (1999) and Naik et al. (1999) all find that a more transparent market 
environment leads to greater price efficiency and/or liquidity.  This is because 
disclosure in trading can accelerate revelation of information in price, reduce adverse 
selection and encourage uninformed investors to participate in the market.  However, 
Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) also provide evidence that greater transparency leads 
to wider bid-ask spreads at the open of trading and Naik et al. (1999) find evidence 
that the public investor is forced to bear more price revision risk with greater 
transparency. 
 
Empirical evidence regarding post-trade transparency is limited, however, to Board 
and Sutcliffe (1995, 1996), Gemmill (1996) and Saporta et al. (1999) who examine 
the effect of London Stock Exchange (LSE) delayed reporting rules for block trades 
and Porter and Weaver (1998) who examine late trade reporting on Nasdaq.  The 
empirical evidence for the LSE supports the argument that a more transparent market 
is at least as liquid and price efficient as a market that facilitates late trade reporting.  
Porter and Weaver (1998) also provide evidence that the late trade reporting facility 
on Nasdaq is used by market makers to manage the release of information.  The 
second essay in this dissertation examines pre-trade transparency, an area of market 
microstructure characterised by a far greater dearth in the existing literature that is 
outlined in the next section.  
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2.3.2 Pre-Trade Transparency 
Table 2-5: Literature examining pre-trade transparency 
Author(s) Market(s) Research Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Impact of Greater 
Transparency 
Madhavan (1992) Order/Quote 
driven 
Theoretical Price efficiency Increases  
Biais (1993) Centralised/ 
Fragmented 
Theoretical Quoted spread Equal 
Bollerslev & Domowitz 
(1993) 
Multiple dealer Experimental Price efficiency Improves  
Madhavan (1996) Multiple dealer Theoretical Volatility  
Liquidity  
Price stability 
Improve if market is 
sufficiently large 
Bloomfield & O’Hara 
(1999) 
2-dealer Experimental Price efficiency 
Spreads  
Trader welfare 
Little effect 
Quoted spread Narrower opening 
spread  
Volume Lower  
Flood et al. (1999) Multiple dealer Experimental 
Price efficiency Decreases  
 
Table 2-5 profiles prior literature examining pre-trade transparency.  Madhavan 
(1992) analyses price formation under a continuous quote-driven trading mechanism, 
where dealers post prices before order submission, and an order-driven system, where 
traders submit orders before prices are determined.  Modelling trading as a game 
between strategic traders with rational expectations, Madhavan (1992) predicts that 
the quote-driven system provides greater price efficiency than the continuous auction 
system.  This is unless there is free entry into market making in which case the 
equilibria of the two mechanisms coincide.  Flood et al. (1999) suggest that this 
provides some evidence of the impact of transparency and argue that quote-driven 
markets are necessarily more transparent pre-trade than order-driven markets.  
Madhavan (1996) analyses another dimension of pre-trade transparency, the 
disclosure of order imbalances, by developing a theoretical model of strategic trading.  
The model predicts that, in a sufficiently large market, greater transparency always 
reduces volatility and improves market quality.  Bollerslev and Domowitz (1993) 
compare different ‘book lengths’, or number of limit orders held in the electronic limit 
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order book, in a computer simulation, and provide evidence that an increase in the 
limit order book length improves price discovery. 
 
Work explicitly examining the impact of limit order or quote transparency on market 
quality, which is examined in the second essay of the dissertation, is limited to a 
theoretical paper by Biais (1993) and experimental papers by Bloomfield and O’Hara 
(1999) and Flood et al. (1999).  Biais (1993) analyses fragmented markets, such as 
telephone dealer markets, and compares them to centralised markets, such as futures 
exchanges.  In centralised markets, all orders are addressed to the same location so 
market participants can observe all quotes and trades, whereas in fragmented markets, 
deals are the outcome of bilateral negotiations that other market participants cannot 
observe.  Biais (1993) develops an inventory control model to examine the impact of 
quote transparency on bid-ask spreads.  The model assumes that quote setters are 
homogeneously informed and predicts that the bid-ask spread is equal in both 
transparent and non-transparent markets.   
 
Both Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) and Flood et al. (1999) design laboratory 
experiments to test the impact of dealer quote disclosure on bid-ask spreads.  The 
findings of Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) are consistent with Biais (1993) in that 
they provide evidence that quote transparency has little impact on bid-ask spreads.  In 
contrast, Flood et al. (1999) find that bid-ask spreads are wider in the less transparent 
experimental setting, arguing that this reflects the pricing-in of search costs by 
dealers.  Glosten (1999) argues that the difference in the results of Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (1999) and Flood et al. (1999) is more apparent than real, as the market 
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settings examined are quite different.  While both experimental studies examine 
competitive dealer market settings and include informed and uninformed traders, 
Flood et al. (1999) designs an experiment in which trade information is never 
revealed, quote data may be available and interdealer trade is the bulk of trading 
activity. 
 
Prior literature examining pre-trade transparency, as outlined in Table 2-5, focuses on 
the impact of pre-trade transparency on various dimensions of price discovery and 
liquidity, including bid-ask spreads.  However, there is no prior literature that directly 
examines the effect of limit order book transparency on limit order book depth (the 
aggregate size of buy and sell orders), the focus of the second essay in this 
dissertation.  In this respect, this essay is also related to previous work by Biais et al. 
(1995), which was the first paper to document the shape of an electronic limit order 
book.18  Using a unique data-set obtained from the Paris Bourse, containing 
information on market depth away from the best quotes, Biais et al. (1995) document 
that limit order book depth at the best quotes is lower than at other quotes.  Further, 
depth away from the best quotes is not found to vary significantly.  They conjecture 
that “the shape of the limit order book reflects the correlation in the value of the 
security to various bidders on the same side of the market, the extent of competition 
among bidders on the same side of the market and the shading of bids compared to the 
underlying reservations values” (Biais et al., 1995, pp. 1667), as well as informational 
                                                 
18 Prior literature examining limit order book data also includes Kavajecz (1999) who investigate 
whether specialists manage quoted depth to reduce adverse selection risk and Goldstein and Kavajecz 
(2000) who use limit order data provided by the NYSE to investigate the impact of reducing the 
minimum tick size on the liquidity of the market.   
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asymmetries related to the size of trades.  
 
 In direct contrast to this prediction, Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000) analyse 
the order book of the Saudi Stock Market (SSM) and find that depth at the second best 
quotes is the largest.  They suggest one possible interpretation of the results is the 
difference in the level of transparency on the Paris Bourse and SSM.  That is, the 
Paris Bourse reveals information concerning the five best quotes whereas the SSM 
only disseminates information on the two best quotes.  The second essay in this 
dissertation addresses the lack of prior research on market transparency by exploring 
the impact of electronic limit order book transparency on market depth. 
 
2.4  Intranight Trading Behaviour 
Intraday market behaviour is an area of market microstructure research important to 
market participants and academics alike and hence subject to extensive and rigorous 
examination, as displayed in Table 2-6.  The findings of intraday research provide 
insights into the economic role of securities trading (see Gerety and Mulherin, 1994) 
and have formed the basis for subsequent inquiry into securities market behaviour 
centred around issues such as information assimilation (see Ederington and Lee, 1993, 
1995) and the influence of different market designs (see Chan et al., 1995a).  
Notwithstanding the prevalence of extended trading hour sessions existing on 
electronic trading systems, as documented in Chapter 1, intraday market behaviour 
analysis has not yet been extended to the overnight market session.  Therefore the 
third essay in this dissertation provides evidence relevant to understanding the role, 
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sources and economic significance of such overnight trading, facilitated by electronic 
screen traded systems. 
 
Table 2-6: Literature examining intraday market behaviour 
Author(s) Period Market(s) Observation 
Interval 
Dependent 
Variable(s) 
Pattern 
Wood et al. (1985) 1971-1972 
1982 
NYSE 1-min Returns  
Return  variance 
U-shaped 
Harris (1986) 1981-1983 NYSE 15-min Returns U-shaped 
Jain & Joh (1988) 1979-1983 NYSE Hourly Returns/Volume U-shaped 
Jordan et al. (1988) 1978-1984 CBOT 45-min Volatility U-shaped 
Lockwood & Linn (1990) 1964-1989 NYSE Hourly Volatility U-shaped 
McInish & Wood (1990a) 1980-1984 NYSE 1-min Returns U-shaped 
McInish & Wood (1990b) 1987 TorontoSE 1-min Returns/Volume U-shaped 
Harvey & Huang (1991) 1980-1988 CME Hourly Return variance Mixed 
McInish & Wood (1991) 1980-1984 NYSE Hourly Returns/Volume 
Return variance 
U-shaped 
Brock & Kleidon (1992) 1987 NYSE 1-min Spreads U-shaped 
Ekman (1992) 1983-1988 CME 15-min Returns 
Volatility/Volume 
U-shaped 
Gerety & Mulherin (1992) 1933-1988 NYSE Hourly Returns/Volume U-shaped 
McInish & Wood (1992) 1989 NYSE 1-min Spreads Reverse J 
Ederington & Lee (1993) 1988-1991 CME 5-min Volatility Declining 
Foster & Viswanathan (1993) 1988 NYSE/ 
AMEX 
Hourly Volatility/Volume U-shaped 
Spreads U-shaped 
Depth Reverse U
Lee et al. (1993) 1988 NYSE 30-min 
Volume U-shaped 
Niemeyer & Sandas (1993) 1991-1992 Stockholm 10-min Volume 
Volatility/Spreads 
U-shaped 
Declining 
Gerety & Mulherin (1994) 1952-1992 NYSE Hourly Volatility Declining 
Lehmann & Modest (1994) 1991-1993 TokyoSE 30-min Spreads 
Volatility/Volume 
U-shaped 
Webb & Smith (1994) 1987-1990 CME 5-min Volatility/Volume U-shaped 
Spreads Declining Chan et al. (1995a) 1991, 1992 Nasdaq 5-min 
Volatility/Volume U-shaped 
NYSE 15-min Spreads 
Volatility/Volume 
U-shaped 
Spreads Declining 
Chan et al. (1995b) 1986 
CBOE 15-min 
Volatility/Volume U-shaped 
Hamao & Hasbrouck 1995 TokyoSE 15-min Spreads 
Returns/Volume 
U-shaped 
Volatility Declining Gwilym et al. (1996) 1992-1993 LIFFE 5-min 
Volume U-shaped 
Spreads Declining Gwilym et al. (1997) 1993-1994 LIFFE Hourly 
Volatility/Volume U-shaped 
Gwilym & Thomas (1998) 1992-1995 LIFFE 5-min Spreads Declining 
Specialist spread Declining Chung et al. (1999) 1990-1991 NYSE 30-min 
Limit order spread U-shaped 
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The three market quality variables commonly examined in intraday market behaviour 
research, as profiled in Table 2-6, are price volatility, trading volume and bid-ask 
spreads.  Prior research has generally documented an elevation in price volatility and 
trading volume at the open and close of daytime trading sessions (Wood et al., 1985; 
Jain and Joh, 1988; Jordan et al., 1988; Lockwood and Linn, 1990; McInish and 
Wood, 1990b; 1991; Ekman, 1992; Gerety and Mulherin, 1992; Foster and 
Viswanathan, 1993; Lee et al., 1993; Niemeyer and Sandas, 1993; Lehmann and 
Modest, 1994; Webb and Smith, 1994; Chan et al., 1995a; Chan et al., 1995b; Hamao 
and Hasbrouck, 1995; Gwilym et al., 1997).  This elevation in price volatility and 
trading volume has been attributed to strategic trading by informed traders (Admati 
and Pfleiderer, 1988; Foster and Viswanathan, 1994) and opening procedures 
(Amihud and Mendelson, 1987; Stoll and Whaley, 1990).   
 
Evidence that bid-ask spreads in competitive dealer markets (including futures 
markets) are elevated at the open of trading and narrow as the trading session 
progresses is found in Niemeyer and Sandas (1993), Chan et al. (1995a), Chan et al. 
(1995b), Gwilym et al. (1997) and Gwilym and Thomas (1998).  In contrast, the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which is a specialist market, exhibits a U-shaped 
pattern in bid-ask spreads (see Brock and Kleidon, 1992; McInish and Wood, 1992; 
Lee et al., 1993, Chan et al., 1995b; Chung et al., 1999).  Foster and Viswanathan 
(1994) relate elevated bid-ask spreads at the open of trading to strategic trading by 
informed traders.  Wider bid-ask spreads at the open have also been attributed to price 
uncertainty that is resolved during the course of the trading day (Madhavan, 1992).  
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) develop a model for specialists in which bid-ask 
spreads widen as inventory imbalances accumulate, predicting wider bid-ask spreads 
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at the open and close. Chan et al. (1995b) suggest that it may be the different ability 
of specialists and market makers to manage inventory imbalances that explains the 
difference in intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads between competitive dealer and 
specialist markets.  That is, they argue that in maintaining a fair and orderly market, 
specialists cannot execute orders on only one side of the bid-ask spread. 
 
Prior literature outlined earlier in Table 2-2 has examined trading behaviour on 
overnight systems such as Globex (Chow et al., 1996; Coppejans and Domowitz, 
1999), APT (Gwilym and Thomas, 1998) and SYCOM (Wang, 1999).  However, as 
discussed in Section 2.2.2, these papers compare electronic and floor trading rather 
than trading behaviour on overnight markets per se.  Each of these authors provides a 
caveat to their findings in a discussion of how elements associated with the overnight 
trading environment may affect their results.  These elements include the lower levels 
of trading activity, altered information flows and different market participants.  
Furthermore, both Coppejans and Domowitz (1999) and Wang (1999) suggest that 
their results provide some evidence that the nature of the overnight environment is an 
important determinant of market performance in terms of bid-ask spreads and adverse 
selection.  Huang and Masulis (1999) provide additional evidence of the importance 
of different market environments existing across the 24-hour trading day in their study 
of the impact of competition on bid-ask spreads in the over-the-counter spot foreign 
exchange market.  The authors find that the expected level of competition, and hence 
bid-ask spreads, is time varying over the 24-hour trading day.  Hence whether the 
intraday trading behaviour patterns discussed above extend to overnight markets is 
examined in the third essay of this dissertation.  
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2.5  Summary 
This dissertation provides empirical evidence on the impact of electronically traded 
futures markets.  It is clear from the literature review provided in this chapter that the 
scarcity of literature and/or the contradictory evidence existing in the extant literature 
provides further motivation for the empirical examination of these issues.  The first 
essay in this dissertation examines the impact of electronically traded futures markets 
on liquidity.  The three main branches of prior literature that evaluate the performance 
of electronic trading, profiled in Section 2.2, do not provide conclusive evidence on 
this issue.  This is because the prior literature examines markets with distinctly 
different institutional characteristics or equities markets, which are not directly 
comparable to futures markets.  The second essay in this dissertation explores the 
impact of limit order book transparency (a design feature facilitated by electronic 
trading) on market depth and hence addresses the lack of prior research on market 
transparency highlighted in Section 2.3.  Finally, the third essay in this dissertation 
examines market behaviour on overnight trading sessions, another design feature 
facilitated by electronic trading.  This essay examines whether the intraday trading 
behaviour patterns discussed in Section 2.4 extend to overnight markets. 
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Chapter 3: The Impact of Electronic Screen Trading on Liquidity 
 
3.1  Introduction 
The first essay in this dissertation provides new evidence on the impact of electronic 
trading in futures markets on liquidity.  During 1999, the LIFFE was one of the first 
major futures exchanges in the world to replace the traditional form of futures trading 
– open outcry on a trading floor – with electronic trading on LIFFE CONNECT.19  
The SFE, the largest futures exchange in the Asia-Pacific region, also replaced floor 
based open outcry trading with electronic screen trading on SYCOM IV (Sydney 
Computerised Market) during October and November 1999.20  More recently, the 
HKFE replaced trading by open outcry with electronic trading on HKATS on 5 June 
2000.21  These three changes provide unprecedented, unique and timely ‘natural 
experiments’ for examining the impact of electronic trading on futures market 
behaviour. 
 
Whether futures markets should be electronically traded is one of the most debated 
questions in the international financial marketplace.  Currently, a disparity exists in 
the way international futures exchanges organise trading, which reflects divergent 
views on best practice.  Apart from the exchanges that have announced shifts to 
electronic trading, several futures exchanges have been established as electronically 
traded markets, emulating beliefs that it is the most cost effective and efficient trading 
                                                 
19 See “London exchange begins electronic trading system”, Wall Street Journal, 1 December 1998. 
20 See “SFE’s SPI contract moves from pit to screen”, SFE Press Release, 30 September 1999. 
21 See “Electronic trading at the Hong Kong Futures Exchange”, HKFE Press Release, 5 June 2000. 
 44
mechanism (for example, the DTB in Germany and the Swiss Options and Financial 
Futures Exchange – SOFFEX).  Despite this, the largest and most important futures 
exchanges in the world – the CBOT and CME – maintain open outcry trading floors, 
providing support to the argument that trading through open outcry maximises 
liquidity.22  However, it is notable that both of these exchanges have experimented 
with electronic trading alongside normal trading (see Wall Street Journal, 18 
November 1998).  Furthermore, the CME has introduced full electronic trading in 
Deutsche Mark futures.23  A large number of criticisms of electronic trading have 
surfaced in the international financial press, including suggestions that traders 
generally prefer floor traded markets (see Wall Street Journal, 16 November 1998), 
trading by futures market makers or ‘locals’ is impaired (see Australian Financial 
Review, 5 December 1997) and complex trading strategies are difficult to execute (see 
Financial Times, 15 September 1998).  
 
Such criticisms of electronic trading have also surfaced in academic literature.  Miller 
(1990), Massimb and Phelps (1994) and Pirrong (1996) argue that electronic trading 
systems deprive local traders and market makers of some of their trading advantage 
and deter their participation and ability to provide liquidity.  Further, most electronic 
trading systems do not reveal the identity of traders which, Pirrong (1996) suggests, 
can result in a higher degree of information asymmetry.  However, as documented in 
Section 2.2 of this dissertation, little rigorous empirical analysis of these issues has 
                                                 
22 For example, Miller (1990) argues that electronic trading systems “are unlikely to attract the services 
of large numbers of competing market makers and hence to offer levels of immediacy and liquidity 
comparable to those of the currently most active trading pits” of the CBOT and CME (see Miller, 1990, 
pp. 139). 
23 See “D-Mark Contract’s move to screen riles Merc traders”, Wall Street Letter, 7 June 1999. 
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been carried out, with notable exceptions including Grünbichler et al. (1994), Shyy 
and Lee (1995) and Pirrong (1996).  Not only is this literature generally limited to an 
analysis of electronic trading on the DTB, owing to the absence of a suitable ‘natural’ 
experiment, but has also provided conflicting results.  For example, in analysing 
simultaneous trading of German Bund futures on the floor of the LIFFE and electronic 
system of the DTB, Pirrong (1996) finds that bid-ask spreads of the DTB are no wider 
than on the LIFFE.  In contrast, Shyy and Lee (1995) find bid-ask spreads to be 
narrower on the floor traded system.  This essay aims to bring new evidence to bear 
on the liquidity of electronically traded markets, by examining the change in trading 
systems used by three major futures exchanges. 
 
The remainder of the essay is organised as follows.  In Section 3.2, key differences 
between floor and electronic screen trading, which may impact on liquidity, are 
discussed.  The data are described in Section 3.3 and in Section 3.4, the procedure 
used in testing the impact of electronic screen trading on liquidity is outlined.  Section 
3.5 presents the analysis of the impact of electronic trading on liquidity and the final 
section concludes and provides suggestions for future research.  
 
3.2  Theory 
There are several key differences between floor and electronic screen trading, which 
may lead to a difference in the provision of liquidity.  There are many measures of 
liquidity (see Harris, 1990; Bessembinder, 2000).  Bid-ask spreads are commonly 
used as a measure of liquidity and are an important indicator of market quality (see 
Porter and Weaver, 1997; Battalio et al., 1997; Kumar et al., 1998) because they 
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represent a cost of trading (see Neal, 1992; de Jong et al., 1995).  As bid-ask spreads 
are directly observable in the data-set used in this study, the impact of electronic 
screen trading on bid-ask spreads is the focus of this essay. 
 
Miller (1990), Massimb and Phelps (1994) and Pirrong (1996) argue that electronic 
trading systems deprive local traders and other market makers of some of their trading 
advantages and deter their participation.  Pirrong (1996) contends that the substantial 
capital investment required to participate in an electronic trading system may limit the 
pool of potential locals.  In addition, the strict enforcement of trade execution rules, 
such as price and time priority, on electronic markets may also deter market 
participants such as local traders whose profitability depends on a timely response to 
price changes or complex trading strategies.  That is, floor traded markets are more 
conducive to this trading behaviour, as a new auction commences after every trade 
and time priority is not maintained.  Glosten (1994) and Huang and Masulis (1999) 
argue that there is an inverse relationship between bid-ask spreads and the level of 
competition.  Hence it is possible that by deterring market participants such as local 
traders and other market makers, electronic trading systems may lead to wider bid-ask 
spreads.24   
 
However, prior literature has also identified a number of reasons why electronic 
trading systems may enhance liquidity.  Theoretical models developed in prior 
                                                 
24 In contrast, Pirrong (1996) highlights that fragmentation of order flow sometimes occurs in floor 
trading, when trading volume rises and transactions may be simultaneously executed at disparate prices 
in different areas of the pit.  This fragmentation of order flow potentially reduces the amount of 
competition for any order, hence increasing bid-ask spreads in open outcry systems. 
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literature argue that bid-ask spreads cover quote setters for order processing, adverse 
selection and inventory holding costs (see Stoll, 1989; George et al., 1991).  
Grünbichler et al. (1994) highlight that electronic trading systems generally lower the 
fixed costs of running an exchange, which can translate into lower trading costs for 
market participants.  Pirrong (1996) discusses how miscommunication errors in an 
open outcry system (for example, when two traders enter different details about a 
particular trade) and the costs associated with these are eliminated on electronic 
trading systems.  Clearing firms can monitor electronic trading more efficiently, on a 
real time basis, than floor trading thereby reducing the default risk of traders and 
further reducing the costs of supplying liquidity. Grünbichler et al. (1994) also argue 
that electronic screen trading reduces the time required to physically process an order, 
route it to the market and execute the trade.  This reduction in time needed to process 
orders may reduce execution risk.  Hence by reducing the cost of trading, electronic 
trading may reduce order processing costs and hence bid-ask spreads. 
 
It is also possible that electronic trading may lead to lower bid-ask spreads, relative to 
floor trading, by reducing adverse selection costs.  Grünbichler et al. (1994) and 
Pirrong (1996) argue that traders using electronic systems have a greater 
informational advantage relative to market participants in floor traded markets.  This 
information advantage may include more timely and accurate price and volume 
information, as well as information concerning prices in other markets, market 
analytics and breaking news and is generally available to all users of electronic 
terminals.  As this information can reduce adverse selection costs, electronic trading 
may be associated with narrower bid-ask spreads.  
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Differences in the market transparency of floor and electronic trading systems are also 
likely to affect adverse selection costs.  Electronic markets are able to provide more 
information about prices and depth away from the best bid and ask relative to open 
outcry trading.  Shyy and Lee (1995) suggest that this information may be valuable in 
reducing adverse selection costs and hence bid-ask spreads.  However, electronic 
trading is generally anonymous whereas traders participating in open outcry markets 
know the identity of the local/broker with whom they trade.  Benveniste et al. (1992), 
Pagano and Röell (1992) and Pirrong (1996) argue that floor traders observation of 
each others’ order flow and activity can be used to infer valuable information about 
such things as motives for trade, demand for immediacy and inventory positions.  
Hence it is also possible that the information available in floor traded markets may be 
important in reducing adverse selection costs.25 
 
There are a number of conflicting arguments concerning the impact of electronic 
trading on liquidity, relating to competition, order processing and adverse selection 
costs.  Hence it is an empirical issue as to whether electronic trading decreases bid-ask 
spreads, leading to the following hypothesis stated in null form:  
H1: The introduction of electronic trading has no effect on bid-ask spreads.  
 
It is possible that the liquidity of electronic trading systems may deteriorate relative to 
floor trading during periods of high information arrival.  Pirrong (1996) argues that 
                                                 
25 Pirrong (1996) also expresses the concern, however, that the transparency of floor trading makes 
possible tacit collusion between market participants, to the disadvantage of consumers who need to buy 
or sell large quantities on short notice. 
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quotes are ‘alive’ much longer in an electronic trading environment in comparison to 
floor trading, where a limit order is only alive as long as the trader’s ‘breath is warm’.  
When a quote is posted, it is similar to a short option position with a time to 
expiration equal to the time required to revise the quote.  Exposing quotes for a longer 
period of time both increases the value of the short option position and the probability 
of it being ‘picked off’ by a more informed trader.  This is likely to be exacerbated 
during periods associated with the arrival of new information.  Hence risk averse 
traders may attempt to decrease exposure to greater price risk in an electronic trading 
environment by setting a wider bid-ask spread or withdrawing limit orders from the 
limit order book, principally during periods of information arrival.   
 
The reduction of orders from the limit order book in turn reduces the informativeness 
of the limit order book, suggesting that limit order book information from electronic 
systems is only valuable to traders in periods associated with low information.  In 
addition, it is likely that the ability of floor traders to observe other market 
participants may become more important in reducing adverse selection costs during 
periods of information arrival.  Together, these arguments imply that bid-ask spreads 
in electronic trading systems may widen relative to floor trading during periods of 
information arrival.  This gives rise to the second hypothesis examined in this essay: 
H2: Bid-ask spreads of electronically traded systems are more sensitive to 
information arrival than those from floor trading. 
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3.3  Data 
This study analyses the trading behaviour of three stock index futures contracts, the 
Hang Seng Index (HSI), Share Price Index (SPI) and Financial Times Stock Exchange 
100 Index (FTSE), traded on the HKFE, SFE and LIFFE, respectively.26  HSI, SPI 
and FTSE futures transferred from continuous open outcry auction to electronic 
trading on 5 June 2000, 4 October 1999 and 10 May 1999, respectively.  This study 
focuses on stock index futures because trading volume and price data are readily 
available for the underlying markets, which provides a useful control.  
 
Intraday trade and quote data for the nearest-to-maturity HSI, SPI and FTSE futures 
were captured from a Bloomberg terminal for sample periods surrounding each 
exchange’s transfer to electronic screen trading.  Contract maturities for HSI futures 
include both quarterly and serial months, however the nearest-to-maturity contract 
was found to be the most actively traded throughout the sample period.27  To avoid 
any ‘anticipatory’ effects of traders leaving the market or unusual activity occurring 
preceding the changeover to electronic trading, 5 trading days prior to the changeover 
were eliminated from the sample period.  A learning or ‘gestation’ period of 10 
trading days following (and inclusive of) the changeover to electronic trading was 
also excluded.  Excluding these days, sub-samples of 50 trading days prior to the 
introduction of electronic trading and 50 trading days following the introduction of 
                                                 
26 See Appendix 3.7 to this essay for a detailed description of each futures contract included in the 
analysis. 
27 Ekman (1992) calls this the ‘dominant’ contract. 
 51
electronic trading were examined for each contract.   
 
For each contract, the sub-samples are constructed so that the average time-to-
maturity for the sub-sample prior to the introduction of electronic trading is similar to 
the average time-to-maturity for the sub-sample following the introduction of 
electronic trading.  The early expiry of the December 1999 SPI futures contract on 23 
December 1999 resulted in an additional 4 trading days being excluded from the two 
sub-samples constructed for the SFE in order to equilibrate their average time-to-
maturity.  This sampling criterion is important as prior literature documents that 
futures price volatility and trading activity are systematically related to the futures 
contract life cycle (see Milonas, 1986; Bessembinder and Seguin, 1992).  For HSI 
futures, data were collected from 13 March 2000 through 26 May 2000 for the period 
prior to the introduction of electronic trading and 20 June 2000 through 28 August 
2000 for the period following the introduction of electronic trading.  Data for SPI 
futures were collected for the period prior to electronic trading from 15 July 1999 
through 24 September 1999 and for the electronic trading period from 18 October 
1999 through 22 December 1999.  For FTSE futures, the floor trading sub-sample 
includes data from 17 February through 29 April 1999 and the electronic trading sub-
sample from 24 May 1999 through 2 August 1999. 
 
All three exchanges examined in this essay route intraday data to users through 
information vendors such as Bloomberg.  This data is relied upon by institutions to 
make trading decisions.  Bloomberg data include the best bid and ask quotes as well 
as trade prices and volumes time-stamped to the nearest second.  As trading rules for 
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each exchange required all bids and offers to be announced to the floor prior to trade 
execution, trades generally do not occur at prices inside the best bid and ask quotes.  
 
In addition to intraday trade and quote data, daily high and low futures and spot index 
prices were captured from Bloomberg.  Daily futures volume traded in the respective 
contracts as well as the value traded in the component stocks of the underlying indices 
were also collected from Bloomberg.  
 
3.4  Method 
As a starting point in testing the first hypothesis, bid-ask spreads are estimated and 
compared across the period prior to the introduction of electronic trading (called the 
floor trading period) and the period following the introduction of electronic trading 
floor (called the electronic trading period).  Prior research suggests that in addition to 
market structure, price volatility and trading volume are important determinants of 
bid-ask spreads.28  Hence these variables are also examined across the floor and 
electronic trading periods.  Each variable is calculated over daily intervals.29  
Following McInish and Wood (1992) time-weighted quoted bid-ask spreads 
(SPREADS) are calculated in index points for each day t as follows: 
∑
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28 See McInish and Wood (1992) and Frino et al. (1998b). 
29 See Appendix 3.8 to this essay for results pertaining to analysis conducted on an intraday basis. 
(3.1) 
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Where ti  is the amount of time bid-ask spread i was alive during the interval t.  Time-
weighted percentage bid-ask spreads are also calculated where each quoted bid-ask 
spread, BASi in Equation 3.2, is divided by the midpoint of the bid-ask quote. 
 
Price volatility is calculated using the time-weighted standard deviation of the 
midpoint of the bid-ask quote, Pi, as follows (see McInish and Wood, 1992):  
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Where ti  is the amount of time bid-ask quote i was alive during interval t.  This metric 
avoids the problem demonstrated by Venkatesh (1992) of bid-ask bounce imparting 
an upward bias in volatility estimates based on trade prices.  That is, the variability of 
the midpoint of the bid-ask quote, Pi, is not affected by trades moving between the 
buy and sell side of the bid-ask spread.  This essay examines the number of contracts 
traded (VOLUME) as a proxy for trading volume. 
 
Descriptive statistics are derived for both the floor and electronic trading periods.  
Parametric t-tests are used to compare the means of the floor and electronic trading 
periods and test whether there is any significant difference between these.  The mean 
of a population measures the location of the distribution.  When sampled populations 
do not have approximately normal relative frequency distributions (for example when 
they are highly skewed) inferences derived from the t-test are questionable.  Hence 
the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum test is also applied.  The Wilcoxon rank sum 
tests for a shift in the population distributions.   
(3.2) 
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The regression model presented below is then tested to control for the possibility that 
changes in price volatility and trading volume may have influenced bid-ask spreads 
during the sample period.  The linear model is:30  
tAtttAt DVOLATILITYaVOLUMEaVOLATILITYaDaaSPREADS ε+++++= *43210
 
Where DA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if observation t is drawn from the period 
during which the electronic trading system was operating or 0 otherwise.  The 
coefficient on DA captures the incremental effect of electronic trading on bid-ask 
spreads after controlling for changes in price volatility and trading volume. SPREADSt 
and VOLATILITYt are the time-weighted bid-ask spread and price volatility measures, 
respectively.  The square root of trading volume, VOLUMEt, is calculated to reduce 
the effect of outliers, consistent with McInish and Wood (1992).  
 
Since it is impossible to measure information intensity directly, in order to test 
Hypothesis 2 this essay follows Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) who argue that new 
private information is reflected in part in the pattern of price volatility.  Hence an 
interactive variable representing the product of price volatility and DA is included in 
Equation 3.3.  This variable captures potential systematic changes in the relationship 
between bid-ask spreads and price volatility around the change in trading system.  The 
analysis is undertaken using time-weighted bid-ask spreads measured in both index 
points and as a percentage of the bid-ask quote midpoint.  Newey-West (1987) 
                                                 
30 Prior literature such as Bessembinder and Seguin (1992) finds evidence to support the endogeneity of 
volume and volatility.  Following Wang et al. (1994), however, Hausman (1978) tests for endogeneity 
did not indicate that simultaneous equation bias is present in the OLS estimates. 
(3.3) 
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adjusted t-statistics are estimated to adjust for the possible effects of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
3.5  Results 
Results from tests of whether electronic trading has an effect on bid-ask spreads 
(Hypothesis 1) are provided in Table 3-1.  Table 3-1 reports summary statistics for 
bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading volume over daily intervals for the floor 
and electronic trading periods (for each contract).  Panel A of Table 3-1 reports that 
bid-ask spreads are significantly lower during electronic trading on the HKFE, with 
mean bid-ask spreads falling almost 1 index point or approximately 16%.  Panel B of 
Table 3-1 documents that bid-ask spreads are also significantly lower over the period 
during which the SPI was traded on SYCOM IV.  Mean bid-ask spreads are 
approximately 0.1 index point lower during electronic trading of the SPI.  In contrast, 
Panel C of Table 3-1 documents that bid-ask spreads are significantly wider over the 
period during which LIFFE was operating with electronic trading. 
 
Table 3-1 also documents the change in price volatility and trading volume across the 
floor and electronic screen trading periods.  Price volatility is significantly lower 
during the period following the introduction of electronic trading, across all 
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Table 3-1: Descriptive statistics for floor and electronic screen trading 
 Bid-Ask Spreads (Index Points) Bid-Ask Spreads (Percentage) Time-Weighted Volatility Trading Volume 
 Floor Screen t/z  Floor Screen t/z  Floor Screen t/z  Floor Screen t/z  
Panel A: HSI                 
Mean 6.046 5.087 -9.83 * 0.038 0.030 -12.2 * 17.279 12.859 -5.45 * 13592.440 13661.140 0.09  
Median 6.068 5.191 -7.62 * 0.038 0.030 -7.99 * 17.092 12.851 -4.66 * 14026.5 13169.5 -0.31  
Std. Dev. 0.352 0.594   0.003 0.004   4.667 3.329  3923.139 3407.014   
n 50 50   50 50   50 50   50 50   
                
Panel B: SPI              
Mean 1.370 1.247 -11.62 * 0.046 0.042 -8.14 * 1.572 1.250 -5.30 * 10490.870 10262.804 -0.40  
Median 1.373 1.241 -7.33 * 0.046 0.042 -6.33 * 1.580 1.225 -4.89 * 10131 9997 -0.34  
Std. Dev. 0.045 0.056   0.002 0.003   0.343 0.223   2846.006 2611.180   
n 46 46   46 46   46 46   46 46   
          
Panel C: FTSE              
Mean 1.858 2.008 3.85 * 0.030 0.031 2.69 * 4.161 3.423 -5.83 * 29979.540 28593.180 -0.68  
Median 1.882 1.942 2.97 * 0.030 0.030 2.01 ** 4.112 3.326 -5.29 * 28756 27892 -0.93  
Std. Dev. 0.152 0.230   0.003 0.004   0.631 0.635   10319.341 9997.746   
n 50 50   50 50   50 50   50 50   
* Significant at the 0.01 level            
** Significant at the 0.05 level           
*** Significant at the 0.10 level           
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contracts.31  Given the well documented positive relationship between bid-ask spreads 
and price volatility (see McInish and Wood, 1992) then the lower bid-ask spreads 
reported for the HKFE and SFE may in part be driven by the fall in price volatility.  It 
is also possible to reconcile the evidence of lower price volatility and wider bid-ask 
spreads during electronic trading on the LIFFE.  That is, if bid-ask spreads are more 
sensitive to price volatility under electronic trading (Hypothesis 2), it is possible that 
this greater sensitivity may be driving the wider bid-ask spreads on LIFFE 
CONNECT in the absence of higher price volatility.  The regression analysis reported 
below presents the effect of the introduction of electronic trading on bid-ask spreads, 
after controlling for the change in price volatility and the change in the sensitivity of 
bid-ask spreads to price volatility.  Although Table 3-1 provides some evidence that 
mean daily trading volume is slightly lower for all contracts during the period of 
electronic trading, this is not significant. 
 
Table 3-2 reports the results of the regression analysis of bid-ask spreads against the 
explanatory variables, price volatility and trading volume, dummy and interactive 
variables.  The F-statistic, which is a measure of the overall significance of the 
estimated regression (and also a test of significance of R2), indicates that the model is 
significant for all contracts.  Panel A of Table 3-2 displays the results pertaining to 
bid-ask spreads measured in index points and Panel B presents results concerning 
percentage bid-ask spreads.   
 
                                                 
31 This is consistent with Ferris et al. (1997) who found no evidence (relating to the Vancouver Stock 
Exchange) to support the contention that automation of securities trading destabilises the market by 
increasing its volatility. 
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Table 3-2: Determinants of bid-ask spreads  
 HSI SPI FTSE 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Panel A: Bid-Ask Spreads (Index Points)      
Constant 5.409 10.95 * 1.415 28.57 * 1.750 8.16 * 
Automated -1.442 -4.12 * -0.202 -3.65 * -0.128 -0.56
Volatility 0.050 5.74 * 0.054 2.07 ** 0.110 2.89 * 
Sqrt(Volume) -0.002 -0.47 -0.001 -4.61 * -0.002 -2.70 * 
Volatility*DA 0.055 2.72 * 0.077 2.04 ** 0.102 1.72 ***
    
Adj. R2  0.66  0.69  0.38
F-statistic  48.20 *  51.66 *  15.89 * 
n  100  92  100
      
Panel B: Bid-Ask Spreads (Percentage)        
Constant 0.036 11.22 * 0.046 17.62 * 0.026 8.40 * 
Automated -0.014 -5.60 * -0.007 -2.67 * -0.003 -0.93
Volatility 1.39× 10-4 1.40 0.003 2.08 ** 0.002 3.52 * 
Sqrt(Volume) -5.14× 10-6 -0.17 -4.19× 10-5 -2.16 ** -2.92× 10-5 -2.46 ** 
Volatility*DA 0.001 3.10 * 0.003 1.89 *** 0.002 1.94 ***
    
Adj. R2  0.67 0.54  0.36
F-statistic  50.72 * 27.47 *  14.80 * 
n  100 92  100
* Significant at the 0.01 level   
** Significant at the 0.05 level  
*** Significant at the 0.10 level  
 
Consistent with McInish and Wood (1992), Table 3-2 provides evidence of a positive 
relationship between bid-ask spreads and price volatility and a negative relationship 
between bid-ask spreads and trading volume for both measures of bid-ask spreads.  
The coefficient on price volatility is positive and significant across all contracts for 
bid-ask spreads measured in points and positive and significant for the SPI and FTSE 
for percentage bid-ask spreads.  The coefficient on trading volume is negative for all 
contracts and statistically significant for the SPI and FTSE.  Table 3-2 also indicates 
that, after controlling for these determinants of bid-ask spreads, the coefficient on the 
electronic trading dummy variable is negative for all contracts (including the LIFFE) 
and significant for the HSI and SPI.  This evidence against the stated Hypothesis 1 - 
that electronic trading has no impact on bid-ask spreads - implies that bid-ask spreads 
are lower during electronic trading, even after controlling for the known determinants.  
This implies that electronic trading can facilitate higher levels of liquidity than floor 
traded markets. 
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The coefficient on the interactive variable representing the change in the relationship 
between price volatility and bid-ask spreads during the period of electronic trading is 
positive and significant for all contracts, for both bid-ask spreads measured in points 
and percentage bid-ask spreads.  This result supports Hypothesis 2 and suggests that 
the relative performance of electronic trading deteriorates during periods of higher 
price volatility.  Hence it is possible that the sensitivity of bid-ask spreads to price 
volatility under electronic trading is driving the wider bid-ask spreads on the LIFFE 
reported in Table 3-1. 
 
3.5.1 Further Tests 
The previous section documented that price volatility decreased significantly 
following the introduction of electronic trading across all exchanges.  Trading volume 
was also found to decrease after the introduction of electronic trading, although this 
was insignificant for all contracts.  Previous work by Miller (1990), Massimb and 
Phelps (1994) and Pirrong (1996) argues that electronic trading systems deprive local 
traders and other market makers of some of their trading advantages and deter their 
participation.  This suggests that the introduction of electronic trading may decrease 
trading volume.  Miller (1990) also argues that local traders are crucial for continuous 
liquidity, especially when large order imbalances develop.  Hence it is possible that if 
electronic trading deters the participation of certain market participants, larger price 
changes may result when incoming trades are matched.  To assess whether changes in 
price volatility and trading volume are driven by fundamental market conditions or 
the change in trading system, daily price volatility and trading volume in futures are 
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compared to the daily price volatility and trading volume of the underlying stock 
indices.  Changes in price volatility and trading volume in the component stocks of 
the underlying indices are not directly influenced by the change in trading system for 
the futures market and hence can be used as a control. 
 
As price data for the stock indices consists of daily high, low and close prices, price 
volatility is measured using the Parkinson (1980) high-low volatility metric:  
( )
2ln4
lnln
2
n
LH
VOLATILITYd
−=  
Where H and L are the daily high and low prices, respectively.  Wiggins (1992) 
demonstrates that this estimator is more efficient than estimates of price volatility 
based on closing prices.   
 
Volume data captured from Bloomberg for the stock indices is a value traded turnover 
metric.  In order to make this comparable to futures volume, each daily turnover 
figure is divided by a multiple of the stock index closing price and the value per index 
point of its related futures contract.32  For example, for the SPI, stock index turnover 
is divided by a multiple of the closing index price and 25 (the value of each SPI 
futures index point in Australian dollars).  The value per index point is 50 Hong Kong 
dollars for HSI futures and 10 English pounds for FTSE futures.  Each variable, and 
the difference between the stock and futures variables, is calculated over daily 
intervals and t-tests, as well as nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum tests, are applied to 
                                                 
32 The effect of this process is to convert stock turnover into an effective or equivalent contract turnover 
measure. 
(3.4) 
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test whether there is any significant difference between the means of the floor and 
electronic trading periods.   
 
Table 3-3: Differences in stock index and futures volatility and volume across floor and 
electronic screen trading 
 ∆  High-Low Volatility (× 1000)  ∆  Trading Volume 
 Stock Index Futures (Stock-Futures)  Stock Index Futures (Stock-Futures) 
Panel A: HSI      
Mean  -0.124  -0.117 -0.007 37.038  68.700  -31.662
Median  -0.075  -0.080 0.003 29.003  -857  866.075
t-statistic -3.45 * -2.79 * -0.33 2.46 ** 0.09  -0.04  
z-statistic -3.44 * -2.42 ** 0.42 2.13 ** -0.31  0.35  
n 50  50 50 50  50  50
      
Panel B: SPI      
Mean  -0.005  -0.014 0.008 183.045  -228.065  411.110
Median  -0.008  -0.016 0.006 392.355  -134  426.025
t-statistic -0.92  -1.95 *** 1.19 1.27  -0.40  0.76
z-statistic -1.14  -2.42 ** 1.20 2.49 ** -0.34  0.96
n 46  46 46 46  46  46
      
Panel C: FTSE      
Mean  -0.005  0.012 -0.017 -686.804  -1386.360  699.556
Median  0.001  0.007 1.8× 10-4 -194.009  -864  68.27
t-statistic -0.33  0.71 -1.42 -2.03 ** -0.68  0.35
z-statistic 0.16  0.42 0.90 -1.93 *** -0.93  0.31
n 50  50 50 50  50  50
* Significant at the 0.01 level  
** Significant at the 0.05 level 
*** Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
Table 3-3 reports differences in price volatility and trading volume for both stock 
indices and futures contracts across the floor and electronic trading periods.  Futures 
price volatility is significantly lower during the electronic trading period for both the 
HSI and SPI.  As documented in Table 3-3, stock index price volatility is also lower 
during the electronic trading period for both the HSI and SPI and significant for the 
HSI.  In contrast, price volatility is higher during electronic trading for FTSE futures, 
although this result is insignificant.  While median price volatility is also higher 
during electronic trading for the spot FTSE index, mean price volatility is lower.  The 
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variable representing the difference in stock and futures price volatility does not 
change significantly across the floor and electronic trading sub-samples for any 
contract.  This suggests that the change in futures price volatility is similar to its 
underlying stock index and hence driven by fundamental market conditions rather 
than the introduction to electronic trading.  
 
Table 3-3 provides evidence that trading volume is lower during the electronic trading 
period for all three futures contracts (except mean trading volume for the HSI) 
although the difference is small and not significant.  Trading volume is significantly 
higher for the HSI and SPI stock indices and significantly lower for the FTSE stock 
index during the electronic trading period.  Similar to the results for price volatility, 
the difference in stock and futures volume does not change significantly across the 
floor and electronic trading sub-samples.  This implies that the lower trading volume 
during electronic trading of futures is driven by fundamental market conditions rather 
than the introduction of electronic trading. 
 
3.6  Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
During 1999 and 2000, the LIFFE, SFE and HKFE abandoned trading by open outcry 
and introduced electronic screen trading.  This allows for a direct comparison of the 
performance of these two types of trading systems.  While bid-ask spreads measured 
in index points and percentage bid-ask spreads are found to be significantly lower 
under the electronic trading regimes introduced by the HKFE and SFE, bid-ask 
spreads on the LIFFE appear to increase.  Further analysis provides evidence that 
electronic trading leads to lower bid-ask spreads for all exchanges after taking into 
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account the determinants of price volatility and trading volume.  This implies that 
electronic trading can facilitate higher levels of liquidity than floor traded markets.  
Furthermore, bid-ask spreads on all exchanges appear to widen in response to price 
volatility at a faster rate under electronic trading than on the floor.  This finding 
suggests that the liquidity of electronically traded systems deteriorates more rapidly 
than floor traded systems during periods of high price volatility.  
 
This essay documents that electronic trading can facilitate higher levels of liquidity 
than floor traded markets.  Additional research could examine the possible 
explanations for this impact on liquidity, such as differences in order processing or 
adverse selection costs on floor and electronic trading systems.  The impact of the 
transparency of floor and electronic trading systems on market quality and whether 
this is driving the deterioration in the liquidity of electronic trading systems during 
high volatility periods is also best left to future inquiry. 
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3.7  Appendix: Institutional Detail 
3.7.1 HKFE 
The HKFE is a leading derivatives market in the Asia-Pacific region.  Full electronic 
trading on HKATS was implemented on 5 June 2000 as part of the exchange’s 
strategy to be equipped for the challenges of the increasingly competitive financial 
services industry.33  Apart from HSI futures, all other HKFE products had transferred 
to electronic trading in September 1997.  In the month prior to full electronic trading 
on the HKFE, there were 110 exchange participants connected to HKATS, with 290 
screens being used.  Two simulated trading sessions on HKATS were held on 29 
April and 6 May 2000, involving approximately 105 exchange participants.  The 
target volume set by the HKFE of three times the historical peak in trading activity 
was achieved in both sessions.  Trading on HKATS is conducted in an order driven 
environment, with buy and sell orders matched automatically according to strict price-
then-time priority.  HKATS operates with continuous trading after a call market 
open.34  In addition to providing real-time price information and the aggregate size of 
buy and sell orders (market depth) for the best quotes, HKATS reveals the best five 
bid and offer prices in the market, with the corresponding number of contracts on 
offer at each price.   
 
HSI futures trade between 09:45 and 16:15, breaking for lunch between 12:30 and 
14:30.  Trading hours in HSI futures remained constant around the changeover to 
                                                 
33 The HKATS trading platform was introduced on 19 April 1999 and replaced the Automated Trading 
System (ATS).  HKATS was designed to provide increased capacity and functionality. 
34 See Madhavan (1992) for a detailed description of these trading procedures. 
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electronic screen trading, except for the introduction of two 30-minute call markets 
prior to the start of the morning and afternoon trading sessions.  The HSI futures 
contract is valued at 50 Hong Kong dollars per index point, with a minimum tick of 1 
point.  Contract months consist of the spot and next calendar month and the following 
two calendar quarterly months. 
 
3.7.2 SFE 
The SFE is the largest futures exchange in the Asia-Pacific region and daytime 
electronic trading on SYCOM IV began on 4 October 1999 with the SPI.  The 
transformation to full electronic trading was part of the SFE’s strategy to maintain its 
position as the Asia-Pacific’s leading financial futures exchange, with increased 
global access through trading hubs installed in key international financial centres.  
Prior to the change in trading system, the SFE supplied its members with both screens 
and terminals with access to SYCOM IV.35  When SYCOM IV became operational, 
there were between 350 and 450 screens being used in Sydney.  The SFE conducted 
extensive training in the lead-up to electronic trading, including 800 hours of 
simulated trading sessions in the month prior to full electronic trading.  Trading on 
SYCOM IV is conducted in an order driven environment, with buy and sell orders 
matched automatically according to strict price-then-time priority.  SYCOM IV 
operates with continuous trading after a call market open.  During the sample period 
examined in this essay, SYCOM IV revealed only firm prices and market depth at the 
                                                 
35 The SYCOM IV trading platform was introduced on 5 July 1999 and replaced SYCOM III.  
SYCOM IV provides greater flexibility for traders and capacity for future growth. 
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best quotes, although broker acronyms and order volumes for the first ten orders at the 
best quotes are also displayed.36   
 
Prior to 4 October 1999, SPI futures were traded on the floor of the exchange between 
09:50 and 16:15, breaking for lunch between 12:30 and 14:00.  SYCOM IV was open 
for overnight trading from 16:30 to 06:00 during Australian Eastern Standard Time 
(AEST) and 16:30 to 07:00 during Australian Eastern Daylight Time (AEDT).  
SYCOM IV daytime sessions replicated the floor trading sessions until November 15 
1999, when trading hours in the SPI were extended from 09:30 to 16:30 including 
lunch-time trading.37  The SPI futures contract has a quarterly maturity and is valued 
at 25 Australian dollars per index point, with a minimum tick of 1 point. 
 
3.7.3 LIFFE 
LIFFE is the world’s third-largest derivatives exchange and was the last large open 
outcry operation in Europe.  Electronic trading on LIFFE CONNECT began on 30 
November 1998 with equity options.  This electronic trading platform was a direct 
response by LIFFE to the loss of business to Eurex, specifically with respect to 
German Bund futures.  Prior to the change in trading system, LIFFE supplied its 
members with free software to connect to LIFFE CONNECT.  Compulsory simulated 
trading sessions were held each Tuesday and Thursday for three weeks prior to the 
launch of LIFFE CONNECT, with 20,000-25,000 trades occurring in each 3-hour 
                                                 
36 On 19 January 2001, the SFE increased transparency to reveal limit order book depth at the three best 
prices. 
37 Daytime trading hours have since changed to extend from 09:50 to 16:30, with overnight trading 
between 17:10 and 07:00 (08:00) during AEST (AEDT). 
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session on volumes of around 1.4 million contracts.  When the major interest rate 
futures contracts traded on LIFFE transferred to electronic trading on 12 April 1999, 
78 firms were trading on-screen, with approximately 350-400 screens in London. 
 
Trading on LIFFE CONNECT is conducted in an order driven environment, with buy 
and sell orders matched automatically according to strict price-then-time priority.  
LIFFE CONNECT operates with continuous trading after a call market open.  Firm 
prices together with market depth information are visible to all participants of LIFFE 
CONNECT on screen in real-time, although all orders are anonymous.  Traders may 
also request to observe a ‘snapshot’ of all prices and corresponding depth for a given 
contract month/strategy. 
 
18:00
LIFFE CONNECT trading
LIFFE floor trading LIFFE APT trading
16:30 16:46
8:35
 
Figure 3-1: Trading hours during floor and electronic screen trading – FTSE 
 
For the FTSE futures contract prior to 10 May 1999, the floor opened at 08:35, closed 
at 16:30 and switched to APT at 16:46 until 18:00 (see Figure 3-1).  The APT system, 
introduced in November 1989, attempted to replicate the conditions of floor trading 
using a pro-rata trade execution algorithm.38  LIFFE CONNECT operated from 08:35 
to 18:00 during the sample period for the FTSE.  FTSE futures have a quarterly 
                                                 
38 See Appendix B of this dissertation for a discussion of pro-rata trade execution algorithms in 
electronic screen traded markets. 
 68
maturity and are valued at 10 pounds per index point, with a minimum tick of 0.5 
points (5 pounds). 
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3.8  Appendix: Intraday Analysis 
As it is possible that changes in the variables examined in this essay are concentrated 
at certain times of the day, the intraday patterns in time-weighted bid-ask spreads and 
price volatility are examined and compared across the floor and electronic trading 
periods using 15-minute measurement intervals.39  This is done by regressing each 
variable on a series of time-of-day dummy variables similar to Chan et al. (1995a).  
For example, for bid-ask spreads the following model is estimated: 
∑ ∑
= =
++++=
6
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6
1
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t t
tiAiiiAt DDDDaaSPREADS εβα  
Where DA is a dummy variable that equals 1 if observation t is drawn when the 
electronic trading system was operating or 0 otherwise. Di are time-of-day dummy 
variables, where D1 (D7) represents the first (last) 15-minute interval of the trading 
day and each dummy variable D2-D6 represents 5 (4) sequential 15-minute intervals 
for LIFFE CONNECT (SYCOM IV).  For HKATS, D2-D4 (D5-D6) represent 4 (3) 
sequential 15-minute intervals for the morning (afternoon) trading session.  The 
omitted interval used is D4 for LIFFE CONNNECT and D3 for SYCOM IV and 
HKATS.40 
 
                                                 
39 Intraday patterns in trading volume are not reported due to the inaccuracy of this variable for the 
floor trading periods.  
40 For SYCOM IV and HKATS, D3 represents the 11:00-11:30 period which is not adjacent to the 
lunch-time trading halt for these markets. 
(3.5) 
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Figure 3-2: Intraday bid-ask spreads 
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Intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads are depicted for HSI, SPI and FTSE futures 
contracts in Figure 3-2.41  It can be seen in Panel A of Figure 3-2 that mean bid-ask 
spreads in HSI futures exhibit similar or lower levels of liquidity during electronic 
screen trading relative to floor trading, throughout the trading day.  The opening 
interval of the afternoon trading session of HSI futures is not associated with as great 
a widening in bid-ask spreads as the opening interval of the morning session for both 
floor and electronic trading.  This indicates that it is information asymmetry related to 
the overnight non-trading period that is driving the widening at the open as opposed to 
the call market opening procedure.  For FTSE futures, as depicted in Panel C of 
Figure 3-2, mean quoted bid-ask spreads in the first intervals of the trading day are 
significantly wider following the introduction of electronic trading relative to during 
floor trading.  It is also evident that the 30-minute period around the time of scheduled 
US macroeconomic releases (13:30 London time) is associated with wider quoted bid-
ask spreads for FTSE futures under electronic trading.42  Apart from these periods of 
uncertainty and/or information arrival, the electronically traded market structure 
introduced by LIFFE facilitates similar levels of liquidity as the prior floor traded 
market. 
 
Panel B of Figure 3-2 illustrates intraday mean bid-ask spreads in SPI futures across 
three sub-samples including the floor trading period (Floor), the initial electronic 
trading period (Screen1) and the subsequent electronic trading period (Screen2) which 
                                                 
41 Results are presented for time-weighted bid-ask spreads measured in index points.  Analysis 
conducted for percentage bid-ask spreads (not reported) yielded similar results. 
42 See Appendix A to this dissertation for evidence regarding the impact of macroeconomic releases on 
futures market behaviour. 
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introduced extended trading hours, including lunch-time trading.43  Bid-ask spreads 
are consistently lower under electronic screen trading across the trading day for the 
SPI.  As SPI futures are traded overnight, it is likely that price discovery occurs 
during this period which assists traders in overcoming information asymmetry at the 
open of the daytime session.  This is in contrast to HSI and FTSE futures, which do 
not trade on an overnight market and exhibit a widening in bid-ask spreads at the open 
of trading.44  It is also possible that the additional transparency of SYCOM IV, with 
broker acronyms visible for up to 10 orders placed at the best bid and ask prices, adds 
valuable information for traders during periods commonly associated with higher 
adverse selection.  The wide bid-ask spreads during lunch-time trading are not 
surprising given that the SFE’s previous trial of lunch-time trading on the floor during 
1994 was revoked after four months due to a lack of market interest and liquidity. 
 
Panels A and B of Table 3-4 present results concerning the significance of intraday 
patterns in bid-ask spreads and price volatility, respectively.  The F-statistic indicates 
that the estimated regression model is significant for all contracts.  Consistent with 
Figure 3-2, the negative and significant coefficient on DA for HSI and SPI futures in 
Panel A provides evidence that bid-ask spreads are significantly lower under 
electronic trading after taking into account time-of-day dummy variables.  This is not 
apparent for FTSE futures, where the coefficient on DA is positive and significant 
even after taking into account intraday patterns.  For all three contracts, the 
                                                 
43 See Appendix 3.7 to this essay for a detailed description of these periods. 
44 Coppejans and Domowitz (2000) also find evidence that higher variance at the open of trading may 
be due to the long period of non-trading which precedes it, as opposed to differences in market 
mechanisms. 
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coefficients on D1-D7 provide evidence that bid-ask spreads narrow as the trading 
session progresses, consistent with evidence concerning bid-ask spreads in 
competitive dealer markets (see Chan et al., 1995a; Chan et al., 1995b).  Furthermore, 
for all three contracts, the positive and significant coefficient on DAD1 suggests that 
the first interval of the electronic trading day is associated with wider bid-ask spreads 
relative to the first interval of floor trading.  This provides some evidence that the 
relative performance of electronic trading deteriorates during periods of greater 
trading intensity or information asymmetry.  
 
Panel B of Table 3-4 present results concerning the significance of intraday patterns in 
price volatility.  After accounting for time-of-day variables, the negative and 
significant coefficient on DA provides evidence that price volatility is significantly 
lower under electronic trading for all exchanges.  Price volatility exhibits a U-shaped 
pattern for the FTSE and SPI, consistent with prior literature (see McInish and Wood, 
1992; Foster and Viswanathan, 1993), although this is not apparent for the HSI.  
These patterns do not appear to change significantly under electronic trading for any 
exchange, except during the first interval of trading.  That is, the coefficient on DAD1 
is negative and significant for all exchanges, providing evidence that bid-ask spreads 
in the first interval of electronic trading are less sensitive to price volatility than on the 
floor.  This supports the argument of Comerton-Forde (1999) that a call market 
opening contributes to lower price volatility.  Furthermore, this result implies that that 
it is not higher price volatility at the open of electronic trading that is driving the 
widening in bid-ask spreads at this time. 
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Table 3-4: Intraday patterns: Bid-ask spreads and price volatility 
 HSI  SPI  FTSE 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic 
Panel A: Bid-Ask Spreads (Index Points) 
Constant 6.173 86.96 * 1.373 77.84 * 1.927 53.35 * 
DA -1.153 -9.10 * -0.126 -5.21 * 0.123 2.56 * 
D1 0.812 3.66 * -0.024 -1.17 -0.014 -0.16  
D2 -0.017 -0.24 0.000 0.00 -0.016 -0.30  
D3    -0.013 -0.29  
D4 -0.068 -0.90 0.020 1.02   
D5 -0.038 -0.40 0.010 0.49 -0.043 -0.89  
D6 -0.382 -3.11 * -0.023 -1.04 -0.241 -5.22 * 
D7 -0.623 -3.95 * -0.066 -2.72 * -0.286 -3.19 * 
DAD1 0.470 1.64 *** 0.079 2.58 * 0.408 3.25 * 
DAD2 0.731 5.71 * 0.011 0.42 0.067 0.84  
DAD3    -0.117 -1.99 ** 
DAD4 -0.086 -0.66 -0.017 -0.64   
DAD5 -0.057 -0.34 0.002 0.06 0.044 0.65  
DAD6 -0.104 -0.48 -0.001 -0.04 0.057 0.82  
DAD7 0.108 0.40 0.020 0.63  0.080 0.73  
        
Adj. R2  0.33  0.20  0.07
F-statistic  67.43 *  36.46 *  18.51 * 
n  1720  1828  3153
        
Panel B: Price Volatility     
Constant 16.117 17.36 * 1.448 17.69 * 2.900 23.29 * 
DA -2.946 -2.02 ** -0.352 -3.52 * -0.432 -2.46 ** 
D1 22.093 7.77 * 1.171 6.67 * 4.868 6.23 * 
D2 5.095 3.62 * 0.565 5.29 * 2.333 10.52 * 
D3    0.597 3.63 * 
D4 -2.425 -2.14 ** -0.217 -2.27 **   
D5 0.564 0.39 -0.014 -0.15 0.604 3.01 * 
D6 -1.111 -0.78 -0.052 -0.49 2.061 10.11 * 
D7 -3.834 -2.29 ** 0.052 0.40 2.224 6.71 * 
DAD1 -15.981 -4.71 * -0.617 -2.98 * -1.951 -2.18 ** 
DAD2 -1.219 -0.62 -0.148 -1.11  -0.555 -1.88 ***
DAD3    -0.150 -0.67
DAD4 -0.409 -0.25 0.226 1.94 ***  
DAD5 -1.090 -0.56 0.121 1.00 -0.032 -0.12
DAD6 -1.747 -0.87 0.098 0.75 -0.441 -1.54
DAD7 -1.653 -0.72  0.183 1.09  -0.012 -0.02  
       
Adj. R2  0.16  0.16  0.18
F-statistic  27.77 * 27.27 *  53.75 * 
n  1776 1840  3158
* Significant at the 0.01 level    
** Significant at the 0.05 level  
*** Significant at the 0.10 level  
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Chapter 4: An Empirical Analysis of the Impact of Electronic Limit 
Order Book Transparency on Market Depth 
 
4.1  Introduction 
The second essay in this dissertation looks more closely at the impact of electronic 
system design on market quality by examining the impact of electronic limit order 
book transparency on market depth.  This issue has become particularly important 
with the global trend towards the adoption of electronic screen trading.45  Unlike 
trading by open outcry, electronic trading is capable of delivering varying levels of 
limit order book transparency.  At a recent SEC sponsored roundtable held in 
Washington DC on 4 May 2000, market and regulatory participants agreed that limit 
order book transparency is inevitable and beneficial for securities markets, however 
how much information should be made publicly available and the best method for 
displaying this information was in dispute.46  The controversy surrounding the issue is 
also apparent in the diversity in practice across exchanges.  For example, some 
markets have adopted electronic trading systems that restrict the transparency of the 
limit order book to a number of price steps including the Sydney Futures Exchange, 
which only reveals information pertaining to the three best bid and ask prices, and the 
Toronto Stock Exchange, which publicly disseminates information for the five best 
                                                 
45 Examples of exchanges that have recently abandoned trading by open outcry in favour of electronic 
screen trading include the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange and the 
Sydney Futures Exchange in 1999 and the Hong Kong Futures Exchange in 2000. 
46 See “SEC asks: Book ‘em?  SIA-ICI committee formed to weight limit order issue”, Security 
Industry News, 8 May 2000. 
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bid and ask prices.47  The Paris Bourse and Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Globex) 
reveal quote and depth information for the five best bid and ask prices, however 
traders are also permitted to view a separate list of all individual orders outstanding.  
Other exchanges have adopted systems that display market interest at all price levels, 
including the London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange, Eurex 
and Chicago Board of Trade (a/c/e).  In addition, the Tokyo International Financial 
Futures Exchange extended accessibility of market depth information to customers, as 
well as members, from 2 April 2001.48 
 
While a large body of theoretical and empirical research has examined the impact of 
transaction transparency, as documented in Section 2.3 of this dissertation, research 
explicitly examining the impact of limit order or quote transparency is limited to a 
theoretical paper by Biais (1993) and experimental papers by Bloomfield and O’Hara 
(1999) and Flood et al. (1999).  Biais (1993) develops an inventory control model to 
examine the impact of quote transparency on bid-ask spreads.  The model assumes 
that quote setters are homogeneously informed and predicts that the expected bid-ask 
spread is equal in both transparent and non-transparent markets.49  Both Bloomfield 
and O’Hara (1999) and Flood et al. (1999) design laboratory experiments to test, 
among other things, the impact of dealer quote disclosure on bid-ask spreads.  The 
                                                 
47 A more subtle manifestation of the phenomenon is so-called hidden or undisclosed limit orders.  For 
example, the Australian Stock Exchange and Paris Bourse allow traders to place large limit orders with 
their associated volume withheld from public display (see Aitken et al., 1998; Biais et al., 1995). 
48 See “TIFFE to disclose market depth information with ITA Wave”, TIFFE Press Release, 25 October 
2000. 
49 Biais (1993) recognises that this finding is analogous to the ‘revenue equivalence theorem’ in the 
theory of auctions.  That is, in both a sealed bid or Dutch auction (where bids are not transparent) and 
an open or English Auction (where bids are transparent), the buyer with the highest private valuation 
bids a price just above the second-highest private valuation, with the two bids being equal on average. 
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findings of Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) are consistent with Biais (1993) in that 
they find that quote transparency has little impact on bid-ask spreads.  In contrast, 
Flood et al. (1999) find that bid-ask spreads are wider in the less transparent 
experimental setting, arguing that this reflects the ‘pricing-in’ of search costs by 
dealers.  The difference in the results is more apparent than real, as the market settings 
examined are quite different.  While both experimental studies examine competitive 
dealer market settings and include both informed and uninformed traders, in contrast 
to Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999), Flood et al. (1999) designs an experiment in which 
trade information is never revealed, quote data may be available and interdealer trade 
is the bulk of trading activity.  At the very least, this theoretical and experimental 
literature suggests that whether limit order transparency is expected to have an impact 
on market liquidity is an open issue.  This study extends the literature by bringing 
empirical evidence to bear on the quote transparency issue and tests whether limit 
order disclosure influences quote setting behaviour. 
 
Glosten (1999) identifies that the impact of quote transparency on market behaviour, 
examined by Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) and Flood et al. (1999), is unlikely to be 
able to be empirically tested as “the opportunity for a clear test with an exogenous 
change in institution is rare if not non-existent” (Glosten, 1999, pp. 2).  This study 
examines one such ‘rare’ institutional difference.  The SFE and NZFOE both operate 
electronic open limit order books that, during the sample period examined, were 
identical in every respect except one.  That is, the transparency of the limit order book 
on the SFE was restricted to orders at the best bid and ask prices, while limit orders on 
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the NZFOE were transparent up to the three best prices.50  This provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the impact of limit order transparency on market behaviour. 
 
The data-set available for this study was provided by the Surveillance Division of the 
SFE and contains a complete list of every order entered and trade executed on the SFE 
and NZFOE electronic trading systems.  The data enable reconstruction of the entire 
limit order book and hence analysis of the composition of the order book at any point 
in time.  In this respect, this study is related to previous work by Biais et al. (1995) 
which was the first paper to document the shape of an electronic limit order book.  
Using a unique data-set obtained from the Paris Bourse containing information on 
market depth away from the best quotes, they document that limit order book depth at 
the best quotes is lower than at other quotes.  In addition, Biais et al. (1995) find that 
depth away from the best quotes does not vary significantly.  Using a similarly 
powerful data-set for the SFE and NZFOE, this study extends this research by testing 
the impact of one possible determinant of the shape of the order book – limit order 
transparency.51 
 
The remainder of this essay is organised as follows.  In the next section, a description 
                                                 
50 The best bid and best ask prices refer to the highest bid and lowest ask price, respectively.  On 19 
January 2001, the SFE increased transparency to reveal limit order book depth at the three best prices, 
similar to the NZFOE. 
51 Biais et al. (1995) conjecture that “the shape of the limit order book reflects the correlation in the 
value of the security to various bidders on the same side of the market, the extent of competition among 
bidders on the same side of the market and the shading of bids compared to the underlying reservations 
values” (Biais et al., 1995, pp. 1667) as well as informational asymmetries related to the size of trades. 
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of the institutional detail of the SFE and NZFOE is presented, while Section 4.3 
contains a theoretical discussion.  Section 4.4 describes the data and provides  
descriptive statistics, while Section 4.5 outlines the results of tests comparing the 
market depth of the SFE to NZFOE.  Section 4.6 presents various robustness tests, 
while the final section concludes and provides suggestions for future research. 
 
4.2  Institutional Detail 
The SFE and NZFOE are the only futures exchanges in Australia and New Zealand, 
respectively.  The NZFOE is fully owned and operated by the SFE.  Contracts on both 
exchanges currently trade on an electronic trading system called SYCOM.  SYCOM 
is an open electronic limit order book.52  Access to SYCOM is obtained though a 
workstation with an Automated Order Entry Interface (AOEI) or a Member firm 
workstation.  Workstations are computer terminals that are linked to the SYCOM host 
via dedicated telephone lines.  Members with workstations with AOEI’s are able to 
connect their in-house software and hardware directly to SYCOM in order to create 
and rout orders electronically, whereas Members with Member firm workstations 
must manually enter orders.  There are currently 438 Member firm workstations and 
60 workstations with AOEI’s located in Australia, with almost all situated in Sydney.  
There are an additional 24 Member firm workstations operating in New Zealand, 
mainly located in Auckland and Wellington. 
 
                                                 
52 For a characterisation of an open electronic limit order book see Glosten (1994). 
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Only Full Members of the SFE and NZFOE have direct access to SYCOM in order to 
trade futures contracts in their respective markets.  SFE Members can also access and 
trade any of the contracts on the NZFOE.  Full Members are charged an exchange fee 
equal to 99 Australian cents per contract side on the SFE and 2.50 New Zealand 
dollars per contract side on the NZFOE.  Membership of the SFE also includes Local 
traders, who obtain access to SYCOM through Full Members.  Local traders are 
charged an exchange fee of 44 Australian cents per contract side.  However, aside 
from this discount on exchange fees, local traders do not have any other special 
privilege or obligation.  Investors place orders on SYCOM through brokers and 
brokerage fees are privately negotiated.  Brokers are also permitted to trade as 
principals. 
 
All transactions are executed on SYCOM during exchange trading hours and off-
market trading is not permitted.53  Continuous daytime trading for SFE 90-Day Bank 
Accepted Bill futures operates from 08:30 until 16:30, Monday to Friday.  Similarly, 
NZFOE 90-Day Bank Accepted Bill futures trade continuously from 08:00 until 
16:30 Monday to Friday, with a break in trading between 12:00 and 13:00.54 
 
Trading commences each morning with a call market operating for 10 minutes prior to 
continuous trading on both the SFE and NZFOE.  Unexecuted limit orders from the 
                                                 
53 One exception is an Exchange for Physical (EFP) transaction, which is the undertaking of a physical 
transaction in conjunction with an offsetting futures transaction, with the same counter-parties at a 
negotiated price. 
54 The overnight trading session for SFE 90-Day Bank Accepted Bill futures extends from 17:10 to 
07:00 (07:30 during Daylight Saving Time) and from 19:10 to 07:00 for NZFOE 90-Day Bank 
Accepted Bill futures.  While both exchanges operate overnight trading sessions, the overnight trading 
session on the NZFOE is illiquid.  New Zealand Eastern Standard time is 2 hours ahead of Australian 
Eastern Standard Time. 
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call market are carried over to continuous trading.  Traders are free to enter new limit 
orders during continuous trading and either amend or cancel existing limit orders.  
Limit orders are queued for execution using a price and time priority algorithm.55  A 
limit order whose volume is amended upwards loses time priority and goes to the end 
of the limit order queue at the new price.  In order to effect a transaction, traders ‘hit’ 
limit orders standing at the best price on the opposite side of the market by entering an 
order with this price.  On the SFE, to execute a transaction that extends beyond the 
best price, traders must repeatedly hit the new best price.  On the NZFOE, traders can 
instantaneously execute against all limit orders standing at the three best prices. 
 
During the sample period, SYCOM automatically disclosed the total volume and 
number of unexecuted limit orders standing at the best prices only, for each contract.  
Traders can also observe the broker identity and volume for the first ten limit orders 
standing at the best prices.  On the NZFOE, traders are also able to observe the limit 
order depth for the three best prices on each side of the market (bid and ask).56  When 
a trade is executed, a printer attached to all SYCOM terminals prints out the price, 
volume and broker identification relating to the trade.  This information can also be 
displayed on a message window and hence is visible to all market participants.   
 
This study examines trading in Australian and New Zealand 90-Day Bank Accepted 
                                                 
55 See Appendix B to this dissertation for a description of the price and time priority algorithm in 
electronic screen traded markets. 
56 This information is not automatically displayed on Member firm workstations.  Brokers must use the 
‘Sweep’ function in the Order Entry window to access this information.  Our discussion with New 
Zealand brokers suggests that the Sweep function is considered to be very useful and is frequently used 
to find out the volume of orders standing outside the best quotes. 
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Bill futures (herein BAB futures) on the SFE and NZFOE, respectively.57  Both 
contracts are deliverable, quoted at a price equivalent to 100 minus the annual 
percentage yield, have a minimum tick of 0.01 yield points and operate on a March, 
June, September and December expiration cycle.  SFE BAB futures are based on 
Australian Bank Accepted Bills with a face value of 1 million Australian dollars, 
while NZFOE BAB futures are based on New Zealand Bank Accepted Bills, with a 
face value of 500,000 New Zealand dollars.58  Initial margins on SFE BAB futures 
were 500 Australian dollars (0.05 percent of the face value of the underlying asset) 
and on NZFOE BAB futures were 500 New Zealand dollars (0.1 percent of the face 
value of the underlying asset) as at 30 June 2000.  Unlike US exchanges, there are no 
limit moves or trading halts that apply to either futures contract. 
 
4.3  Theory 
The work by Biais (1993), Bloomfield and O’Hara (1999) and Flood et al. (1999) 
focuses on the impact of transparency on one dimension of liquidity - bid-ask spreads.  
However, given that the primary difference in the market structure of the SFE and 
NZFOE during the sample period was the transparency of limit orders at the second 
and third best prices in the limit order book, any differences owing to transparency are 
more likely to manifest themselves in limit order book depth rather than bid-ask 
                                                 
57 There are 4 main futures contracts that trade on the SFE.  The average daily trading volume for these 
contracts in 2000 was as follows: 90-Day Bank Accepted Bill futures (30,436); All Ordinaries Share 
Price Index futures (14,540); 3-Year Bond futures (48,850); and 10-Year Bond futures (19,691).  The 
comparable futures contracts on the NZFOE are 90-Day Bank Accepted Bill futures (3,112); NZSE 10 
Capital Share Price Index futures (4); 3-Year Bond futures (15); and 10-Year Bond futures (32).   
58 The exchange rate over the sample period averaged 1 Australian dollar to 1.3 New Zealand dollars. 
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spreads.59  In the absence of any theoretical work in this context, this section develops 
some theoretical intuition to guide the empirical analysis that follows. 
 
Dealer inventory holding cost models (for example, Stoll, 1978) imply that dealers set 
bid-ask spreads so as to recoup inventory holding costs, which are related to the 
amount of time a dealer will hold inventory and the cost per unit of time.  
Analogously, limit order traders are likely to price their orders so as to recoup the 
costs associated with placing limit orders and waiting to trade.  This behaviour is 
likely to be influenced by limit order book transparency and hence effect order 
placement and depth. 
 
A trader seeking to place a limit order on the NZFOE is able to observe the three best 
prices and their associated limit order depth.  Accordingly, such traders can use this 
information to develop estimates of the approximate time they will wait in the limit 
order queue, the probability that their limit order will execute and whether placing a 
limit order at a given price will enable them to recoup the expected costs associated 
with waiting to trade.  For example, if the limit order queue at any of the three best 
prices is too long, it may be optimal for the trader to place a market order (and ‘pay’ 
the bid-ask spread) to execute a trade. 
 
In contrast, a trader seeking to place a limit order on the SFE is only able to observe 
                                                 
59 Limit order depth at the best prices are transparent on both trading systems, while limit order depth 
beyond the third best price is not transparent on both the SFE and NZFOE.  Hence, during the sample 
period, both systems have similar limit order transparency at all but the second and third best prices. 
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the depth at the best bid and ask.  This trader does not know the depth of the limit 
order book at the second and third best prices.  This imposes additional execution risk 
and trading costs on the trader, as there is less information available for estimating the 
time to execution from placing a limit order away from the best price.  The additional 
costs imposed on traders on the SFE relative to NZFOE can have at least two possible 
effects with implications for the shape of the limit order book.  First, traders may be 
less likely to place limit orders at the second and third best limit order price and be 
more likely to place orders at the best limit order price on the SFE relative to NZFOE.   
Second, limit order traders may place orders on the SFE further away from the three 
best prices relative to the NZFOE in order to recoup the additional costs faced.  This 
implies that the depth of the limit order book at the second and third prices relative to 
the best price is likely to be deeper on the NZFOE than SFE.  Similarly, the depth of 
the limit order book at the second and third best prices relative to depth beyond the 
third best price is also likely to be deeper on the NZFOE than SFE.60  Both of these 
conjectures are tested in this essay. 
 
4.4  Data  
The data available for this study were provided by the Surveillance Division of the 
SFE and were captured on-line in real time from SYCOM.  The data relate to the SFE 
and NZFOE nearest-to-maturity 90-Day BAB futures contracts and span the period 27 
                                                 
60 It is worth noting that the theory does not imply that the absolute depth (number of contracts on 
offer) of limit orders at the best price or beyond the third best price on the SFE will be greater than on 
the NZFOE, or that the absolute depth of limit orders at the second and third best prices will be deeper 
on the NZFOE than SFE.  The absolute depth will be influenced by other cross-sectional factors such 
as the absolute size of the markets (see Harris, 1994).   
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April to 11 August 2000, representing 76 trading days.61  The data-set contains a 
complete list of every order entered, amended, cancelled or executed on the SFE and 
NZFOE and hence enables reconstruction of the entire limit order book.  Each order 
record reports the entry time to the nearest second, price and number of contracts, 
while each transaction record reports the execution time to the nearest second, price 
and the quantity traded.  The appendix to this chapter contains a more complete 
description of the data. 
 
Table 4-1: Descriptive statistics 
 Total Depth Depth at Best  
Prices 
Volume Trades Volatility Spread 
Panel A:  SFE        
Mean 11122.843  1509.062  270.202  8.885  0.0016  1.068  
Std. Dev. 5751.383  1054.021  583.236  12.036  0.0002  0.216  
25th Quartile 4832  712  0  2  0  1  
Median 13108  1242  80  5  0  1  
75th Quartile 15940  2097  310  11  0.0032  1.028  
n 2369  2369  2369  2369  2369  2369  
        
Panel B: NZFOE        
Mean 1785.549  323.266  45.035  2.519  0.0012  1.568  
Std. Dev. 758.051  217.338  108.318  2.121  0.0002  0.846  
25th Quartile 1321  170  0  1  0  1  
Median 1730  255  0  2  0  1.159  
75th Quartile 2183  410  48  3  0.0021  2  
n 2226  2226  2226  2226  2226  2226  
          
Difference -9323.900  -1191.100  -225.170  -6.366  -0.0004  0.500  
t-statistic -76.17 * -52.42 * -18.46 * -21.16 * -5.93 * 27.08 * 
* Significant at the 0.001 level       
** Significant at the 0.01 level       
 
A number of variables representing limit order book depth, trading activity, price 
volatility and bid-ask spreads were sampled at 15-minute observation intervals.  Table 
4-1 presents descriptive statistics for each of these variables.  The mean number of 
                                                 
61 The nearest-to-maturity contracts are typically the most liquid and hence prior futures markets 
research tends to focus on these contracts (see Ekman, 1992).  As will become apparent, the measures 
examined in this appendix are also subject to problems in the presence of a thin limit order book, which 
is likely to occur in the deferred contracts.  For example, when there is only 1 order in the limit order 
book, the price level at which that order is placed becomes the best price and hence 100% of the order 
book is placed at the best price.   
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contracts available for execution on the SFE averages over 11,000 at any point in 
time, with 1,509 or approximately 13% of the entire limit order book placed at the 
best bid and ask prices.  In contrast, the number of contracts available for execution 
on the NZFOE averages almost 1,800, with 323 contracts or approximately 18% on 
offer at the best limit order prices.  These descriptive statistics suggest that the limit 
order book is larger for the SFE than the NZFOE.  The measures of trading volume 
and trade frequency presented in Table 4-1 also describe the relatively greater trading 
activity on the SFE.  The mean number of contracts traded on the NZFOE averages 45 
per 15-minute interval, or roughly 17% of the 270 contracts traded per 15-minute 
interval on the SFE.  Similarly, the mean number of trades per 15-minute interval is 
close to 9 on the SFE, while only 2.5 on the NZFOE.  Price volatility, measured for 
each interval as the time-weighted standard deviation of the midpoint of the bid-ask 
spread (as in McInish and Wood, 1992) also appears to be significantly higher on the 
SFE as compared to the NZFOE.  Finally, bid-ask spreads calculated as the time-
weighted difference between the best bid and ask quote (see McInish and Wood, 
1992) average approximately 1 point on the SFE, whereas they are significantly 
higher on the NZFOE at approximately 1.5 points. 
 
4.5  Transparency and Market Depth 
The limit order books on the SFE and NZFOE for the nearest-to-maturity SFE and 
NZFOE BAB futures are then compared over the entire sample period.  At 15-minute 
intervals commencing from the start of continuous trading, the volume of limit bid 
(ask) orders at the following prices are calculated: (i) the best price; (ii) the second 
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and third best prices; and (iii) the fourth and fifth best prices.62  These are then scaled 
by the total volume of orders at the five best prices for each side of the market and 
compared across markets.  Table 4-2 below presents the results. 
 
Table 4-2: SFE and NZFOE limit order books 
  % of Bid Volume  % of Ask Volume 
  Best 2nd&3rd 4th&5th Best 2nd&3rd 4th&5th n 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
SFE Mean 0.280 0.449 0.271 0.274 0.436  0.290 2250
 Std. Dev. 0.189 0.173 0.157 0.176 0.172  0.160  
      
NZFOE Mean 0.246 0.498 0.256 0.283 0.507  0.210 2036
 Std. Dev. 0.185 0.200 0.198 0.204 0.197  0.199
 
Panel B: Significance Tests on Means (NZFOE – SFE) 
Difference  -0.034 0.049 -0.016 0.009 0.071  -0.080
t-statistic  -5.93 * 8.60 * -2.82 ** 1.54 12.48 * -14.40 * 
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
The column marked Best in Table 4-2 reports descriptive statistics and significance 
tests for the proportion of limit order volume placed at the best price on each side of 
the market.  The columns marked 2nd & 3rd and 4th & 5th report similar statistics for 
the proportion of limit order volume at the second and third best prices and the fourth 
and fifth best prices, respectively.  Hence, for the SFE, the average proportion of limit 
bid order volume placed at the best price was 28 percent, the proportion placed at the 
second and third best prices was 44.9 percent, while 27.1 percent of limit bid orders 
were placed at the fourth and fifth best prices.  In comparison, for the NZFOE, the 
average proportion of limit bid order volume at the best price was 3.4 percent lower 
than on the SFE at 24.6 percent.  This difference is statistically significant at the 0.001 
level.  Similarly, the average proportion of limit bid order volume placed at the fourth 
                                                 
62 This practice follows Biais et al. (1995) who also examine the five best bid and ask prices and 
associated depth.  While it is possible to examine orders beyond the fifth best quote, limit orders further 
back in the order book are more likely to be stale. 
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and fifth best prices is also significantly lower at 25.6 percent, while the proportion of 
limit bid order volume placed at the second and third best prices was significantly 
higher at 49.8 percent.  This confirms that the NZFOE is relatively deeper at the 
second and third best bid prices, but relatively thinner at the best and fourth and fifth 
best prices.  Results for ask orders are similar, except there is no significant difference 
between the proportion of orders placed at the best ask on the SFE and NZFOE, 
suggesting some other factors may be influencing this result.  These results provide 
evidence that the proportion of limit order volume at the second and third best prices 
is significantly higher on the NZFOE than the SFE for both bid and ask orders, 
consistent with the predicted effects of different levels of transparency at these prices. 
 
4.6  Robustness Tests 
It was documented earlier that there are a number of differences between the 
characteristics of market behaviour on the SFE and NZFOE over the sample period.  
In particular, it was found that trading volume and price volatility on the SFE are 
higher than on the NZFOE and bid-ask spreads are lower.  In this section, the 
robustness of the results to a number of sample differences is tested and evidence is 
provided as to whether these differences in market behaviour are potentially driving 
the results reported in the previous section. 
 
The existing theory on market depth implies that it is, in part, determined by the level 
of adverse selection risk faced by quote setters.  Lee et al. (1993) argue that quote 
setters may reduce their risk during periods of high adverse selection by 
simultaneously increasing bid-ask spreads and reducing quoted depth.  They provide 
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evidence that there is indeed a significant association between market depth and 
various proxies for adverse selection risk including trading volume, volatility and bid-
ask spreads.  If this adverse selection hypothesis applied equally across all traders in 
the limit order book, while the total size of the limit order book may change in 
response to these variables, its relative shape may very well remain the same.  
However, a number of factors may cause a differential response across limit order 
traders.  For example, the level of risk aversion can cause limit order traders to 
respond differently to these variables and hence change the shape of the limit order 
book.  Therefore, any one of these variables is relevant to assessing the robustness of 
the results. 
 
 In order to test the robustness of the results, for each exchange, days are ranked on 
the basis of their contract volume and divided into two equally sized sub-samples.  
The limit order book depth measures described in the previous section are then 
calculated for the various sub-samples to assess the impact of trading volume on the 
shape of the limit order book.  This entire analysis is also repeated after partitioning 
days into two sub-samples based on price volatility, using the price volatility measure 
described in Section 3.  Finally, 15-minute observations are divided into sub-samples 
based on where the bid-ask spread is at the minimum tick (the minimum tick is a 
binding constraint) and where the bid-ask spread is greater than the minimum tick (the 
minimum tick is non-binding).  The analysis described above is again repeated on 
these sub-samples.  Table 4-3 presents the results of these robustness tests. 
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Table 4-3: SFE and NZFOE limit order books under different market conditions 
 % of Bid Volume % of Ask Volume 
 Best 2nd&3rd 4th&5th Best 2nd&3rd 4th&5th n 
Panel A: Trading Volume            
SFE      
Low Volume 0.281  0.448 0.271 0.279 0.424  0.297 1134
High Volume 0.269  0.449 0.282 0.268 0.449  0.283 1116
Difference -0.012  0.001 0.011 -0.011 0.025  -0.014  
t-statistic -2.82 ** 0.17 2.20  -1.53 3.45 * -2.02   
      
NZFOE 
Low Volume 0.243  0.507 0.251 0.296 0.500  0.204 992 
High Volume 0.250  0.490 0.261 0.270 0.514  0.216 1044
Difference 0.007  -0.017 0.010 -0.027 0.014  0.012
t-statistic 0.91  -1.96  1.14 -2.95 ** 1.65  1.40
 
Panel B: Price Volatility 
SFE      
Low Volatility 0.298  0.437 0.266 0.297 0.446  0.256 1151
High Volatility 0.262  0.461 0.277 0.249 0.426  0.326 1099
Difference -0.036  0.024 0.011 -0.049 -0.021  0.069  
t-statistic -4.51 * 3.32 * 1.72 -6.60 * -1.82  10.35 * 
      
NZFOE 
Low Volatility 0.233  0.511 0.256 0.259 0.508  0.234 963 
High Volatility 0.258  0.487 0.255 0.304 0.507  0.189 1073
Difference 0.025  -0.024 -0.001 0.046 -0.001  -0.045  
t-statistic 2.07  -2.20  -0.14 5.11 * -0.12  -5.07 * 
 
Panel C: Bid-Ask Spreads 
SFE 
Not Binding 0.266  0.446 0.288 0.278 0.409  0.313 188 
Binding 0.278  0.451 0.271 0.270 0.438  0.292 2031
Difference 0.013  0.005 -0.017 -0.008 0.029  -0.021
t-statistic 0.89  0.36 -1.45 -0.62  2.20  -1.72
      
NZFOE 
Not Binding 0.263  0.505 0.233 0.332 0.480  0.188 850 
Binding 0.234  0.493 0.273 0.247 0.526  0.227 1181
Difference -0.029  -0.012 0.040 -0.085 0.046  0.039
t-statistic -3.35 * -1.32 4.57 * -9.00 * 5.10 * 4.27 * 
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
It was earlier reported that contract trading volume in NZFOE BAB futures was 
significantly lower than SFE BAB futures over the sample period.  Panel A of Table 
4-3 documents differences in the shape of the limit order book on days of lower 
trading volume relative to days of higher trading volume.  For the SFE, the volume 
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traded on days of lower volume is more similar to the average volume traded on the 
NZFOE.  Panel A documents that on days of lower trading volume, the proportion of 
limit bid order volume placed at the best bid price is significantly higher (at the 0.01 
level) than on days of higher volume, however there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of limit bid order volume placed at the second and third best bid prices and 
the fourth and fifth best bid prices.   
 
Further, on days of lower trading volume, there is no significant difference in the 
proportion of limit ask order volume placed at the best ask price and the fourth and 
fifth best ask prices.  However, the proportion of limit ask order volume placed at the 
second and third best ask prices is significantly lower.  These results suggest that the 
depth of the limit order book on the SFE at the second and third best prices is thinner 
relative to depth at the best price and fourth and fifth best prices on days of lower 
trading volume.  Hence, on days when the trading activity on the SFE approaches that 
of the NZFOE, the shape of the limit order book looks less like that documented for 
the NZFOE.  The results in Panel A for NZFOE suggest that there is little difference 
in the shape of the limit order book between the two sub-samples formed on the basis 
of trading volume.  The implication of these findings is that differences in trading 
volume between the SFE and NZFOE are unlikely to explain the results documented 
in the previous section.63 
 
                                                 
63 In fact, a stronger interpretation of these results is that the difference in trading activity between the 
SFE and NZFOE actually bias against finding a relatively deeper limit order book on NZFOE at the 
second and third best quotes, which strengthens the conclusions that can be drawn from the results. 
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Analogous to trading activity, it was earlier reported that the price volatility of 
NZFOE BAB futures was also lower than SFE BAB futures over the sample period.  
Panel B of Table 4-3 documents the shape of the limit order book on days of lower 
and higher price volatility for both the SFE and NZFOE.  Panel B reports that on days 
of lower price volatility on the SFE, the proportion of limit bid order volume placed at 
the best bid price is significantly higher and the proportion of limit bid order volume 
placed at the second and third best bid prices is significantly lower.  There is little 
evidence of a change in the proportion of the limit order book placed at the fourth and 
fifth best bid prices.  This suggests that the depth of the SFE limit order book at the 
second and third best prices is thinner relative to depth at the best price and fourth and 
fifth best prices on days of lower price volatility.   
 
A similar conclusion can be drawn from an examination of the results for ask orders, 
excepting that depth at the second and third best prices appears to become marginally 
thicker relative to depth at the fourth and fifth best prices on days of lower price 
volatility.  Hence, on days when price volatility on the SFE is more comparable to the 
NZFOE, the shape of the limit order book looks less like that documented for the 
NZFOE.  The results in Panel B for the NZFOE are weak and somewhat mixed.  
There is little evidence of a significantly different shape in the limit order book for 
limit bid orders on days of higher price volatility.  However, the limit ask order depth 
at the second and third best prices appears to become thinner relative to the depth at 
the best price (as the depth at the best price is significantly higher), but thicker relative 
to the depth at the fourth and fifth best prices (as the depth at the fourth and fifth 
prices is significantly lower) on days of higher price volatility.  On balance, the 
implication of these findings is that differences in price volatility between the SFE 
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and NZFOE are also unlikely to explain the results documented in the previous 
section.   
 
Finally, Panel C reports results for partitions formed on the size of bid-ask spreads.  
The results imply that there is no significant difference in the shape of the limit order 
book on the SFE for intervals where bid-ask spreads are bound by the minimum tick 
relative to intervals where bid-ask spreads are not, although the sample size for 
intervals where the minimum tick is non-binding is quite small.  Some significant 
results emerge for the NZFOE.  The results suggest that when the minimum tick is 
binding (bid-ask spreads are narrow), the depth of the limit order book at the second 
and third best prices appears to be thicker relative to the depth of limit orders at the 
best price, but potentially thinner relative to the limit order depth at the fourth and 
fifth best prices for both the bid and ask schedules.  Overall, these findings cannot 
support a conclusion that the results documented in the previous section are related to 
differences associated with bid-ask spreads. 
 
As a final robustness test, Table 4-4 reports results from a regression of trading 
volume, price volatility and bid-ask spreads (as previously defined) and a dummy 
variable equalling 1 if the observation is drawn from the NZFOE data-set.  These 
independent variables are regressed on the proportion of limit order volume offered at 
the second and third best prices for the bid schedule, the ask schedule and the overall 
schedule, respectively.  This analysis provides evidence on whether, after controlling 
for the differences in market behaviour across the SFE and NZFOE, the proportion of 
limit order volume at the second and third best quotes is in fact deeper on the NZFOE.   
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Table 4-4: Regression analysis 
 % of Bid Volume at 2nd & 3rd % of Ask Volume at 2nd & 3rd % Volume at 2nd & 3rd 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.443 30.51 * 0.467 30.77 * 0.455 50.78 * 
NZFOE 0.047 3.42 * 0.085 6.16 * 0.066 7.25 * 
Volume 9.24*10-6 1.06 -1.53*10-6 -0.20 3.86*10-6 0.65
Volatility -1.82*10-6 -0.15 -5.49*10-6 -2.48 * -1.02*10-5 -7.74 * 
Spread 0.005 0.48 -0.029 -2.44 -0.012 -1.88
     
F-statistic  17.70 *  48.19 *  61.65 * 
n  4236  4233  4233
* Significant at the 0.001 level  
** Significant at the 0.01 level  
Note: All t-statistics are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the procedure outlined in 
Newey and West (1987). 
 
Confirming the evidence presented in Table 4-3, it does not appear that trading 
volume or the size of the bid-ask spread are significant explanatory factors of the 
shape of the limit order book.  In contrast, the negative and significant coefficient on 
price volatility in the regression analysis of the ask schedule suggests that higher price 
volatility may lead to a lower proportion of limit order volume being offered at the 
second and third best quotes.  It appears that this relationship is driving the negative 
and significant coefficient on price volatility in the overall regression analysis.  Even 
after controlling for price volatility, however, and the possibility that the higher price 
volatility on the SFE may be influencing the lower proportion of limit order volume 
offered at the second and third best quotes, the coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing the NZFOE is positive and significant in all three regressions.  This 
provides further evidence that it is in fact the greater transparency of the NZFOE that 
is driving the higher proportion of limit order volume offered at the second and third 
best prices rather than any differences in market conditions. 
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4.7  Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
This is the first study to empirically examine the impact of limit order book 
transparency on market depth.  The essay exploits a unique institutional difference 
offered by the trading systems adopted by the SFE and NZFOE.  The SFE’s electronic 
trading system disclosed limit order depth at the highest bid price and the lowest ask 
price only, while the NZFOE disclosed limit order depth at the three highest bid and 
three lowest ask prices.  This essay documents that the proportion of the limit order 
book placed at the second and third best prices on the NZFOE is thicker relative to the 
SFE.  Further, this result appears to be robust to differences in trading volume, price 
volatility and the size of bid-ask spreads across the two exchanges.  It is concluded 
that the lower transparency on the SFE foists additional execution risks and costs on 
limit order traders, which discourages traders from placing limit orders at the second 
and third best prices. 
 
There are a number of possible future research directions.  Research examining the 
shape of the electronic limit order books appears to be quite rare and limited to the 
handful of studies cited in this essay.  Given the growth in implementation of open 
electronic limit order books and the relevance of the shape of the order book to the 
cost of trading, then this is an important issue for future research.  The increasing 
availability of limit order book data from quote vendors such as Bloomberg and 
Reuters will enable future researchers to explore this issue.  Further, given the 
diversity in transparency across different markets, the findings of this study may be 
able to be re-examined in other market settings.   
 96
4.8  Appendix  
The SYCOM data-set is comprised of a complete list of order records, including 
existing orders, new orders, amended and cancelled orders.  The other records in the 
database are transaction records that describe the details of trades executed and trade 
cancellations.  A typical record is described below (where CT represents Client Type 
and CH represents Client/House). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most common record types are: 
(i) RetO represents new bid and ask orders which are carried over to new trading 
sessions. 
(ii) PrgO represents new bid and ask orders which are only standing for the current 
trading session. 
(iii) *RetO represents one side of a spread order.   
(iv) Deal represents a trade. 
(v) Canc represents a cancelled order. 
(vi) Cancelled Deal represents a cancelled trade.   
(vi) Amend represents an amended order. 
16:30:00|RetO|4|IRZ8|9517B|100|           /          /               - 
  |   |LIM|XXX/YYY/ZZZ ZZZ-1|1|H|4771 
Record Type 
Record No.
Deal No. Order Type 
CH
Time 
CT
CH Buying: Operator/Trader/Firm Firm No.
CT
Contract
Price (Ask/Bid)
Vol/Size
Selling: Operator/Trader/Firm Firm No.
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Chapter 5: Intranight Trading Behaviour in Electronic Screen 
Traded Markets 
 
5.1  Introduction 
As documented in Section 2.4 of this dissertation, a large volume of research has 
examined the intraday behaviour of securities markets.  The findings of this research 
provide insights into the economic role of securities trading (see Gerety and Mulherin, 
1994) and have formed the basis of subsequent inquiry into securities market 
behaviour centred around issues such as information assimilation (see Ederington and 
Lee, 1993, 1995) and the influence of different market designs (see Chan et al., 
1995a).  Despite its significance, such analysis has not yet been extended to overnight 
trading sessions, which are facilitated by electronic trading systems.  In examining the 
behaviour of one such market, this essay provides the first analysis of ‘intranight’ 
trading behaviour.64  It documents and analyses three important dimensions of trading 
behaviour, namely quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading activity. 
 
Both Nasdaq and the CHX introduced extended trading hour sessions on their 
electronic systems during 1999.65  The CBOE is also scheduled to launch an 
electronic trading system, CBOEdirect, in June 2001 to facilitate extended trading 
                                                 
64 Previous literature has examined trading behaviour on Globex (e.g. Chow et al., 1996; Coppejans 
and Domowitz, 1996) and APT (Gwilym and Thomas, 1998), however these papers compare electronic 
and floor trading rather than the behaviour of overnight trading. Huang and Masulis (1999) document 
patterns in over-the-counter foreign-exchange bid-ask spreads over the 24-hour trading day. 
65 See “Nasdaq to begin after hours operation of trade reporting and quotation systems on Monday 
October 25”, Nasdaq-Amex Press Release, 22 October 1999 and “Light CHX E-session volume in line 
with expectations”, CHX Press Release, 29 October 1999. 
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hour sessions.66  In addition, the NYSE has proposed the introduction of overnight 
trading sessions to complement daytime trading.67  The move towards overnight 
trading is in response to competition from electronic exchanges offering after-hours 
trading, as well as socio-economic pressure from the larger and more diverse group of 
stockowners existing today.68  The analysis reported in this essay is relevant to 
understanding the role, sources and economic significance of such overnight 
electronic trading. 
 
Several of the world’s most prominent futures exchanges currently operate overnight 
electronic trading systems, including the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Globex), 
Chicago Board of Trade (a/c/e), New York Mercantile Exchange (ACCESS), London 
International Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE CONNECT), MATIF 
(Globex) and Sydney Futures Exchange (SYCOM).  While the overnight trading 
sessions in Europe and North America are relatively short and thinly traded, trading in 
the major contracts on SYCOM is sufficiently liquid to allow a meaningful analysis of 
intranight trading behaviour.  For example, in 1998, SYCOM volume represented 
18.9% of total exchange volume.  In contrast, Globex averaged 4.3% of CME trading 
and Project A, 4.4% of CBOT trading volume.69  In light of these considerations, this 
study analyses intranight trading behaviour on SYCOM. 
 
                                                 
66 See “CBOE to launch CBOEdirect screen-based trading system June 1, 2001”, CBOE Press Release, 
1 March 2001. 
67 Refer “Big board sees only limited demand for night trading, but feels compelled”, The Wall Street 
Journal, 25 May 1999. 
68 Approximately 50% of America’s households now own stocks with many preferring to trade outside 
traditional trading hours.  Refer “Trading into the night”, Chicago Tribune, 25 May 1999. 
69 Source: SFE, CME and CBOT Annual Reports for 1998.  The CBOT has since replaced Project A 
with a/c/e. 
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The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows.  Section 5.2 documents relevant 
institutional detail.  Section 5.3 develops some theoretical predictions on intranight 
trading behaviour.  Section 5.4 describes the data and method used in this study, while 
Section 5.5 reports the results and Section 5.6 concludes.  
 
5.2  Institutional Detail 
SYCOM was launched on 30 November 1989 and was the first electronic overnight 
trading system to be installed in the world.70  The major contracts currently traded on 
SYCOM consist of the Australian 3-Year Treasury Bond (3-Year Bond), 10-Year 
Treasury Bond (10-Year Bond), 90-day Bank Accepted Bill and Share Price Index 
futures contracts.  Trading hours on SYCOM for the sample period covered by this 
study were 16:30 to 06:00 during Australian Eastern Standard Time (AEST) and 
16:30 to 07:00 during Australian Eastern Daylight Time (AEDT).  Sydney operates 
on daylight saving time (AEDT) from the last Sunday in October until the last Sunday 
in March, changing the time difference between Sydney and the US.  The US operates 
on daylight saving time from the first Sunday in April until the last Sunday in 
October.  Table 5-1 illustrates the relationship between SYCOM trading hours and the 
time in US financial centres. 
.   
Table 5-1: SYCOM trading hours and equivalent times in the US (during AEDT) 
 SYCOM open SYCOM close
Sydney 16:30 07:00
   
New York 00:30 15:00 
Chicago -23:30 14:00 
Note: Negative time indicates the city is one day 
behind Greenwich Mean Time. 
                                                 
70 At the time of this study, SYCOM III was in operation.  The SYCOM IV trading platform was 
introduced on 5 July 1999 and replaced SYCOM III.  SYCOM IV provides greater flexibility for 
traders and greater capacity for future growth. 
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SYCOM is an electronic limit order book.  Only SFE Floor Members have access to 
SYCOM terminals.  At the time of this study there were approximately 100 SYCOM 
terminals in operation, all of which were located in Sydney.  The overnight trading 
session commenced at 16:30 with a ten-minute call market and continuous trading 
began at 16:40.71  Limit orders placed on SYCOM that do not immediately execute 
are queued and executed on a price and time priority basis.  During the sample period, 
SYCOM revealed price and depth at the best bid and ask, as well as broker acronyms 
and order volumes for the first ten orders at the best quotes.  When a trade is executed, 
all traders are able to view, in real-time, the identity of the trade participants, trade 
volume and price on a printed trade sheet attached to the SYCOM terminal.  This 
information can also be displayed on a message window.  
 
The underlying market for Australian Government (interest rate) securities is 
primarily located in Sydney.  This market is traded over-the-counter and, by 
convention, trading hours follow those of the SFE floor.  The SPI futures contract 
traded on the SFE is based on the All Ordinaries Index, the constituent stocks of 
which are traded on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).72  The ASX traded from 
10:00 to 16:00 for most of the sample period examined in this chapter, whereas the 
SPI trades on SYCOM outside of these hours.73  
 
                                                 
71 Refer Madhavan (1992) for a theoretical analysis of call market trading procedures. 
72 The All Ordinaries Index is based on the share prices of the major listed companies weighted 
according to the market capitalisation of those companies. 
73 For further detail on the ASX see Aitken et al. (1998). 
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5.3  Theory 
At least three factors are likely to influence intranight trading behaviour on SYCOM: 
Contagion associated with other markets; overseas information releases; and strategic 
trading.  Each of these is discussed in this section.   
 
5.3.1 Contagion Effects 
The open of US markets may have an impact on intranight trading behaviour.  King 
and Wadhwani (1990) develop a contagion model, which implies that traders in one 
market draw information from observed price movements in other related markets.  
Chang et al. (1995) develop and test one of the implications of the model - that price 
volatility will be elevated when a related market is open and lower when it is closed.  
They provide evidence consistent with this prediction by examining the price 
behaviour of the CME’s S&P 500 stock index futures around the open and close of 
the NYSE.   
 
Other literature has found that price movements in Asia-Pacific financial markets are 
related to those in US markets.  For example, Copeland and Copeland (1998) 
conclude that “the Americas lead Europe and the Pacific by one day, presumably 
because the driving information is generated in the Americas” (p.76).74  Hence it is 
likely that Australian financial markets draw information from trading in US markets 
and the contagion model implies that price volatility in US and Australian markets are 
related.  Given that US markets open during the overnight trading session on 
                                                 
74 Also refer Eun and Shim (1989). 
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SYCOM, it is expected that the well documented elevation in volatility at the open of 
US markets (e.g. Wood et al., 1985; Ekman, 1992) will spill over to SYCOM at that 
time.  
 
5.3.2 Overseas Information Releases 
Overseas information releases may also have an impact on intranight trading 
behaviour in a number of ways.  Prior literature (Ederington and Lee, 1993, 1995) 
documents an increase in price volatility in US futures markets around US 
macroeconomic information releases.  Similar patterns have also been found in price 
volatility, bid-ask spreads and trading activity around Australian macroeconomic 
information releases for the SFE (see Appendix A of this dissertation).  Becker et al. 
(1995) find that price volatility and returns in FTSE 100 stock index futures traded on 
the LIFFE are significantly greater in the half-hour surrounding US announcements 
(compared to nonannouncement days), similar to price movements of S&P 500 stock 
index futures to the same announcements.  Becker et al. (1995) argue that their results 
support the hypothesis that foreign traders react to public information originating 
from the US.  In a similar way, it is likely that Australian financial markets draw 
information from US information releases and these releases will subsequently cause 
an increase in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading volume on 
overnight markets. 
 
Rebalancing of portfolios in response to information contained in the overseas 
information releases is expected to affect trading behaviour.  As Bamber (1986) 
argues, prices reflect an averaging of investors’ beliefs following information releases 
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whereas volume reflects investors’ activity.  Hence overseas releases with information 
content relevant to the domestic market are expected to have an impact on price 
volatility and trading volume.  It is highly likely that overseas macroeconomic 
information releases will contain information related to local markets.  This can 
increase information asymmetry amongst local market participants as well as between 
overseas and local participants, as overseas market participants are likely to better 
understand the implications of the information more rapidly than local participants.  
Given that information asymmetry is reflected in a widening of bid-ask spreads 
(Copeland and Galai, 1983) then overseas information releases are also expected to be 
associated with a widening in bid-ask spreads. 
 
5.3.3 Strategic Trading 
Prior research has documented an elevation in price volatility and trading volume at 
the open and close of daytime trading sessions (see Chapter 2).  The elevation in price 
volatility and trading volume has been attributed to strategic trading by informed 
traders (Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988; Foster and Viswanathan, 1994) and opening 
procedures (Amihud and Mendelson, 1987).   
 
Bid-ask spreads in competitive dealer markets (including futures markets) have been 
found to be elevated at the open and to narrow as the trading session progresses (refer 
McInish and Wood, 1992; Chan et al., 1995a, 1995b).  Foster and Viswanathan 
(1994) relate elevated bid-ask spreads at the open of trading to strategic trading by 
informed traders.  Wider bid-ask spreads at the open have also been attributed to price 
uncertainty that is resolved during the course of the trading day (refer Madhavan, 
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1992).  On the basis of this literature, it is expected that price volatility and trading 
volume during overnight trading are elevated at the open and close of trading, and 
bid-ask spreads narrow throughout the trading session.   
 
The theoretical discussion in this section implies that there are likely to be systematic 
patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading volume during 
overnight trading sessions.  First, the contagion theory implies that an increase in 
price volatility is expected around the time that US markets open.  Second bid-ask 
spreads, price volatility and trading volume are expected to increase around the 
announcement of US macroeconomic information.  Finally, existing strategic trading 
models imply that price volatility and trading volume are likely to be elevated at the 
open and close of overnight trading, and bid-ask spreads are expected to gradually 
narrow.  The following section describes the data and method used to document and 
analyse the intranight patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading 
volume on SYCOM. 
 
5.4  Data and Method 
The data used in this study are Inter-exchange Technical Committee (ITC) data 
provided by the SFE and extend from 1 August 1995 to 31 August 1997.  ITC data are 
captured on-line in real-time from SYCOM and are disseminated instantaneously to 
quote vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters.  ITC data contain records describing 
every transaction (price and volume) and quote revision (price only) time-stamped to 
the nearest second.  The three most actively traded contracts on SYCOM are analysed 
in this study, being 3-Year Bond, 10-Year Bond and SPI futures.  Treasury Bond, 10-
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Year Treasury Note, 5-Year Treasury Note, 2-Year Treasury Note and Treasury Bill 
‘tick data’ for US futures contracts are also obtained from a quote vendor, CISCO 
Futures, for the sample period.  Tick data provide a record of price changing 
transactions time-stamped to the nearest second, but do not include trade volume or 
bid and ask quotes.   
 
A historical database compiled by a leading Australian broker is used to identify days 
of scheduled US macroeconomic information releases that occurred during SYCOM 
trading hours.75  Over the period 1 August 1995 to 31 August 1997, the database 
contains 653 US macroeconomic releases occurring in 514 SYCOM trading 
sessions.76  A calendar produced by the US Federal Agencies was used to determine 
the time of day that each release was made.  Days that contain announcements whose 
release time could not be established (104 days) were excluded from analysis.   
  
This study examines periods in which the time relativity between Australia and the 
US remains constant.  For brevity, only results for the period when Sydney is 
operating on AEDT and the USA is operating on Eastern Standard Time (EST) are 
reported.77 
 
                                                 
75 The times and types of the releases are described in Table 5-7 in the Appendix to this chapter. 
76 There are no Australian macroeconomic releases during the SYCOM trading session. 
77 Analysis for other periods produced qualitatively similar results. 
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5.4.1 Variable Measurement 
A number of measures have been used to examine the behaviour of quoted bid-ask 
spreads, price volatility and trading activity in prior literature.  Following McInish and 
Wood (1992), this study calculates time-weighted quoted bid-ask spreads (SPREADSt) 
for each observation interval as follows:  
∑
∑
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Where ti  is the amount of time bid-ask spread i ( iBAS ) was alive during the 
interval.78  Similarly, price volatility (VOLATILITYt) is calculated as the time-
weighted standard deviation of prices (Pi) using bid-ask midpoints as follows: 
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Where ti  is the amount of time bid-ask midpoint i ( iP ) was alive during the interval 
and P  is the time-weighted bid-ask midpoint.  The use of quote midpoints avoids 
bid-ask bounce that imparts an upward bias in price volatility estimates based on trade 
prices (refer Venkatesh, 1992).  Trading volume (VOLUMEt) is measured as the 
number of contracts traded during the interval.79  The mean for each variable is 
calculated for 15-minute observation intervals during continuous SYCOM trading.80  
                                                 
78 The analysis was replicated using percentage bid-ask spreads yielding consistent results with those 
presented in the chapter. 
79 Two additional trading volume measures, the number of trades and mean trade size, are also 
calculated however are not reported in this study as they yield similar results. 
80 Analysis conducted on 5-minute intervals (not reported) yielded similar results. 
(5.1)
(5.2) 
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Following prior research (see Ekman, 1992), only the nearest-to-maturity contract is 
examined as it is the most liquid. 
 
5.4.2 Tests 
To test the predictions of contagion and strategic trading models, intranight patterns 
for non-release days are documented.  To establish the statistical significance of these 
intranight patterns, each of the key variables (quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility, 
and trading volume) are regressed on time-of-night dummy variables.81  For example, 
for the time-weighted quoted bid-ask spread, the following model is estimated using 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS): 
∑
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++=
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Where Di are dummy variables representing each 15-minute intranight interval, of 
which there are 57.  The dummy variable representing the 15-minute period 
commencing at 11:30 is excluded in estimating Equation 5.3.  All t-statistics are 
adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity using the procedure outlined in 
Newey and West (1987). 
 
In order to examine the impact of overseas macroeconomic releases on intranight 
patterns, six sub-samples of data are constructed: Days without releases; and days 
with releases at 00:30 (08:30 New York Time), 01:15 (09:15), 02:00 (10:00), 06:00 
                                                 
81 An Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was used to establish whether each series is stationary. As 
there is no evidence that any of the series are non-stationary, all tests are carried out on raw variables.  
(5.3) 
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(14:00) and 07:00 (15:00).  To properly measure the effect of releases at specific 
times of the night, days with more than one release are excluded from analysis.  
Means are calculated for each sub-sample, variable and interval across days.  The 
significance of the difference in mean quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and 
trading volume between US macroeconomic release and non-release days is assessed 
using a t-test.82  Results for the sample of releases at 08:30 New York time are 
reported in this study, as they are the greatest in number and Ederington and Lee 
(1993) find that they have the greatest impact on price volatility.   
 
US macroeconomic information announcements are likely to have an impact on 
Australian markets in two ways.  First, Australian markets may directly infer the 
relevance of US announcements from the information released.  Second, the 
contagion model implies that Australian markets may also indirectly infer the 
relevance of US announcements by observing the reaction of US markets to the 
information released. 
 
In order to assess whether price volatility (VOLATILITYt) on SYCOM is reacting to 
information contained in US macroeconomic releases or the US market reaction to 
these releases, the following model is estimated for intervals exhibiting abnormal 
behaviour on release days (as compared to non-release days):83  
tMtt DaVOLATILITYUSaaVOLATILITY ε+++= 210 _  
                                                 
82 Nonparametric tests were applied and yielded similar results to those reported in the chapter. 
83 As US Treasury Bonds open for trading at 00:20 AEDT, the first interval of analysis is 00:20-00:30, 
followed by 15-minute intervals. 
(5.4) 
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Where DM is a dummy variable equal to 1 if observation t occurred on a 
macroeconomic release day and US_VOLATILITYt is the price volatility of US 
Treasury Bond futures.84  The US price volatility variable is calculated using the high-
low method developed by Parkinson (1980) as follows:85 
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This analysis cannot be carried out for SPI futures as the NYSE and S&P 500 index 
futures open 1 hour following US macroeconomic announcements. 
 
McInish and Wood (1992) demonstrate that a significant portion of the intraday 
variation in bid-ask spreads can be explained by the behaviour of price volatility and 
trading volume.  They recognise that inventory holding cost and information 
asymmetry models imply that bid-ask spreads widen during periods of high price 
volatility, as a dealer requires compensation for the greater risk of holding a sub-
optimal portfolio and the increased risk of trading with informed traders.  
Consequently a positive relationship between price volatility and bid-ask spreads is 
expected.  Further, as higher trading volume allows competing market makers to 
avoid accumulating excessive inventory positions and taking on undesired risk, 
inventory holding cost models imply that trading volume is negatively related to bid-
ask spreads.  Huang and Masulis (1999) also identify that institutional factors, 
                                                 
84 An analysis of 45 trading days during the sample period provided evidence that the daily high-low 
volatility for US Treasury Bond futures has the highest correlation with the daily high-low volatility for 
10-Year Bond futures traded on SYCOM (0.66).  The correlation with other US fixed income futures is 
as follows: 10-Year Treasury Note (0.57); 5-Year Treasury Note (0.48); 2-Year Treasury Note (0.41); 
and Treasury Bill (0.33).   
85 This estimator of price volatility is used due to the absence of bid and ask quotes in tick data. 
(5.5) 
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specifically predictable shifts in customer order flow through time, can influence bid-
ask spreads across a 24-hour trading day.   
 
To determine whether patterns in price volatility and trading volume are driving 
patterns in intranight quoted bid-ask spreads, the following model is estimated:86  
t
i
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3210  
Where VOLATILITYt, VOLUMEt and Di are as described earlier, and DUS is a dummy 
variable which takes on a value of 1 if the observation occurred when the US markets 
were open in order to account for systematic differences in the behaviour of bid-ask 
spreads across these two periods. 87 
 
5.5  Results 
5.5.1 Overview of Intranight Trading Behaviour 
Figure 5-1 illustrates the intranight patterns in mean quoted bid-ask spreads, price 
volatility and trading volume for 10-Year Bond futures and SPI futures, across all 
days during AEDT (a total of 125 trading days).88  These patterns are similar across 
both contracts.  Figure 5-1 documents an elevation in trading volume and price 
volatility at the open and close of overnight trading, consistent with intraday patterns 
                                                 
86 More recent papers tend to standardise data (e.g. Chan et al., 1995a; Chan et al., 1995b) but the 
results are qualitatively similar for this analysis. 
87 Hausman (1978) tests for endogeneity indicated simultaneous equation bias present in the OLS 
estimates.  Hence this model is estimated using Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).  In the 
presence of simultaneity, GMM gives estimators that are consistent and efficient. 
88 As the findings are similar across all interest rate contracts, results are reported for 10-Year Bond 
futures only. 
(5.6) 
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Panel A: 10-Year Bond Futures 
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Figure 5-1: Intranight patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading 
volume 
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previously documented for daytime markets.  The pattern in quoted bid-ask spreads is 
strikingly different to that previously documented for daytime trading.  Bid-ask 
spreads do not narrow as the trading session progresses, but instead appear to 
gradually widen during the overnight session.  This behaviour is inconsistent with 
existing theories of bid-ask spreads.  It is only toward the close of the night-time 
trading session that bid-ask spreads begin to narrow.  Bid-ask spreads, price volatility 
and trading volume also appear to increase between 00:30 and 01:30, coinciding with 
the time of US releases and the open of US markets.  
 
5.5.2 Contagion Effects 
Figure 5-2 documents intranight patterns on days without scheduled US releases and 
Tables 5-2 and 5-3 report tests of the statistical significance of these patterns.89  
Interest rate futures contracts traded on the CBOT and CME open at 07:20 Chicago 
time (00:20 Sydney time) and the NYSE and S&P 500 stock index futures contract 
(traded on the CME) open for trading at 09:30 New York time (01:30 Sydney time).  
Figure 5-2 confirms that the times at which the US markets first open are associated 
with an increase in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading volume.  
Casual observation suggests that the open of the CBOT and CME have the greatest 
impact on 10-Year Bond futures whereas the open of the NYSE and S&P 500 futures 
have the most influence on the SPI. 
 
                                                 
89 For reasons of space, only a subset of these results is reported.  
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Panel B: SPI Futures 
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Figure 5-2: Intranight patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading 
volume on non-release days 
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Table 5-2: Intranight patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading 
volume on non-release days for 10-Year Bond futures 
 Bid-ask spreads(× 102)  Volatility(× 102) Volume 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.728 20.93 * 0.107 7.70 * 32.831 7.04 * 
16:40 -0.128 -3.38 * 0.095 4.73 * 63.220 5.23 * 
16:55 -0.117 -2.98 ** 0.062 3.02 ** 29.559 3.76 * 
17:10 -0.150 -3.91 * 0.050 2.21  27.119 3.12 ** 
17:25 -0.094 -2.27  0.042 1.87   17.254 1.97  
17:40 -0.094 -2.27  0.018 0.92   8.559 1.02   
      
00:00 0.087 1.45   0.034 1.43   8.085 0.91   
00:15 (Chicago) 0.157 2.42  0.109 4.00 * 27.339 2.40  
00:30  0.216 3.39 * 0.144 5.15 * 46.661 2.92 ** 
00:45 0.246 4.01 * 0.093 4.18 * 10.831 1.45   
01:00 0.244 3.52 * 0.115 3.79 * 2.593 0.29   
01:15 0.222 3.42 * 0.108 3.68 * 8.627 0.97   
01:30 (NYSE) 0.215 3.36 * 0.060 2.60 ** 11.051 1.23   
01:45 0.276 3.50 * 0.143 3.93 * 30.441 2.60 ** 
02:00 0.267 3.90 * 0.153 3.81 * 32.911 2.60 ** 
02:15 0.270 3.71 * 0.139 3.61 * 14.373 1.35   
       
05:30 0.737 6.67 * 0.113 3.26 ** 6.356 0.59   
05:45 0.723 7.47 * 0.097 3.05 ** 14.153 1.21   
06:00 0.711 7.20 * 0.143 3.96 * 22.339 1.94   
06:15 0.576 5.97 * 0.184 5.21 * 37.424 2.59 ** 
06:30 0.428 4.63 * 0.123 4.38 * 32.881 2.64 ** 
06:45 0.328 4.44 * 0.246 7.34 * 72.051 4.68 * 
          
Adjusted R2  0.26  0.06   0.04  
F-statistic  21.87 * 5.10 *  3.20 * 
n  3421  3420   3421  
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
  
 
Table 5-2 reports that the coefficient on the intranight dummy variable associated 
with the 15 minute interval beginning at 00:15 for price volatility is positive and 
significant for 10-Year Bond futures.  This interval coincides with the opening of 
fixed income futures traded on Chicago markets at 00:20.  It is only in the interval 
following this, however, that the coefficients on the intranight dummy variables are 
positive and significant for quoted bid-ask spreads and trading volume (as well as 
price volatility).  This is consistent with Fleming and Remolona (1997) who also find 
a significant reaction in price volatility preceding that in trading volume around 
scheduled macroeconomic announcements in the US Treasury market.  The 
coefficients on the intranight dummy variables for quoted bid-ask spreads remain 
positive and significant for the remainder of the night and the coefficients on 
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intranight dummy variables for price volatility remain positive and significant until 
03:30, 2 hours following the opening of the NYSE and S&P 500 stock index futures 
(not reported).  
 
Table 5-3: Intranight patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading 
volume on non-release days for SPI futures 
 Bid-ask spreads  Volatility Volume 
 Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 1.959 18.09 * 0.197 5.95 * 7.712 2.83 ** 
16:40 -0.391 -2.52  0.333 5.49 * 23.961 4.63 * 
16:55 -0.473 -3.17 ** 0.137 2.59 ** 12.136 2.71 ** 
17:10 -0.463 -3.14 ** 0.174 3.52 * 13.034 2.82 ** 
17:25 -0.423 -2.99 ** 0.048 0.96   5.678 1.58   
17:40 -0.452 -3.27 ** 0.060 1.21   6.068 1.59   
       
00:00 0.254 1.86   -0.029 -0.60   -2.339 -0.83  
00:15 (Chicago) 0.299 2.11  0.000 0.00   0.915 0.29  
00:30  0.370 2.34  0.142 2.25  1.034 0.33  
00:45 0.447 2.29  0.138 1.81   -0.898 -0.32  
01:00 0.910 3.88 * 0.077 1.29   -2.932 -1.02  
01:15 0.990 4.27 * 0.035 0.61   0.678 0.21  
01:30 (NYSE) 1.178 5.18 * 0.176 2.63 ** 1.847 0.55  
01:45 1.222 5.50 * 0.202 3.16 ** 5.051 1.20  
02:00 1.512 6.37 * 0.245 3.32 * 5.237 1.32  
02:15 1.637 6.99 * 0.070 1.40   0.407 0.13  
       
05:30 1.235 5.89 * 0.240 3.53 * 1.186 0.39   
05:45 1.369 5.92 * 0.160 2.72 ** 1.881 0.55   
06:00 1.464 6.68 * 0.281 3.93 * 2.949 0.91   
06:15 1.582 6.48 * 0.317 4.63 * 7.322 1.60   
06:30 1.205 5.11 * 0.340 4.92 * 6.644 1.85   
06:45 0.688 3.93 * 0.612 8.24 * 25.034 5.12 * 
          
Adjusted R2  0.33  0.08   0.07  
F-statistic  30.21 * 6.07 *  5.39 * 
n  3396  3391   3420  
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
Table 5-3 reports that, in contrast to the 10-Year Bond futures contract, it is solely the 
opening of the NYSE (and S&P 500 futures) which appears to have a significant 
impact on SPI futures.  The coefficient on the intranight dummy variables for quoted 
bid-ask spreads are positive and significant from 30 minutes prior to the NYSE open 
and for the remainder of the trading session.  The coefficients on intranight dummy 
variables for price volatility are positive and significant in the interval coinciding with 
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the NYSE open (01:30) and for 30 minutes following this.  Apart from the behaviour 
of quoted bid-ask spreads, the results for both 10-Year Bonds and SPI futures are 
consistent with contagion effects expected following the opening of US markets. 
 
5.5.3  Overseas Information Releases 
Figure 5-3 documents intranight patterns on days of scheduled US macroeconomic 
releases at 00:30 (08:30 New York time) while Table 5-4 reports whether these 
patterns are significantly different to those occurring on non-release days.  Figure 5-3 
demonstrates that quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading volume are 
elevated at 00:30, coinciding with the 08:30 US release time, for both contracts.   
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Panel B: SPI Futures 
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Figure 5-3: Intranight patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading 
volume on days of 08:30 US releases 
 
Table 5-4 reports that, with the exception of price volatility in the SPI, all three 
variables are significantly higher on days of US releases than non-release days during 
the 00:30 interval, for both contracts.  US releases appear to have a more prolonged 
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impact on 10-Year Bond futures, where price volatility is significantly higher for 30 
minutes and trading volume for 1 hour following the release.  These results confirm 
that US information releases have an impact on overnight trading behaviour.90 
 
Table 5-4: Mean quoted bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading volume on non-
release days (NR) and 08:30 US release days (R) for 10-Year Bond and SPI futures 
 Bid-ask spreads  Volatility Volume 
 NR R t-statistic NR R t-statistic NR R t-statistic 
Panel A: 10-Year Bond Futures 
00:00 0.008 0.008 -0.06  0.141 0.199 1.52  40.915 65.032 1.30  
00:15 0.009 0.010 1.54  0.216 0.326 2.43  60.169 107.935 1.99  
00:30 0.009 0.012 2.98 ** 0.251 0.635 4.39 * 79.492 232.750 3.68 * 
00:45 0.010 0.011 1.37  0.200 0.396 3.12 ** 43.661 144.484 3.32 ** 
01:00 0.010 0.011 0.93  0.222 0.322 2.07  35.424 126.516 3.43 ** 
01:15 0.010 0.011 1.44  0.214 0.353 2.19  41.458 106.613 2.77 ** 
           
n 59 31   59 31  59 31  
           
Panel B: SPI Futures 
00:00 2.213 1.945 -1.15  0.168 0.229 0.95  5.373 4.226 -0.94  
00:15 2.258 2.324 0.26  0.197 0.367 2.52  8.627 9.871 0.43  
00:30 2.329 3.288 3.44 * 0.339 0.456 1.18  8.746 29.871 2.99 ** 
00:45 2.406 3.061 2.05  0.335 0.505 1.52  6.814 16.806 2.08  
01:00 2.870 3.047 0.48  0.274 0.461 1.94  4.780 7.097 1.47  
01:15 2.949 2.901 -0.14  0.232 0.367 1.54  8.390 8.065 -0.11  
           
n 59 31   59 31  59 31  
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
Note: t-statistics report the significance of the difference between release and non-release days.  The coefficients 
for volatility are multiplied by 102 for 10-Year Bond futures. 
 
Table 5-5 reports the impact of US Treasury Bond futures volatility and 08:30 US 
releases on 10-Year Bond futures volatility.  This table describes the contagion effects 
from US markets whereby US Treasury Bond futures volatility exhibits a positive and 
significant relationship with 10-Year Bond futures volatility for the overall sample 
and for all intervals during the hour surrounding 00:30.  It is also clear from Table 4 
that price volatility in the overall sample and, specifically, the 15-minute 
                                                 
90 Fleming and Remolona (1997) also find that bid-ask spreads, price volatility and trading activity in 
the US Treasury (cash) market increase around US macroeconomic releases with the period of elevated 
trading volume extending beyond that of elevated price volatility.  They argue that this reflects activity 
of liquidity traders reacting with lags, unwinding of speculative positions or portfolio rebalancing. 
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interval beginning at 00:30 is significantly higher on 08:30 US release days.  This 
confirms that overseas macroeconomic releases are a determinant of intranight trading 
behaviour. 
 
Table 5-5: The impact of US Treasury Bond futures volatility and 08:30 US releases on 
10-Year Bond futures volatility 
  00:15  00:30 00:45 01:00  Overall 
  Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic  Coefficient t-statistic
                 
Constant  0.002 5.92 *  0.003 10.59 * 0.001 5.24 * 0.002 5.76 *  0.002 20.07 *
US Volatility 979.008 6.43 *  132.141 4.08 * 1401.616 3.71 * 1272.011 3.37 **  869.384 7.61 *
DM  0.001 1.73   0.003 3.66 * 0.001 1.24  6.71*10-5 0.15   0.000 3.67 *
            
Adjusted R2  0.22   0.43  0.35  0.27   0.25  
F-statistic   11.19 *  31.53 * 22.63 * 15.83 *  256.85 *
n   73   81 81 82   1541
* Significant at the 0.001 level      
** Significant at the 0.01 level       
 
5.5.4  Strategic Trading  
The results reported earlier in Tables 5-2 and 5-3 are broadly consistent with 
predictions of strategic trading models for the night-time trading session.  Although 
there is evidence of elevated price volatility and trading volume at the open and close 
of trading, as found in prior literature, the pattern in bid-ask spreads remains contrary 
to existing theory and prior research.  The coefficients on the intranight dummy 
variables for price volatility are positive and significant for the first 30 minutes (45 
minutes for the SPI) of trading and for 1.5 hours prior to the close of SYCOM.  The 
coefficients on the intranight dummy variables for trading volume are significantly 
positive for the first 45 minutes of trading and for the 45 minutes (15 minutes for the 
SPI) prior to the close of SYCOM. The coefficients on the intranight dummy 
variables for the quoted bid-ask spread analysis are initially negative and significant 
indicating that quoted bid-ask spreads are relatively narrow for the first 45 minutes (2 
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hours for the SPI) of trading on SYCOM.  After 00:30 (01:00 for the SPI) however, 
the coefficients on the intranight dummy variables are positive and significant 
indicating that quoted bid-ask spreads are relatively elevated for the second half of the 
night. 
 
There are at least three possible explanations for the anomalous behaviour in bid-ask 
spreads.  First, overseas traders may enter the market and may be better informed with 
respect to information being generated in their market.  In turn, adverse selection 
models of the bid-ask spread (for example, Copeland and Galai, 1983) predict that 
bid-ask spreads will widen if market participants have differential access to 
information.  Second, futures traders may rely on a price signal from the underlying 
market.  Prior literature examining lead-lag relationships finds that the futures market 
leads the equities market, with the existence of feedback from equities markets to 
futures markets (see Chan, 1992).  As the most recent signal from the underlying 
market gets older, its usefulness as an information signal deteriorates leading to 
greater uncertainty as to the ‘true’ price and hence wider bid-ask spreads.  Finally, as 
identified earlier, the behaviour of bid-ask spreads during the night may be driven by 
patterns in price volatility and trading volume. 
 
Table 5-6 reports that price volatility and trading volume are significant explanatory 
variables for quoted bid-ask spreads for both 10-Year Bond and SPI futures.91  
However, the coefficient on the dummy variable representing when US markets are 
                                                 
91 For reasons of space, only a subset of these results is reported. 
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open is positive and significant for the SPI only.  The significantly positive and 
negative coefficients associated with price volatility and trading volume, respectively, 
are consistent with the findings of McInish and Wood (1992) and suggest that patterns 
in price volatility and trading activity do indeed explain at least part of the intranight 
trading behaviour in bid-ask spreads.  Further, the coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing when US markets are open is positive (and significant for the SPI) 
confirming that the widening in quoted bid-ask spreads in the second half of the night 
is partly driven by US markets.   
 
Table 5-6: Intranight patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads on non-release days for 10-
Year Bond and SPI futures 
 10-Year Bond Futures SPI Futures 
 Coefficient(× 102) t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Constant 0.485 11.12 * 1.346 10.62 * 
Volatility 246.537 9.34 * 1.761 5.06 * 
Volume -0.003 -7.82 * -0.018 -6.19 * 
DUS 0.088 1.21  0.519 2.68 ** 
16:40 -0.067 -1.31  -0.324 -2.05   
16:55 -0.092 -1.89  -0.161 -1.06   
17:10 -0.103 -1.88  -0.199 -1.28   
17:25 -0.062 -1.10   -0.086 -0.60   
17:40 -0.022 -0.43   -0.083 -0.58   
    
00:00 0.115 1.93   0.662 3.71 * 
00:15 (Chicago) -0.018 -0.25   0.193 1.16   
00:45 0.058 0.81   0.025 0.16   
01:00 -0.026 -0.32   0.556 2.47  
01:15 -0.021 -0.27   0.728 2.90 ** 
01:30 (NYSE) 0.099 1.32    0.671 2.82 ** 
01:45 0.015 0.14    0.710 2.80 ** 
02:00 -0.004 -0.05    0.902 3.44 * 
02:15 -0.026 -0.29   1.210 4.94 * 
     
05:30 0.496 4.11 * 0.686 2.62 ** 
05:45 0.536 5.40 * 1.020 3.85 * 
06:00 0.433 3.80 * 0.930 3.48 * 
06:15 0.224 2.15  1.044 3.62 * 
06:30 0.195 1.82  0.630 2.27  
06:45 -0.057 -0.63   -0.095 -0.37   
     
Adjusted R2 0.12   0.26  
n 3415   3343  
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
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More importantly, after controlling for price volatility, trading volume and the US 
open, the coefficients associated with intranight dummy variables for 10-Year Bond 
futures are positive and significant from 04:00 and positive and significant for the SPI 
from 01:15.  Hence evidence of relatively elevated bid-ask spreads during the night 
remains even after controlling for patterns in price volatility and trading volume.   
 
5.6  Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
Consistent with earlier work on intraday trading behaviour, this chapter provides 
evidence that there are at least three significant determinants of intranight trading 
behaviour on electronic systems: (I) information drawn from price behaviour in 
overseas markets (contagion effects); (ii) overseas macroeconomic information 
releases; and (iii) strategic behaviour by informed and liquidity traders.  The policy 
implications for the design of overnight electronic trading systems are clear.  That is, 
the most important time periods for overnight markets to be open (in order to facilitate 
price discovery and liquidity) are when related markets are open or when 
macroeconomic releases occur in related markets. 
 
This study also documents a gradual widening in the bid-ask spread during the 
overnight trading session, which is contrary to existing theory and prior research.  A 
number of possible explanations are put forward for the widening in bid-ask spreads.  
First, overseas traders may enter the market and these traders may be better informed 
with respect to information being generated in their market.  Second, futures traders 
may, to an extent, be dependent on a price signal from the underlying market.  As the 
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most recent signal from the underlying market gets older, its usefulness deteriorates 
leading to greater uncertainty as to the ‘true’ price and hence wider bid-ask spreads.  
Research on this issue is best left to future inquiry.  
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5.7  Appendix 
Table 5-7: US Macroeconomic Releases: 1 August 1995 – 31 August 1997 
New York Time Sydney Time  
(AEDT) 
Release Total 
Number  
Number occurring 
during AEDT 
08:30 00:30 CPI, durable goods, employment cost index, 
employment, GDP,  housing starts, leading indicators,  
personal income, PPI, retail sales, trade balance  
254 100 
09:15 01:15 Capacity utilisation, industrial production 48 22 
10:00 02:00 Business inventories, construction spending, consumer 
confidence, current account, factory goods, leading 
indicators, NAPM, new home sales, Philadelphia Fed. 
Survey, productivity, real earnings, wholesale trade 
201 77 
14:00 06:00 Federal budget updates 17 11 
15:00 07:00 Consumer credit 25 7 
Unclassified  Auto sales, beige book, Chicago PMI, department store 
sales, existing home sales, FOMC meetings, non-farm 
production, miscellaneous 
108 58 
TOTAL *   653 275 
Days in sample   207 
Days in sample without releases   61 
Note: The total number of releases is greater than the number of days in the sample because there are frequently days with 
more than one release. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This dissertation provides evidence on the impact of electronic screen trading in 
futures markets on liquidity.  The significance of this issue is highlighted by the rapid 
advances in technology internationally and the seemingly endless contest between 
exchanges to implement new or improved trading systems.  A review of the prior 
literature associated with this issue in Chapter 2 demonstrates that there is no 
conclusive empirical evidence concerning the market quality of electronic trading 
relative to floor trading.  In addition, this literature has not examined the impact of 
different system designs facilitated by electronic trading.  This dissertation addresses 
this gap in the literature to aid researchers, regulators, exchange policy makers and 
systems builders as they confront issues related to electronic trading systems.  This 
dissertation provides three essays evaluating the liquidity of electronic trading and the 
impact of different system designs facilitated by electronic trading on market quality. 
 
The first essay is presented in Chapter 3.  The essay empirically evaluates the liquidity 
of electronic screen traded markets by examining the transition from floor to 
electronic trading for the LIFFE, SFE and HKFE.  Whether futures markets should be 
electronically traded is one of the most important practical problems debated in the 
international financial marketplace, given the divergent views on best practice and the 
inconclusive empirical evidence.  After controlling for price volatility and trading 
volume, bid-ask spreads are found to be lower under the electronic trading regimes 
implemented by all three exchanges and the change is statistically significant for the 
SFE and HKFE.  This provides evidence that electronic trading can facilitate higher 
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levels of liquidity relative to floor traded markets.  This implies that futures exchanges 
continuing to operate floor traded markets are impairing the potential liquidity of 
these markets.  However, the results in Chapter 3 also imply that bid-ask spreads 
widen at a faster rate in response to increased price volatility under electronic trading, 
relative to floor trading.  This indicates that the liquidity of electronic trading system 
designs of the LIFFE, SFE and HKFE deteriorates more rapidly than floor traded 
systems in periods of higher volatility.  This result is significant as it provides a 
challenge to regulators, exchange policy makers and systems builders to design and 
implement an electronic screen trading system that can cope with highly volatile 
trading conditions. 
 
By analysing the impact of electronic limit order book transparency on market depth, 
the second essay in this dissertation provides evidence on the impact of different 
system designs facilitated by electronic trading.  That is, electronic trading systems 
are able to deliver different levels of quote and depth transparency through the degree 
of limit order book information made available to users.  The issue of the degree of 
limit order book information that should be transparent has become particularly 
important given that exchanges internationally are adopting electronic trading systems 
with different degrees of limit order book transparency.  The essay exploits a unique 
institutional difference offered by the trading systems adopted by the SFE and 
NZFOE.  The SFE’s electronic trading system disclosed limit order depth at the 
highest bid price and the lowest ask price only, while the NZFOE disclosed limit 
order depth at the three highest bid and three lowest ask prices.  During the sample 
period examined, the essay documents that the proportion of the limit order book 
placed at the second and third best prices on the NZFOE is higher relative to the SFE.  
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This result is robust to differences in trading volume, price volatility and the size of 
bid-ask spreads across the two exchanges.  These findings imply that the level of 
transparency on electronic trading systems can influence market liquidity, as proxied 
by market depth.  More specifically, lower transparency potentially imposes 
additional execution risks and costs on limit order traders, which can discourage these 
traders from placing orders at more competitive prices.  This is an important 
conclusion given that exchange policy makers introducing electronic trading systems 
or updating existing systems are able to reveal different levels of information about 
the electronic limit order book.  
 
The third essay is presented in Chapter 5.  The essay examines overnight or 
‘intranight’ trading behaviour, another design feature facilitated by electronic trading.  
Notwithstanding the prevalence of extended trading hour sessions existing on 
electronic systems, prior literature has not examined the role, sources and economic 
significance of overnight trading.  Using data for the overnight market of the SFE, an 
elevation in price volatility and trading volume at the open and close of overnight 
trading sessions is documented, consistent with earlier work examining daytime 
markets.  In contrast to existing theory and prior research, quoted bid-ask spreads are 
found to widen throughout night-time trading sessions.  Bid-ask spreads, price 
volatility and trading volume also appear to increase at approximately 00:30.  Apart 
from the behaviour of quoted bid-ask spreads, a number of tests are carried out which 
imply that these patterns are consistent with information drawn from price behaviour 
in related markets (contagion effects), overseas macroeconomic information releases, 
and strategic trading by informed and uninformed traders. 
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There are clear policy implications which can be drawn from the findings in Chapter 
5.  The most important time periods for overnight electronic markets to be open (in 
order to facilitate price discovery and liquidity) are when related markets are open or 
when macroeconomic releases occur in overseas markets.  The widening in bid-ask 
spreads documented for the overnight trading session is of potential concern to 
exchanges operating or intending to operate extended trading hours.  It is possible that 
overseas traders who enter the market and are better informed with respect to 
information being generated in their market may cause the widening in bid-ask 
spreads.  Alternatively, futures traders may, to an extent, be dependent on a price 
signal from the underlying market.  As the most recent signal from the underlying 
market gets older, its usefulness deteriorates leading to greater uncertainty as to the 
‘true’ price and hence wider bid-ask spreads.   
 
A number of future research directions were outlined.  Future research could examine 
a number of possible explanations for the impact of electronic trading on liquidity, 
analysed in Chapter 3, such as differences in order processing or adverse selection 
costs on floor and electronic trading systems.  Whether the different degrees of 
transparency of floor and electronic trading systems drive the deterioration in the 
liquidity of electronic trading systems during high volatility periods is also best left to 
future inquiry.  The increasing availability of limit order book data from quote 
vendors such as Bloomberg and Reuters will enable future researchers to explore the 
relevance of the shape of the limit order book to the cost of trading.  Given the 
diversity in transparency across different markets, the findings of Chapter 4 may be 
able to be re-examined in other market settings.  Finally, future research could also 
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address the possible explanations for the gradual widening in the bid-ask spread 
during the overnight trading session – a robust and intriguing finding.  
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Appendix A: Intraday Futures Market Behaviour Around Major 
Scheduled Macroeconomic Announcements: Australian 
Evidence92  
 
A.1  Introduction 
This appendix examines intraday market behaviour around major scheduled 
information announcements on the SFE.  Prior literature on how futures markets 
process information around macroeconomic announcements on an intraday basis has 
examined volatility and returns in US and London futures markets (see Ederington 
and Lee, 1993, 1995; Crain and Lee, 1995; Leng, 1996; and Becker, Finnerty and 
Kopecky, 1996).93  Ederington and Lee (1993) find that the bulk of price adjustment 
occurs within the first minute following major releases, with volatility substantially 
higher than normal for approximately fifteen minutes and slightly elevated for several 
hours.  Ederington and Lee (1995) find that the price adjustment is rapid and basically 
complete within 40 seconds of the release.  Leng (1996) finds that the impact of major 
announcements lasts for at least an hour whereas the impact of minor announcements 
is relatively short lived.  Crain and Lee (1995) also find that most of the price 
adjustment occurs within the first hour, with some evidence that volatility remains 
higher than normal for several hours.  Prior literature concerning intraday market 
adjustment around announcements has been limited to analysis of price behaviour.  In 
this appendix, intraday price behaviour around major macroeconomic announcements 
                                                 
92 The material in this appendix is the basis for a publication forthcoming in the Journal of Banking and 
Finance.  
93 Crain and Lee (1995) also examine trading volume on a daily basis. 
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is re-examined for the SFE.  This analysis is also extended to trading volume and 
quoted bid-ask spreads in order to more completely examine market behaviour around 
major announcements.  While no prior research has examined intraday trading volume 
and quoted bid-ask spreads in futures markets, research concerning these variables in 
the US Treasury (cash) market and around stock specific information releases has 
yielded additional insight into market adjustment processes (e.g. Morse, 1981; 
Jennings, 1994; Fleming and Remolona, 1999). 
 
There are a number of methodological refinements implemented in re-examining 
trading behaviour around major macroeconomic announcements on the Australian 
market.  First, Ederington and Lee (1993), Crain and Lee (1995) and Leng (1996) find 
that information releases with the greatest impact in the US are those occurring at 
08:30 Eastern Time, 10 minutes following market opening.  Although these releases 
consist of some of the major US announcements, it is difficult to distinguish the 
effects of market opening from the impact of information announcements.94  The SFE 
allows a cleaner intraday experiment as macroeconomic announcements generally 
occur at 11:30, almost two hours after the market opening at 09:50.  Further, prior US 
studies have focussed on foreign exchange and interest rate futures.95  This appendix 
extends this research to stock index futures, specifically the Share Price Index futures 
contract traded on the SFE. 
 
                                                 
94 For example, Crain and Lee (1995) find that both announcement and nonannouncement day 
volatility is the highest during the first hour (08:00-09:00) of trading in Eurodollar futures. 
95 Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995), Crain and Lee (1995), Leng (1996) and Becker et al. (1996) 
examine foreign exchange and/or interest rate futures. 
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According to Smith and Whaley (1994), US futures exchanges do not collect bid and 
ask quotes.  In addition, US ‘time and sales’ data available to researchers is essentially 
a list of price changing transactions, which does not include trade volume.  In 
contrast, price reporting practices on the SFE produce a more comprehensive data-set 
that includes bid and ask quotes and trade volume.  Access to trade volume data 
allows an extension of Crain and Lee’s (1995) analysis of daily trading volume to an 
intraday level.  Also, the availability of bid and ask quotes allows an examination of 
intraday patterns in quoted bid-ask spreads and the construction of price volatility 
metrics purged of biases induced by bid-ask bounce (see Venkatesh, 1992).  McInish 
and Wood (1992) conjecture that intraday patterns in bid-ask spreads may reflect 
resolution of risk over the trading day not captured by price volatility and trading 
volume.  This analysis is also important as bid-ask spreads are an important 
component of transaction costs.96   
 
The remainder of this appendix is structured as follows.  In Section A.2, a description 
of the data, sampling, and institutional detail of the SFE is presented and in Section 
A.3, the analysis of price adjustment around information announcements is presented.  
In Section A.4, the analysis of trading activity and quoted bid-ask spreads is 
presented.  Section A.5 provides a summary and suggestions for future research. 
 
A.2  Data, Sampling and Institutional Detail 
This study utilises a database assembled by a leading Australian broker consisting of 
the dates of all scheduled macroeconomic announcements occurring in Australia by 
                                                 
96 See Aitken and Ferris (1991). 
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the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) between 2 August 1995 and 21 August 
1997.  This database describes 500 macroeconomic announcements occurring on 312 
of the 499 trading days over this period.   
 
The release of macroeconomic announcements in Australia is conducted in a slightly 
different manner to the ‘lock-up’ procedure followed in the US.97  The ABS allows 
information vendors on its premises prior to the release to set up equipment as part of 
the ‘wire service’, however no information is disseminated to these vendors until the 
official release time at 11:30.  Market participants are also allowed on ABS premises 
for the ‘counter release’ in the Sydney Office at 11:30.  At this time, information is 
also released to subscribers to the ABS’s on-line time series data service and to their 
web-site.  
 
Intraday transaction and quote data were obtained from the SFE for the SPI futures 
contract.  SPI futures were traded by open outcry on the floor of the exchange 
between 09:50 and 16:10, breaking for lunch between 12:30 and 14:00.98  Pit data 
(also known as Inter-Exchange Technical Committee - ITC - data) containing trade 
and quote records were provided by the SFE.  Trade records contain fields describing 
the price and volume of trades, while quote records contain fields describing the price 
of new bids and asks.  The ITC data were compiled from the ‘real time’ observation 
of SFE pit personnel known as price reporters and are time stamped to the nearest 
                                                 
97 See Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995) for a description of the release procedures followed in the US. 
98 As described in Chapter 3, the SFE moved to full electronic trading during October and November 
1999. 
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second.  ITC data is routed to users via information vendors and is relied upon by 
institutions to make trading decisions.  Hence reporting delays for ITC data are likely 
to be minimal.   
 
Analysis was restricted to announcements that occur at 11:30, resulting in a sample of 
396 macroeconomic announcements (see Table A.6) occurring over 272 days.99  The 
remaining 227 days are used as a control.  Following Ederington and Lee (1993), only 
‘major’ macroeconomic announcement categories are examined.  These are identified 
as those announcement types having the greatest impact on price volatility (see the 
Appendix to this study).  As reported in Table A.6, Real GDP, Consumer Price Index, 
Balance of Payments, Average Weekly Overtime Earnings, Employment, Retail 
Trade and Merchandise Imports are all major macroeconomic announcements.  There 
are 132 major announcements in the sample occurring over 91 days. 
 
Following Ederington and Lee (1995), this appendix examines 10-second intervals for 
twelve minutes around information announcements for the SPI futures contract with 
the nearest delivery date.  This 12-minute window extends from 2 minutes before to 
10 minutes after the announcement at 11:30.100  A control sample is also formed for 
the same period using nonannouncement days.  Although a number of different 
statistical tests were applied to test for the difference in variables between 
announcement and nonannouncement days, large-sample tests of the difference 
                                                 
99 The event time for the remaining announcements could not be properly identified. 
100 The analysis was also conducted using 1-minute observation intervals (not reported).  This analysis 
suggested that although the majority of price adjustment following announcements is captured using 
10-second intervals, price volatility and trading activity are slightly elevated for a longer period.   
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between means are reported, with nonparametric tests yielding substantially similar 
results.  For the return volatility tests, nonparametric Brown-Forsythe modified 
Levene F-tests are reported, consistent with Ederington and Lee (1993, 1995). 
 
A.3  Price Adjustment 
A.3.1 Price Volatility 
To examine the impact of announcements on price volatility, the variance of returns 
across intervals aligned in event time (11:30) are calculated for announcement and 
nonannouncement samples.  Returns, tR , are calculated as )/( 1−= ttt PPLogR .  
Following Ederington and Lee (1995), Pt  is the average of the last two transaction 
prices observed on or before time t and the variance of this return series is one of the 
proxies for volatility examined in this study (PRVAR).  Although Ederington and Lee 
(1995) average these prices to remove price fluctuations due solely to bid-ask bounce, 
they recognise that Pt  is discrete and consequently price volatility may be upward 
biased.  They also acknowledge that smoothing price changes may in fact downward 
bias price volatility.  Venkatesh (1992) also demonstrates that bid-ask bounce imparts 
an upward bias in price volatility estimates based on trade prices.  Hence this study 
also calculates the variance of returns based on the last quote midpoint ( tQ ) observed 
on or before t (QTEVAR).  Following McInish and Wood (1992), price volatility is 
also calculated as the standard deviation of the quote midpoint during each 10-second 
interval as follows:  
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Where ti  is the amount of time iQ  was alive during interval t.
101, 102 
 
Figure A.1 and Table A.1 depict the different measures of price volatility in 10-
second intervals around 11:30 on major announcement and nonannouncement days.  
Based on Ederington and Lee’s (1995) return variance measure (PRVAR), Figure A.1 
documents a sharp increase in price volatility commencing in the (10,20) interval and 
peaking in the (20,30) interval.103  While these results are generally consistent with 
Ederington and Lee (1995), there is no significant reaction in the (0,10) interval.  This 
may be attributable to the smoothing of price volatility caused by the use of average 
prices.  The return variance declines quite rapidly within 50 to 60 seconds following 
announcements, but remains significantly higher than on nonannouncement days (at 
the 0.01 level) until interval (100,110).  These results imply that the bulk of price 
adjustment to new information occurs rapidly and within the first two minutes 
following the announcement. 
 
                                                 
101 On average, there are 1.49 quotes in every 10-second interval.  If the standing quote is the only 
quote in an interval, then QTESD is 0. 
102 Consistent with Ederington and Lee (1995), the median time between price changes, the percentage 
of price changes greater than one tick in size and the percentage of price reversals and continuations are 
also examined.  The results concerning this analysis are not presented, as they do not yield any 
additional insights into price adjustment following macroeconomic announcements in Australia.   
103 (10,20) refers to the 10-second interval between 10 and 20 seconds following 11:30.  Intervals  
(-60,120) are reported in the tables. 
(A.1) 
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Figure A-1: Abnormal price volatility around major announcements104 
 
 
As depicted in Figure A.1, the price volatility measure QTEVAR appears to increase at 
the announcement time and peaks in the (10,20) interval, however it is significantly 
higher on announcement days from (-10,0) through to (160,170).  The price volatility 
measure QTESD also provides evidence that price volatility rises prior to 
announcements and peaks in the (10,20) interval.  QTESD is significantly higher on 
announcement days at the 0.01 level from interval (-10,0) through to (230,240).  
Hence the measures of price volatility based on quote midpoints offer additional 
insights to Ederington and Lee’s (1995) measure and suggest that, in this market, 
price volatility rises before announcements and remains significantly higher than on 
nonannouncement days for a longer period of time.  
 
                                                 
104 The horizontal axis displays interval ending times. 
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Table A-1: Price volatility measures, nonparametric Brown-Forsythe modified Levene 
F-tests and z-tests 
 PRVAR QTEVAR QTESD 
 NA A F-statistic NA A F-statistic NA A z-statistic
(-60,-50) 0.01 0.01 0.14 0.01 0.03 3.86 0.05 0.07 1.39
(-50,-40) 0.01 0.01 3.95 0.02 0.02 1.11 0.05 0.06 0.68   
(-40,-30) 0.01 0.03 11.14 * 0.02 0.03 0.83 0.05 0.07 1.19   
(-30,-20) 0.01 0.02 1.89 0.02 0.04 8.07 ** 0.06 0.10 2.09
(-20,-10) 0.01 0.01 2.34 0.02 0.04 4.36 0.06 0.11 2.08
(-10,0) 0.01 0.03 2.31 0.02 0.04 8.60 ** 0.05 0.11 3.09 * 
(0,10) 0.01 0.02 0.95 0.02 0.04 11.39 * 0.06 0.12 2.53 **
(10,20) 0.01 0.17 68.69 * 0.02 0.40 93.29 * 0.06 0.40 6.57 * 
(20,30) 0.01 0.31 84.26 * 0.02 0.29 85.02 * 0.06 0.32 6.86 * 
(30,40) 0.01 0.13 30.73 * 0.02 0.16 50.62 * 0.05 0.23 6.05 * 
(40,50) 0.01 0.09 58.35 * 0.02 0.08 57.61 * 0.06 0.22 6.14 * 
(50,60) 0.02 0.08 32.75 * 0.02 0.12 35.31 * 0.06 0.19 4.98 * 
(60,70) 0.01 0.09 43.28 * 0.02 0.13 60.51 * 0.06 0.22 5.90 * 
(70,80) 0.01 0.05 27.21 * 0.02 0.09 25.49 * 0.06 0.18 4.58 * 
(80,90) 0.01 0.10 42.72 * 0.01 0.11 43.24 * 0.05 0.17 4.60 * 
(90,100) 0.01 0.08 27.79 * 0.02 0.07 27.48 * 0.05 0.17 5.10 * 
(100,110) 0.02 0.04 12.70 * 0.02 0.08 37.61 * 0.05 0.17 5.46 * 
(110,120) 0.02 0.04 5.47 0.02 0.06 7.45 ** 0.07 0.14 2.41 **
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
Note: Returns are multiplied by 1000 before calculating variances, giving reported variances of 106 times the 
true value.  NA denotes nonannouncement days and A denotes major announcement days. 
 
A.3.2 Correlation Coefficients 
Ederington and Lee (1993) recognise that volatility may remain elevated after a 
macroeconomic release because prices adjust slowly or because of additional 
information.  If prices adjust slowly, then the returns over the adjustment period will 
be positively autocorrelated.  Hence, in order to assess the speed and efficiency of the 
market’s adjustment to new information, two variables are analysed.  First, serial 
correlation coefficients between successive 10-second returns are calculated for 
announcement and nonannouncement days in order to determine whether prices trend 
in the same direction.105  Second, correlation coefficients between each interval’s 
return and the return from the time of the announcement to 30 seconds later (0,30) are 
                                                 
105 Returns are based on both average prices and quote midpoints. 
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calculated to determine whether the return in later intervals is a continued reaction to 
the initial announcement.106  The significance of these correlation coefficients is 
assessed using t-tests.   
 
Table A-2: First order serial correlation coefficients, correlation coefficients with (0,30) 
returns based on quote midpoints and z-tests 
 Correlation Coefficients  
 First Order Serial Correlation Correlation with (0,30) Return  
(-60,-50) -0.010 -0.163 
(-50,-40) 0.146 -0.216  
(-40,-30) -0.073 0.022 
(-30,-20) -0.047 0.199  
(-20,-10) -0.134 0.001  
(-10,0) -0.144 -0.126  
(0,10) -0.088 -0.132  
(10,20) -0.231 0.140  
(20,30) 0.266 ** 0.284 **  
(30,40) 0.354 * 0.274 ** 
(40,50) -0.119 -0.298 **  
(50,60) -0.132 0.344 *  
(60,70) -0.102 -0.080  
(70,80) 0.039 -0.016 
(80,90) -0.024 0.019  
(90,100) -0.041 0.060  
(100,110) -0.231 -0.198 
(110,120) -0.019 -0.143  
Ave. NA -0.094 * 0.005  
* Significant at the 0.001 level
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
Note: Correlation coefficients are presented by interval for major announcement days, with an average for 
nonannouncement (NA) days. 
 
 
Table A.2 documents correlation coefficients for 10-second intervals around 11.30.107  
The results provide weak evidence that prices trend in the same direction following 
major announcements.  Only the intervals between 20 and 40 seconds following the 
announcement time exhibit positive and significant serial correlation coefficients.  In 
                                                 
106 For intervals within (0,30), correlation coefficients between each interval’s return and the difference 
between the (0,30) return and that interval’s return are examined. 
107 Herein, results based on quote midpoint returns are presented as Lease et al. (1991) demonstrate that 
the effect of an event can be overstated when transaction prices are used in an event study.  
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contrast, Ederington and Lee (1995) find that coefficients prior to announcements are 
generally small and insignificant, and following announcements are generally positive 
and significant.  They also find a significant relationship between returns in intervals 
falling within the 50 seconds following announcements and the (0,30) return, whereas 
this relationship is only apparent between 20 and 40 seconds following 
announcements for SPI futures.  This appears to be followed by a period of 
adjustment with a significantly negative correlation coefficient in the (40,50) interval 
and a significantly positive coefficient in the (50,60) interval.  This provides further 
evidence that the futures market adjusts rapidly and efficiently, within one minute of 
scheduled announcements in Australia.   
  
A.3.3 Returns 
Consistent with Ederington and Lee (1995), estimates of the magnitude of price 
adjustment in each interval are obtained by calculating average ‘adjusted returns’.  
This is to determine the magnitude of adjustment from the old to the new equilibrium 
price that occurs in each interval.  Adjusted returns, ARt , for each interval t are 
defined as AR R Dt t t= ∗ , where Rt  denotes returns as previously defined and Dt  = 1  
(-1 or 0) if the (0,30) return is positive (negative or zero, respectively).  That is, the 
direction of the price change over the first 30 seconds following the announcement is 
used to determine whether an announcement is ‘good’ or ‘bad’ news.108  Average 
adjusted returns, AARt , are then calculated for each 10-second interval.  If there is no 
                                                 
108 For intervals within the first 30 seconds following the announcement, Dt  is based on the difference 
between the (0,30) return and each interval’s return to avoid spurious correlation between Rt  and Dt . 
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information leakage on announcement days, AARt  = 0 for t < 0.  For t > 0, AARt  > 0 
during the price adjustment phase and AARt  = 0 when the adjustment is complete.  
Average adjusted returns are cumulated (arithmetically) from the 10-second interval (-
110,-100) relative to the announcement time to form cumulative average adjusted 
returns, CARt . 
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Figure A-2: Cumulative average adjusted returns (CAR) on major announcement and 
nonannouncement days109 
 
Table A.3, Panel A reports AARs for 10-second intervals around 11:30.  During the 
major announcement interval, and for 30 seconds following the announcement time, 
large, positive and statistically significant AARs are evident.  Ederington and Lee 
(1995) find that AARs remain positive and significant for the first 40 seconds 
following announcements.  Figure A.2 illustrates major announcement and 
nonannouncement day CARs and suggests that there is a reversal in the initial price 
                                                 
109 Reported returns are actual returns multiplied by 106. 
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movement following the first 100 seconds.  This is consistent with overreaction to 
major announcements, which is corrected by about the fourth minute after 
announcements.  Ederington and Lee (1995) also find evidence of overreaction, 
although this appears to be corrected in the second and third minutes after 
announcements.  
 
To assess the significance of the expected reversal (overreaction) in prices following 
major announcements, the ‘primary’ and ‘secondary’ price effects of macroeconomic 
announcements are calculated and compared to the price effects occurring at the same 
time on nonannouncement days, as follows: 
)/ln( pa QQtimaryEffecPr =  
)/ln( al QQffectSecondaryE =  
Where aQ is the announcement price and represents the price in interval (90,100).  
The choice of this interval is based on the apparent peak in cumulative average 
adjusted returns as documented in Figure A.2.  pQ  represents the price in the interval 
prior to scheduled macroeconomic announcements (-10,0) and lQ  represents the price 
in the last interval (590,600) of the sample.  Each price effect is multiplied by tD , 
consistent with the AARs examined in the study, to form average adjusted primary and 
secondary effects.  Prices (Q) are based on the last quote midpoint in each interval.  
As expected, Table A.3 Panel B provides evidence that the primary price effect 
around macroeconomic announcements is positive and significantly larger than during 
the corresponding time on nonannouncement days.  Further, the secondary price effect 
(A.2)
(A.3) 
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is negative and significant.  This implies that the reversal in prices is statistically 
significant and suggests that there is overreaction to major announcements. 
 
Table A-3: Average adjusted returns (AAR) and primary and secondary returns based 
on quote midpoints  
 Adjusted Returns (multiplied by 106) 
 NA t-statistic A t-statistic
Panel A: Average Adjusted Returns 
(-60,-50) 3.10 0.74    -14.00 -0.89   
(-50,-40) -8.00 -2.06    -11.00 -0.78   
(-40,-30) 2.30 0.39    -2.00 -0.13   
(-30,-20) 2.80 0.55    17.00 0.96   
(-20,-10) -2.00 -0.49    -10.00 -0.57   
(-10,0) -1.00 -0.19    -17.00 -1.04   
(0,10) -6.00 -2.48   34.30 2.82 ** 
(10,20) -1.00 -0.26   183.90 3.69 * 
(20,30) 1.00 0.20   166.20 4.15 * 
(30,40) -11.00 -2.07    85.40 2.17  
(40,50) 5.80 0.98    -39.00 -1.62  
(50,60) 1.00 0.23    65.40 2.06  
(60,70) 1.50 0.26    33.90 1.07  
(70,80) 6.40 1.68    39.50 1.42   
(80,90) -5.00 -1.07    35.30 1.25   
(90,100) 10.30 0.83    20.00 0.79   
(100,110) 4.90 1.01   -7.00 -0.32   
(110,120) 12.00 2.50    -17.00 -0.88   
      
Panel B: Primary and Secondary Effects    
Primary Effect (-10,100) 93.66   784.30 6.21 * 
Secondary Effect (100,600) 39.12   -327.28 -2.68 ** 
* Significant at the 0.001 level 
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
Note: Panel A reports t-statistics on nonannouncement (NA) and major announcement (A) days and Panel B 
reports t-tests of the difference across nonannouncement (NA) and major announcement (A) days.  
 
 
A.4  Trading Activity and Quoted Bid-Ask Spreads 
A.4.1 Trading Activity 
The behaviour of trading volume around announcements is examined by calculating 
the average number of trades (TRADES) and the average number of contracts per 
trade (SIZE) in each interval.  These trade volume measures are used by McInish and 
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Wood (1992) in their modelling of intraday bid-ask spreads and extend Crain and 
Lee’s (1995) analysis of average daily trading volume in futures markets.  
 
Figure A.3 and Table A.4 document intraday trading volume around 11:30 for major 
announcement and nonannouncement days.  The volume measure TRADES provides 
evidence that trading activity is significantly higher on announcement days between 
10 and 240 seconds following announcements.  The mean number of trades per 10-
second interval peaks at 1.28 in the (40,50) interval on announcement days and is 
245% higher than during the corresponding interval on nonannouncement days.  SIZE 
is significantly larger on announcement days between 10 and 60 seconds following 
announcements and in several intervals after this.  Hence Fleming and Remolona’s 
(1999) finding that public information can affect prices in the absence of significant 
trading activity is consistent with the behaviour of the SPI which exhibits significantly 
higher price volatility in the announcement interval in the absence of a significant 
reaction in trading volume. 
 
The consistency in the behaviour of TRADES and SIZE, clearly reflected in Figure 
A.3, supports the conjecture of Jones et al. (1994) that volume analysis based on trade 
size adds little information beyond that contained in the frequency of transactions.  
Table A.4 reports the mean number of contracts per trade, which ranges from 1.38 to 
3.73 on nonannouncement days and from 2.20 to 5.57 on announcement days.  Hence 
it appears that the elevation in trading volume around major announcements is driven 
largely by increased trade frequency.  While prices reflect an averaging of investors’ 
beliefs, Bamber (1986) recognises that volume reflects investors’ activity.  Hence it 
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appears that adjustments in investors’ activity as reflected in trading volume occur 
over a similar period to changes in investors’ beliefs as reflected in the results 
concerning price behaviour. 
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Figure A-3: Abnormal trading volume on major announcement days 
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Table A-4: Measures of trading volume, quoted bid-ask spreads and z-statistics 
comparing nonannouncement (NA) and major announcement (A) days 
 TRADES (No.) SIZE (Contracts) SPREADS (Points)
 NA A z-statistic NA A z-statistic NA A z-statistic
(-60,-50) 0.36 0.41 0.51 2.16 2.45 0.35 1.13 1.20 0.92
(-50,-40) 0.42 0.42 -0.07   2.48 2.76 0.38    1.13 1.24 1.52   
(-40,-30) 0.37 0.57 1.88 1.38 2.46 1.51    1.14 1.24 1.34   
(-30,-20) 0.37 0.48 1.18   1.61 2.22 0.82    1.14 1.28 1.76
(-20,-10) 0.43 0.49 0.64   1.75 2.20 0.79    1.15 1.36 2.56 ** 
(-10,0) 0.35 0.45 1.16   3.73 3.03 -0.30    1.16 1.37 2.66 ** 
(0,10) 0.40 0.45 0.54   2.17 2.23 0.05    1.18 1.58 3.33 * 
(10,20) 0.42 1.18 5.37 * 1.51 4.88 3.90 *  1.19 1.50 3.30 * 
(20,30) 0.39 1.27 6.06 * 1.90 4.24 3.17 *  1.19 1.46 3.38 * 
(30,40) 0.42 1.18 4.93 * 2.01 3.72 2.63 **  1.20 1.28 1.30   
(40,50) 0.37 1.28 6.46 * 1.80 5.57 4.80 *  1.21 1.25 0.69   
(50,60) 0.41 1.10 4.86 * 1.53 5.27 4.17 *  1.20 1.24 0.61   
(60,70) 0.40 1.16 5.31 * 2.09 3.58 2.23  1.18 1.22 0.63   
(70,80) 0.36 1.04 5.15 * 1.53 4.36 3.80 *  1.17 1.24 0.95   
(80,90) 0.34 1.02 4.57 * 1.90 4.26 2.75 **  1.19 1.16 -0.46   
(90,100) 0.37 1.24 5.71 * 3.60 4.97 0.57    1.16 1.24 1.47   
(100,110) 0.46 0.93 3.75 * 1.82 4.72 3.16 *  1.18 1.27 1.86
(110,120) 0.48 0.76 2.44 ** 1.89 2.97 1.64    1.17 1.25 1.56   
* Significant at the 0.001 level
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
 
 
A.4.2 Quoted Bid-Ask Spreads 
Quoted bid-ask spreads around announcements are examined by calculating time-
weighted quoted spreads for each interval (see McInish and Wood, 1992), as follows: 
∑
∑
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1  
Where ti  is the amount of time bid-ask spread i was alive during the interval.   
 
A regression approach is used to further analyse the behaviour of quoted bid-ask 
spreads around macroeconomic announcements.  McInish and Wood (1992) provide 
evidence that price volatility and trading activity partly explain the behaviour in 
(A.4) 
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intraday quoted bid-ask spreads.  Their analysis is extended to assess whether the bid-
ask spread depends on both expected and unexpected volatility.  Analogously, 
Benston and Hagerman (1974) and Stoll (1978) demonstrate that there is a differential 
reaction to expected and unexpected volatility in equities markets.  Hence, the 
following model is estimated: 
tttttt QTESDu+aQTESDeaSQSIZEaSQTRADESaaSPREADS ε++++= 43210  
Where tSPREADS  is the time-weighted quoted bid-ask spread in interval t.  
Consistent with McInish and Wood (1992), trading activity is measured as the square 
root of the number of trades (SQTRADES) and the square root of the average number 
of contracts per trade (SQSIZE) in each interval.  Expected volatility (QTESDe) is 
estimated by applying the approach developed by Ederington and Lee (1993), which 
uses the coefficients of a regression of dummy variables for each macroeconomic 
announcement type on price volatility during 10-second intervals around 11:30 (see 
the Appendix to this study).  Price volatility is measured as the standard deviation of 
the quote midpoint in each 10-second interval (QTESD) and unexpected volatility 
(QTESDu) is QTESD less QTESDe.  An F-test is used to determine whether the 
coefficients on QTESDe and QTESDu are significantly different. 
 
Figure A.4 and Table A.4 document mean quoted bid-ask spreads on major 
announcement and nonannouncement days around 11:30.  Quoted bid-ask spreads 
begin to widen significantly in interval (-20,-10), peak in interval (0,10) at 1.58 points 
and remain significantly higher on announcement days until interval (20,30).  This 
widening in quoted bid-ask spreads around announcements is consistent with market 
(A.5) 
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makers adjusting quoted bid-ask spreads in response to increased adverse selection 
costs.   
 
Market makers appear to react to scheduled macroeconomic announcements prior to 
the announcement time by widening quoted bid-ask spreads.  Quoted bid-ask spreads 
do not return to nonannouncement day levels until approximately 30 seconds 
following announcements, consistent with the findings for correlation coefficients and 
returns.  Although price volatility remains higher than on nonannouncement days for 
a longer period, it appears that market makers believe the majority of adjustment 
occurs within the first 30 seconds and hence are no longer at risk of trading with 
informed traders. 
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Figure A-4: Mean time-weighted quoted bid-ask spreads (SPREADS) over major 
announcement and nonannouncement days 
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Table A.5 reports regression results for the five intervals around major 
announcements with quoted bid-ask spreads significantly wider than on 
nonannouncement days.110  Analysis which also included a dummy variable for 
announcement days (not reported) finds the coefficient on this variable to be 
insignificant indicating that quoted bid-ask spreads around macroeconomic 
announcements are explained by trading volume and price volatility changes.  The 
analysis provides evidence of a positive and generally significant relationship between 
the different measures of price volatility and quoted bid-ask spreads, consistent with 
McInish and Wood (1992).  Trading volume, as measured by the square root of 
TRADES, is negatively related to quoted bid-ask spreads which is also consistent with 
McInish and Wood (1992), although this relationship is not consistently significant 
across intervals.  Further, the trading volume metric SIZE is insignificant across 
intervals.   
 
The coefficient on expected volatility is positive and significant for all intervals 
except (-20,-10).  Although the coefficient on unexpected volatility is also positive, it 
is not as large as expected volatility and is significant in three of the five intervals.  
Hence the widening in quoted bid-ask spreads results (at least partly) from an increase 
in both expected and unexpected volatility.  F-tests for the equality of coefficients on 
expected and unexpected volatility provide further evidence that expected volatility is 
more significant than unexpected volatility in determining the change in quoted bid-
ask spreads around macroeconomic announcements.  This behaviour is consistent 
                                                 
110 The Durbin-Watson d-statistic provides no evidence of autocorrelation, while the Condition Index 
suggests no severe multicollinearity and F-tests indicate that the model is significant at the 0.001 level 
for each interval. 
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with market makers widening quoted bid-ask spreads due to higher adverse selection 
costs. 
 
Table A-5: Regression analysis of time-weighted quoted bid-ask spreads and White 
adjusted t-statistics 
 Intervals
 (-20,-10) (-10,0) (0,10) (10,20) (20,30)
Intercept (a0) 1.17 * 1.12 * 1.16 * 1.13 * 1.21 *
 37.98 30.99 21.11 17.00  36.65
SQTRADES (a1) -0.12  -0.19 ** -0.39 * -0.10   -0.15 ** 
 -2.33 -3.21 -4.26 -1.63  -2.70
SQSIZE (a2) -0.03   0.03   -0.00   -0.01   -0.05  
 -1.36 1.42 -0.24 -0.58  -2.02
QTESDe (a3) 1.31  1.31 ** 2.90 * 1.99 ** 1.15 * 
 2.09 2.66 3.54 2.89  4.51
QTESDu (a4) 0.72 * 0.23   1.89 * 0.08   0.74 ** 
 4.65 1.02 3.42 0.70  3.02
       
F-statistic (a3=a4) 0.92  5.57 ** 3.97  12.80 * 9.35 * 
       
F-statistic 7.61 * 5.02 * 44.51 * 5.11 * 22.54 * 
Durbin-Watson 1.90 1.99 2.14 2.10  2.01
Condition Index 3.98 4.63 4.60 5.20  5.18
* Significant at the 0.001 level
** Significant at the 0.01 level 
 
A.5  Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
This appendix suggests that futures markets adjust rapidly around scheduled major 
macroeconomic announcements - within 240 seconds of the announcement time.  
Using price volatility metrics similar to prior US research, there is little evidence of 
reaction prior to announcements although significant abnormal price volatility 
(relative to nonannouncement days) persists for up to 110 seconds.  Analysis based on 
a cleaner measure of price volatility purged of bid-ask bounce provides evidence of 
abnormal market behaviour approximately 10 seconds prior to, and continuing for up 
to 240 seconds after, the announcement time.  Returns appear to adjust rapidly, within 
30 seconds of the announcement, although there is some statistically significant 
evidence of overreaction. 
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Similar to the results for price volatility, adjustment reflected in trading volume is 
significant for 240 seconds following announcements, however there is little evidence 
of a reaction prior to announcements.  In contrast, analysis of quoted bid-ask spreads 
suggests that they widen in the 20 seconds prior to announcements and remain 
significantly higher than on nonannouncement days until 30 seconds following 
announcements.  This elevation in bid-ask spreads is related to increases in expected 
and unexpected volatility associated with each type of announcement and is consistent 
with adverse selection models of bid-ask spreads. 
 
At least two future research questions are raised by the results documented in this 
appendix.  First, what is the cause of the apparent overreaction to macroeconomic 
announcements?  Is this driven by market maker trading or by other market 
participants?  Second, what is the relationship between the futures market and the 
underlying market around macroeconomic announcements?  Answers to such 
questions can yield further valuable insights into the adjustment process around 
information announcements, along with insights relevant to assessing the economic 
role of futures markets. 
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A.6  Appendix 
Following Ederington and Lee (1993), ‘major’ macroeconomic announcements are 
identified as those announcement types with a statistically significant impact on 
market volatility.  Dummy variables, Dkt, are defined, where Dkt = 1 if announcement k 
is made on day t and Dkt = 0 otherwise.  The dependent variable in the regression is 
price volatility in the 30-second interval following announcements, interval j, on day 
t.  Hence the following regression is estimated over 499 trading days: 
∑
=
++=
K
k
jtktkjjjt DaaQTESD
1
0 ε  
The coefficient akj is positive and significant if announcement type k has a significant 
impact on price volatility or approximately zero (or negative) if an announcement has 
little impact.  Ederington and Lee (1993) note that as ( ) ja05.02/π  provides an 
estimate of price volatility in interval j on nonannouncement days, then the estimated 
price volatility in interval j on days when k is announced is given by  
)(2533.1 0 kjj aa + .  
 
Following Ederington and Lee (1993), a significance level of 0.005 is used in Table 
A.6 to identify ‘major’ announcements.  On this basis, seven announcements are 
significant in explaining price volatility.  These are (in order of their impact on price 
volatility) Real GDP, Consumer Price Index, Balance of Payments, Average Weekly 
Overtime Earnings, Employment, Retail Trade and Merchandise Imports.  
(A.6)
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Table A-6: The impact of 11:30 macroeconomic announcements on price volatility111 
Regression 
Announcement Coefficient t-statistic n Frequency 
Intercept 0.12 5.30 *   
ANZ Job Vacancies 0.05 0.43  25 Monthly 
Australian Business Expectations -0.03 -0.19  4 Quarterly 
Average Weekly Earnings (prelim & final) 0.89 2.69 *** 4 Quarterly 
Average Weekly Overtime Earnings (prelim & final) 0.49 3.29 ** 15 Quarterly 
Balance of Payments 0.51 6.00 * 26 Monthly & Qtly
Building Approvals 0.27 2.77 *** 24 Monthly 
Company Profits -0.09 -0.46  9 Quarterly 
Consumer Price Index 0.87 6.91 * 8 Quarterly 
Dwelling Unit Commencements -0.01 -0.04  7 Quarterly 
Employment 0.47 5.32 * 25 Monthly 
Housing Finance 0.14 1.69  26 Monthly 
Import Price Index -0.09 -0.27  6 Monthly 
International Trade in Goods and Services 0.08 0.40  6 Monthly 
Job Vacancies and Overtime 0.15 1.11  7 Quarterly 
Lending Finance -0.09 -0.53  5 Monthly 
Merchandise Imports 0.23 2.97 ** 24 Monthly 
Motor Vehicle Registrations 0.09 1.19  25 Monthly 
NAB Business Survey 0.04 0.34  11 Quarterly 
National Accounts 0.10 0.41  3 Quarterly 
Net External Debt 0.29 1.97  9 Quarterly 
Price Index of Articles Produced by Mftg Industry 0.08 1.06  24 Monthly 
Price Index of Materials Used in Non-House Building 0.28 0.85  4 Monthly 
Price Index of Materials Used in Mftg Industries 0.07 0.99  24 Monthly 
Private New Capital Expenditure 0.07 0.53  8 Quarterly 
RBA Credit Aggregates 0.11 1.51  24 Monthly 
Real GDP (Adv) 1.11 6.72 * 6 Quarterly 
Retail Trade 0.28 3.84 * 28 Monthly & Qtly
Stocks and Sales, Selected Industries 0.06 0.58  9 Quarterly 
    
Adjusted R2 0.226    
* Significant at the 0.0001 level 
** Significant at the 0.005 level 
*** Significant at the 0.02 level 
 
                                                 
111 The reported coefficients are 103 times actual coefficients. 
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Appendix B: An Empirical Analysis of Price and Time Priority and 
Pro-Rata Trade Execution Algorithms in Electronic Screen 
Traded Markets112 
 
B.1  Introduction 
Trade execution algorithms are used in electronic screen traded futures markets to 
determine which standing limit orders have priority in execution against incoming 
market orders.  The Chicago Mercantile Exchange operates an overnight screen traded 
system called Globex2.  This system typically uses a price and time priority execution 
algorithm that queues standing limit orders at the same price for execution according 
to the time at which they were submitted.  The price and time priority algorithm is one 
of the most commonly used in electronic screen traded markets (see Domowitz, 
1993).  Until recently, the overnight electronic screen trading systems of the Chicago 
Board of Trade (Project A) and London International Financial Futures and Options 
Exchange (APT) used a pro-rata trade execution algorithm.  Pro-rata execution 
algorithms allow standing limit orders at the same price to share in execution against 
an incoming market order in proportion to their size.  
 
This study provides empirical analysis that assesses the efficiency of price and time 
priority versus pro-rata algorithms.  It is motivated by the fact that very little research 
                                                 
112 The material in this appendix is the basis for a publication in the Journal of Derivatives 7, 2000. 
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has examined specific elements of electronic screen traded systems, despite the 
dramatic increase in the volume of trading on these systems and the international 
move by many exchanges towards electronic screen traded futures markets.113,114  
Domowitz (1990), however, compares the algorithms of three trade execution systems 
applied in futures, option and stock markets examining price discovery and quantity 
determination in each market.  He measures the efficiency of these systems using 
Walrasian equilibrium pricing and welfare measures in terms of trader and customer 
surpluses.  Priority rules on the three systems examined vary with respect to 
transparency, rotation among market makers and prearranged trades, but Domowitz 
(1990) does not explore pro-rata algorithms.   
 
There are a number of reasons to expect that execution algorithms will have an impact 
on liquidity and market quality.  Angel (1996), for example, criticises pro-rata 
algorithms on the basis that “there are no incentives for dealers to compete on price, 
which can lead to wider bid-ask spreads” (Angel, 1996, pp. 13).115  Harris (1990) also 
notes that pro-rata algorithms can discourage certain groups of traders (for example, 
smaller traders) from supplying liquidity.  Harris (1990) recognises that if such traders 
make up the majority of liquidity providers, trade execution algorithms can have an 
impact on liquidity and market quality. Another reason for expecting execution 
algorithms to be relevant is the presence of different algorithms across exchanges, 
                                                 
113 In 1997, trading volume on Globex increased by 118% and on Project A by 143%.  In 1998, volume 
on these two trading systems increased by 123% and 108%, respectively, according to CME and CBOT 
annual reports and publications. 
114 The SFE and LIFFE introduced daytime automated trading systems during 1999. 
115 Angel (1996) acknowledges, however, that a rule giving time priority to the first order that improves 
the current market price may provide more price competition. 
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which suggests that there are differences in beliefs regarding their impact on market 
quality.  This study provides direct empirical evidence on this issue. 
 
On 20 September 1998, the CME changed the algorithm governing trade execution 
for Eurodollar futures from price and time priority to pro-rata.  The CME argues that a 
pro-rata execution algorithm is more suitable for Eurodollar futures because they 
“usually trade in a narrow price range and each price level is represented by size”.116  
This change provides a unique, natural laboratory experiment that can be used to 
evaluate the efficiency of different algorithms.  This study analyses the trading 
behaviour of Eurodollar futures around the introduction of the pro-rata algorithm to 
determine whether the choice of algorithm affects market quality.117  
 
The remainder of the appendix is structured as follows.  The next section describes the 
institutional detail, while Section B.3 sets out the data and sampling procedures.  
Sections B.4 and B.5 describe and report various tests of the impact of the change in 
algorithm on the CME, while the final section provides a summary and conclusion. 
 
B.2  Institutional Detail 
On 20 September 1998, the CME updated their overnight trading platform from 
Globex to Globex2 and instituted a change in the algorithm governing trade execution 
                                                 
116 “Technology at the CME – Make the connection”, CME Globex2, 1998. 
117 Smith and Webb (1993) and Crain and Lee (1995) examine volatility in the Eurodollar contract 
around information announcements and Webb and Smith (1994) examines volatility in the Eurodollar 
around market opening and closing.  None of this research examines trading on the screen traded 
overnight market - Globex. 
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in the Eurodollar futures contract from price and time priority to pro-rata.  Globex2 
has been in effect since 20 September 1998 (although trading reverted to Globex 
between 27 September 1998 and 1 October 1998 because of technical problems).118  
Both Globex and Globex2 are continuous, open, electronic limit order books with 
transparency limited to the best bid and ask.  While very similar to Globex, Globex2 
offers enhanced order flexibility, improved order management, customised screen 
displays and improved order administration functions. 
 
The price and time priority algorithm used on Globex gave priority to higher-priced 
limit bid orders and lower-priced limit ask orders for execution against incoming 
market orders.  When two or more limit orders stood at the same price, older orders 
were given priority in execution.  The pro-rata algorithm used on Globex2 also 
executes higher-priced limit bid orders and lower-priced limit ask orders first against 
incoming market orders, yet differs in the way that it prioritises limit orders at the 
same price.  After the opening, ‘time priority’ is assigned to the first order placed at a 
price that betters the market and this time priority order is executed first at a given 
price level.119  All remaining orders at the same price are then allocated a share of an 
                                                 
118 The technical problems related to some E-mini terminal users and did not affect Eurodollar trades. 
119 Orders placed pre-opening are matched according to price and time priority.  An order does not 
retain its ‘time priority’ after an order at a better price has been entered. 
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incoming market order on the basis of their size relative to other orders at that price.  
The volume allocated to a given limit order is rounded down to the nearest whole 
contract and the largest order is allocated the sum of rounded down portions.  If two 
or more orders have identical quantities and are the largest orders, Globex2 randomly 
assigns the remainder to one of the large orders. 
 
During the sample period, Eurodollar futures were traded on the CME’s overnight 
system from 14:10 to 07:05 (on the following day) Monday through Thursday.  On 
Sundays, trading opened at 17:30 and closed at 07:05.  Floor trading in the Eurodollar 
occurs from Monday through Friday between 07.20 and 14.00.  The Eurodollar 
contract is based on a Eurodollar time deposit with a principal value of USD 1 million 
and a three-month maturity.  The minimum tick on the Eurodollar contract is half of 
one basis point, 0.005, where one basis point, 0.01, is valued at $25.  The nearest 
expiration month trades at a minimum tick of 0.0025. 
 
B.3  Data and Sampling 
B.3.1 Data 
This study examines intraday data for both floor and electronic screen trading around 
the change in the trade execution algorithm in Eurodollar futures on the CME.120  The 
data available describe transactions on Globex, Globex2 and the CME floor.  The data  
                                                 
120 Data were obtained from the Futures Industry Institute. 
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for floor trading are time and sales data, which cover price changing transactions only  
(see Smith and Whaley, 1994).  Each time and sales data record provides a field 
describing the transaction price (but not volume) and a time stamp accurate to the 
nearest second.  For Globex and Globex2, the data available consist of a complete 
transaction list time-stamped to the nearest second, with fields describing price and 
volume. 
 
The data extend from 16 March 1998 through 11 June 1999 and span the two changes 
in the algorithm.  From 16 March 1998 through 17 September 1998 and 27 September 
1998 through 1 October 1998, the price and time priority algorithm was in effect, 
while from 20 September 1998 through 24 September 1998 and from 4 October 1998 
onward, the pro-rata algorithm was in effect.  The final sample available for analysis 
consists of 136 days when the price and time priority algorithm was in effect and 179 
days when the pro-rata algorithm was in effect. 
 
B.3.2 Sampling 
The change in trading algorithm occurred near not only the expiration of the 
September futures contract (14 September 1998), but also a surprise interest rate cut 
by the Federal Reserve on 15 October 1998.121  Figure B-1 illustrates that Eurodollar 
futures prices were unusually volatile around the announcement date and hence any 
                                                 
121 See Federal Reserve Press Release, October 15, 1998. 
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change in market behaviour may be driven by both expiration and announcement 
effects as well as the change in algorithm.122 
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Figure B-1: Eurodollar futures prices between 16 March 1998 and 11 June 1999 
 
 
To avoid possible extraneous effects associated with the interest rate cut, the period 
extending from 14 September 1998 through 14 December 1998 is excluded from 
analysis.  This sampling criteria excludes five days before the first change in 
algorithm and forty-nine days after the final change in algorithm.  This mitigates 
possible learning effects associated with the change in algorithm as well as the period 
associated with technical difficulties (27 September 1998 through 1 October 1998).  
This study essentially applies a pre-post research design centred on the change in the 
algorithm in the Eurodollar.  For this purpose, two sub-samples of data are formed, 
                                                 
122 An examination of 32 days of intraday data captured from a Bloomberg terminal around this period 
supports this conclusion. 
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one including days for the period a price and time priority algorithm was in operation 
(the ‘pre’ period) and the other including days when a pro-rata execution algorithm 
was in operation (the ‘post’ period). 
 
This study analyses trading activity in the nearest-to-maturity quarterly contracts.123  
These are the June 1998 and September 1998 expiration contracts for the pre-period, 
and the March 1999 and June 1999 contracts for the post-period. The data examined 
for the June 1998 expiration contract extend from the beginning of the sample period 
(16 March 1998) through expiration (12 June 1998).  For the September contract, the 
data extend from 15 June 1998 to the end of the pre-period (11 September 1998).  
Data are sampled for the March futures contract from 15 December 1998 through 
expiration (12 March 1999), and for the June expiration contract from 15 March 1999, 
through the end of the sample period (11 June 1999).  This sampling procedure 
controls for possible time-to-expiration effects in liquidity, as the average time to 
maturity of the contracts for the days sampled in the pre-period is approximately equal 
to that of the days sampled in the post-period (see Grammatikos and Saunders, 1986). 
 
B.4  Changes in Bid-Ask Spreads, Trading Volume and Price Volatility 
It has been argued that bid-ask spreads are a measure of the liquidity of markets and 
are an important indicator of the quality of markets (Kumar et al., 1998).  
Consequently, this study examines the change in bid-ask spreads around the time of 
                                                 
123 Quarterly maturities are the most liquid contracts. 
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change in the execution algorithm.   Since the data available for analysis does not 
include bid or ask quotes, two commonly used bid-ask spread estimators are 
examined.  The serial covariance estimator originally developed by Roll (1984) is 
calculated for each day in the pre- and post-periods as follows: 
( )[ ]1,2 −∆∆−= ttd PPCOVBAS  
Where BASd is the effective bid-ask spread on day d, and ( )1, −∆∆ tt PPCOV  denotes 
the covariance of the change in fifteen-minute prices on day d. 
 
Following Laux and Senchack’s (1992) application of this estimator, price changes 
are sampled at regular intraday (fifteen-minute) time intervals, using the last traded 
price in each interval.  When the serial covariance is positive, the Roll estimator is not 
defined and hence such days are excluded from analysis.  As a robustness measure, 
the estimator applied by Wang et al. (1994) is also used.  The Wang estimator requires 
the application of a three-step procedure.  First, the subset of transaction price changes 
that exhibit price continuity are discarded.  Second, the absolute value of price 
changes representing reversals in price movements is computed.  Third, the mean of 
these absolute values is calculated for each day. 
 
Prior research suggests that trading volume and price volatility are important 
determinants of bid-ask spreads (McInish and Wood, 1992; Frino, Stevenson and 
Duffy, 1998).  Hence these variables are examined to assess the extent to which they 
may explain the change in bid-ask spreads.  For this purpose, the number of contracts 
(B.1)
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traded each day is calculated (VOLUMEd), as well as price volatility using the 
Parkinson (1980) extreme value estimator: 
( )
2ln4
lnln
2
n
LH
VOLATILITYd
−=  
Where H and L are the highest and lowest traded prices during day d and ln refers to 
the natural logarithm.  Wiggins (1992) demonstrates that estimates of price volatility 
incorporating extreme values are more efficient than those based on closing prices.  
The first set of tests documents the changes in the mean value of the Roll estimator, 
Wang estimator, trading volume and price volatility from the pre- to the post- sample 
periods.  The statistical significance of these changes is assessed using standard t-
tests.124  
 
Table B-1 reports the mean daily bid-ask spread estimators, trading volume and price 
volatility in both periods, as well as the change in these means (∆ Mean) and 
associated t-statistics.   Panel A reports results for bid-ask spreads based on the Roll 
estimator, while Panel B reports results based on the Wang estimator.  The Roll 
estimator requires the covariance of price returns to be positive (otherwise it is 
undefined), while the Wang estimator relies on observing price reversals over a 
trading day.  The sample sizes therefore differ because Panel A excludes days when 
the Roll estimator is undefined.  Similarly, Panel B excludes days when the Wang 
estimator cannot be calculated. 
 
                                                 
124 Nonparametric tests were also conducted but as the results are consistent with the parametric tests, 
they are not reported. 
(B.2)
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Table B-1: Bid-ask spreads, trading volume and price volatility around the change in 
the trade execution algorithm in Eurodollar futures on the CME 
 Bid-ask Spread Covariance 
(×103) Volume  Volatility (×106) n 
Panel A: Roll Estimator 
         
Mean Pre-Period  0.0050 -0.00795 2160.44  0.00752 39 
Mean Post-Period  0.0048 -0.00752 2121.00  0.01089 38 
∆ Mean  -0.0002 -0.00043 -39.44  0.00338  
t-statistic  -0.33 0.24 -0.19  1.79 **  
       
Panel B: Wang Estimator 
Mean Pre-Period  0.0050 1519.91  0.00662 96 
Mean Post-Period  0.0049 1675.24  0.00810 98 
∆ Mean  -0.0001 155.34  0.00149
t-statistic  -0.51 1.38  1.49
* Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
The results reported in both panels of Table B-1 suggest that average bid-ask spreads 
in the pre- and post-periods are approximately 0.005 (one-half of one basis point).  
Not surprisingly, the t-statistics on the change in mean bid-ask spreads are not 
significant in either panel.  The average trading volume in the pre- and post-periods is 
also similar in both panels and the t-statistics are again not significant.  Hence there is 
little evidence of a statistically significant change in either bid-ask spreads or trading 
volume around the time of change in the execution algorithm.  The results in both 
panels do suggest that price volatility may have changed from the pre- to the post-
period.  The mean price volatility in the post-period is higher than the pre-period in 
both Panel A and Panel B.  Further, the change in mean price volatility is statistically 
significant at the 0.10 level in Panel A.  Given that price volatility is positively related 
to bid-ask spreads (McInish and Wood, 1992; Wang et al., 1994), it is possible that 
any change in the bid-ask spread associated with the change in trade execution 
algorithm is being confounded by the change in price volatility.  The next section 
reports results of two alternative tests, which control for the change in price volatility.   
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B.5  Controls for Changes in Market Conditions 
The data underlying the results reported in Table B-1 are based on Globex and 
Globex2 trading, where the change in the trade execution algorithm occurred.  
Following each Globex and Globex2 trading session is a floor trading session, 
however, which did not undergo any structural change over the sample period.  Given 
that price volatility shocks in Eurodollar futures markets can persist into evening 
trading sessions (Abhyankar, 1995), price volatility and bid-ask spreads computed for 
the floor trading sessions adjacent to the screen trading sessions can be used as the 
basis for a control. 
 
For each day in the pre- and post- periods, bid-ask spread estimators and price 
volatility are calculated using the floor data.  The average daily ratio of Globex bid-
ask spreads to floor bid-ask spreads (for both estimators) and Globex price volatility 
to floor price volatility are calculated for the pre- and post- periods.  The change in the 
mean ratios for each variable is then calculated and a t-test applied to the change.125   
                                                 
125 Trading volume ratios cannot be examined because time and sales data for floor trading do not 
report volume. 
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Table B-2: Globex/floor ratios around the change in the trade execution algorithm on 
the CME 
 Roll Estimator Wang Estimator 
 Bid-Ask Spread Volatility  n Bid-Ask Spread Volatility  n 
Mean Pre-Period  0.3822 1.0114 39 1.0773 0.8909 96
Mean Post-Period  0.4069 0.9410 38 1.1508 0.5700 98
∆ Mean  0.0247 -0.0704 0.7342 -0.3208  
t-statistic  0.55 -0.27 1.48 -1.60 
* Significant at the 0.01 level   
** Significant at the 0.10 level   
Note: Mean daily ratio of bid-ask spreads for Globex2 relative to adjacent floor sessions, as well as an 
analogous ratio for price volatility. 
 
Table B-2 presents the mean Globex/floor ratios for both bid-ask spread estimates and 
price volatility in the pre- and post- periods, together with the change in the mean and 
a t-test on the change.  The average bid-ask spread ratio is similar in the pre- and post-
periods for both the Roll and Wang estimators, and, not surprisingly, the t-statistics on 
the change in the means are not significant for either estimator.  While the mean price 
volatility ratios appear to fall from the pre- to the post- period, the changes are not 
statistically significant.  These findings corroborate those in Table B-1 and imply that 
the change in price volatility is a general market change that affected both floor and 
screen trading.  Further, even after controlling for the change in price volatility 
(through its effect on bid-ask spreads during floor trading), there is no evidence of a 
change in bid-ask spreads around the time of change in the execution algorithm. 
 
Another way to control for changes in price volatility from the pre- to post-period is 
to use a regression framework.  Hence the data are also used to estimate the 
parameters of the model: 
dPddd DaVOLUMEaVOLATILITYaaBAS ε++++= 3210  (B.3) 
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Where PD  is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is drawn from the post-
period, or 0 otherwise, and dε  is the disturbance term.  All t-statistics are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the procedure outlined in Newey and 
West (1987).126   
 
Table B-3: Regression model of bid-ask spreads 
 Roll Estimator Wang Estimator 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
   
Intercept 0.0050 6.81 ** 0.0052 23.07 ** 
Volatility 14259.74 8.51 ** 92218.99 3.60 ** 
Volume -2.15×10-8 -0.67   -5.49×10-7 -3.14 ** 
D -0.0001 -0.25   -0.0002 -0.61   
   
R2  0.21  0.20
F-statistic  6.32 **  15.85 ** 
n  77  194
* Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
 
Table B-3 reports the regression results.127  The coefficient on price volatility is 
positive and significant for both bid-ask spread estimators and the coefficient on 
trading volume is negative across both estimators and significant for the Wang 
estimator.128  These results are consistent with previous work by Wang et al. (1994) 
who examine bid-ask spread estimators in futures markets and McInish and Wood 
(1992) who examine quoted bid-ask spreads in equities markets.  These results 
                                                 
126 Preliminary tests indicated the need to adjust for autocorrelation. 
127 Durbin-Watson statistics are not presented as t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation.  The F-statistic indicates that the overall model is significant. 
128 While there are some differences in results for the two alternative bid-ask spread estimators, these 
are likely to be driven by sampling differences (the application of the Roll estimator results in the loss 
of approximately 69% of observations, while the Wang estimator results in the loss of approximately 
22% of observations).  To this extent, the results based on the Wang estimator are more likely to be 
internally valid, but as the qualitative conclusions that can be drawn from both sets of analysis are 
similar, any sampling biases are unlikely to be serious. 
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represent an internal validity check on the bid-ask spread estimators and suggest that 
they behave as expected. 
 
Table B-3 also documents that the coefficients on the dummy variable are not 
significant at conventional levels.  This again corroborates the findings in Table B-1 
and implies that even after controlling for changes in price volatility (and trading 
volume) from the pre- to the post-period, there is no statistically significant change in 
bid-ask spreads.  This suggests that the change in execution algorithm had little effect 
on the liquidity of Eurodollar futures. 
 
B.6  Summary and Conclusions 
The CME’s change of the algorithm governing trade execution in the Eurodollar 
futures contract from price and time priority to pro-rata allocation allows a direct 
comparison of the performance of these two algorithms.  Sub-samples of data were 
constructed to match the maturity characteristics of contracts in the days before and 
the days after the change, omitting data in periods associated with possibly 
confounding events.  There is little evidence of alteration in the mean bid-ask spread 
according to either the Roll or the Wang estimators around the time of the change in 
the algorithm.   
 
Two further tests were carried out to assess whether market conditions might have 
obfuscated the effect of the change in trade execution algorithm.  First, bid-ask spread 
estimates during Globex and Globex2 trading which experienced the change in 
algorithm were compared with bid-ask spread estimates during adjacent floor trading 
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sessions.  Second, a regression approach was applied to control for possible changes 
in price volatility and trading volume around the time of the change in algorithm.  The 
conclusions that are supported by both sets of analysis are consistent with the broad 
result.  That is, there is little evidence of a statistically significant change in bid-ask 
spreads around the time of the change in trade execution algorithm even after 
controlling for market conditions.  Hence it appears that the pro-rata algorithms have 
little impact on liquidity and market quality. 
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Appendix C: Market Crossings and the Quality of Execution on 
Floor and Electronic Screen Traded Markets 
 
C.1  Introduction 
Market crossings occur in futures markets when a single broker who holds matching 
buy and sell orders from different clients for the same contract and delivery month, 
may ‘cross’ these orders in the market.  The impact of crossings on market quality is a 
contentious issue, reflected in the wide variety of crossing rules existing on different 
exchanges.  For example, the CBOT generally prohibits crossing of customer orders, 
the CME requires that both orders are first bid and offered to the pit three times at the 
cross price, while the LIFFE requires there to be both a bid and offer present in the 
electronic limit order book.  Market crossings are also a topical regulatory issue as the 
Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and SFE have identified 
breaches of trading rules relating to the withholding of orders involved in crossings.129  
Withholding orders threatens open participation in the market and competitive price 
discovery and supports Domowitz’s (1993) argument that cross trades represent non-
competitive execution.  This appendix analyses the nature and quality of execution of 
orders involved in market crossings on the floor and electronic screen traded market 
of the SFE.   
 
Prior literature has not examined ‘on-market’ crossings or the impact of these 
                                                 
129 See “ASIC warns of a ‘shot across the bow’”, The Australian Financial Review, 7 August 1998. 
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crossings on the quality of trade execution.  Cohen and Conroy (1990) assess the 
introduction of Rule 19c-3, which permitted NYSE members to match buy and sell 
orders in-house without sending each order directly to the exchange floor.  Utilising a 
sample of daily data for the first five trading days of each month over the period 
September 1980 through November 1983, they found strong evidence of Exchange 
member over-the-counter market-making activity reducing percentage bid-ask 
spreads.  However, this positive effect was not found to be strong enough to outweigh 
the undesirable market fragmentation effect on returns variance.  Although this 
appendix provides evidence on the impact of ‘off-market’ crossings on market 
quality, it does not directly assess on-market crossings or the quality of trade 
execution for orders involved in crossings. 
 
Prior to 4 October 1999, the SFE conducted daytime trading on the floor of the 
exchange and overnight trading on the electronic screen traded system, SYCOM.130  
Orders received by brokers during daytime trading hours were able to be crossed on 
the floor if they were first bid and offered competitively by open outcry at the cross 
price.  Cross trades are also permitted during SYCOM trading provided the 
component orders are entered into SYCOM in the strict sequence by which brokers 
receive them.  Prior to 24 September 1997, the SFE enforced an additional 
requirement for traders to allow 10 seconds between entering the two sides of a cross 
on SYCOM.  The removal of this requirement on 24 September 1997 provides a 
natural experiment to determine whether trading rules governing market crossings can  
                                                 
130 On 4 October 1999, the SFE began daytime trading in stock index futures on SYCOM IV.  This was 
the first stage towards full electronic trading as described in Chapter 3.   
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provide brokers with flexibility to influence the quality of execution for investors.  
 
The remainder of the appendix is structured as follows.  In the next section, 
institutional detail is discussed and theoretical considerations are presented in Section 
C.3.  In Section C.4, the data and method for examining crossings on the floor and 
SYCOM are presented.  In Section C.5, the results are presented, while the final 
section concludes and provides suggestions for future research. 
 
C.2  Institutional Detail 
During the sample period examined, interest rate futures were traded by open outcry 
on the floor of the SFE between 08:30 and 16:30 and stock index futures between 
09:50 and 16:10, breaking for lunch between 12:30 and 14:00.  The overnight trading 
session on SYCOM commenced at 16:30 with a 10-minute call market and 
continuous trading began at 16:40 through to 06:00 during Australian Eastern 
Standard Time and 07:00 during Australian Eastern Daylight Time. 
 
Floor trading on the SFE was conducted as a continuous open outcry auction market.  
A single floor broker holding both buy and sell orders from different accounts for the 
same contract and delivery month was able to cross these orders directly in the 
market, provided they were first bid and offered competitively by open outcry at the 
cross price.  If neither the bid nor the offer was accepted, the orders could be matched 
by announcing the number of lots, followed by the word ‘crossed’.  A full cross 
occurred when a trader was not accepted on either the bid or offer.  In these 
circumstances, the trader was allowed to cross twice the volume announced to the 
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market.  Where either the bid or offer was accepted in attempting a cross, the broker 
was obliged to conclude the trade with respect to the volume shown to the market and 
then permitted to cross an equivalent volume.                                                                                             
 
Market crossings were required to be executed at or within the market price being 
quoted and were to be clearly identified on the trading chit (a hard-copy record of the 
trade) with the exact time of execution.  These trading chits were presented to an 
Exchange official for verification and initialling and the Exchange official recorded 
full details of each cross trade on the ‘cross sheets’.  Soliciting of an order from one 
customer to fill another customer order was prohibited and no member or trader was 
permitted to withhold execution of an order or seek to avoid trading with the intent to 
cross.  
 
SYCOM is an electronic limit order book.  Limit orders placed on SYCOM that do 
not immediately execute are queued and executed on a price and time priority basis.  
Traders or members who have in hand, at the same time, both buying and selling 
orders for different accounts for the same contract and delivery month may enter such 
orders and execute a cross trade, provided that they are entered into SYCOM in the 
strict order in which they are received.  Prior to 24 September 1997, traders were 
required to allow at least 10 seconds between entering the two sides of the cross.  An 
amendment that came into effect on 24 September 1997 removed the so-called ‘10 
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second’ rule.131 
  
C.3  Theoretical Considerations 
C.3.1 Order Preferencing 
If a broker includes a customer order which is either a discretionary limit order or 
market order in a cross trade, then the quality of execution for customers involved in 
market crossings becomes an important issue.  Discretionary limit orders give brokers 
discretion with respect to the price at which orders are executed.  For example, 
brokers may be given discretion to execute an order within one or more points around 
a given price.  Market orders are to be executed at the market price.  Hence a broker 
holding both sides of the trade under these circumstances has discretion as to which 
customer crosses (pays) the bid-ask spread in order to execute the cross trade.  There 
are several incentives for brokers to preference certain clients.  For example, certain 
clients, particularly large clients, may be preferenced by brokers in order to foster 
long-term trading relationships.  These clients may reward brokers by agreeing, 
through implicit contracts, to trade with them in the future (see Aitken et al., 1995). 
 
Prior literature has found that trade direction is serially correlated (see Hasbrouck, 
                                                 
131 A related trading rule has since been introduced on SYCOM IV whereby half of the volume 
attached to a cross trade is executed immediately, with the remainder locked into the market for open 
trading.  Following a certain period of time, any remaining volume is automatically crossed or released 
to the market.  
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1991).  Hence if consecutive trades occur at the bid, a customer who wishes to buy 
may expect their trade to also occur at the bid (the more active side) and hence earn 
the bid-ask spread.  However, a broker holding both sides of the trade may cross the 
buy trade at the ask in preferencing the seller’s order.  The reverse also holds.  Hence 
this appendix tests the null hypothesis that orders involved in crossings are not subject 
to reduced execution quality, where one party is forced to pay the bid-ask spread in a 
transaction where they normally would not expect to.  
 
C.3.2 Timing of Crossings 
The quality of an order’s execution relates to both the price and the time for which it 
takes the order to be executed.  If brokers have discretion over the execution of orders 
they intend to cross, they may be motivated to hold the cross trade to a quieter trading 
period.  This is because if brokers offer a cross trade to the market during a busy 
trading period, it is likely that other traders will ‘hit’ at least one side of the cross.  In 
contrast, if a broker holds these orders until a less active trading period, it is more 
likely the trader will be able to conduct the cross without being hit and hence fill the 
order on the inactive side of the market (in favouring a particular customer).  Hence 
this study also tests the null hypothesis that there is no evidence that brokers time the 
submission of orders involved in market crossings. 
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C.4  Data and Method 
C.4.1 Data 
Intraday transaction and quote data were obtained from the SFE for the nearest-to-
maturity 3-Year Commonwealth Treasury Bond (3-Year Bond) and Share Price Index 
futures contracts over the period 23 July 1997 through 31 December 1997.  Pit data 
(also known as Inter-Exchange Technical Committee – ITC - data) contain fields 
describing the price and volume of trades, and the price of new bid and ask quotes.  
The ITC data for floor trading were compiled from the ‘real time’ observation of SFE 
pit personnel known as price reporters and are time stamped to the nearest second.  
ITC data are routed to users via information vendors and are relied upon by 
institutions to make trading decisions, hence reporting delays for ITC data are likely 
to be minimal.   
 
SFE Trade Allocation Confirmation System (STACS) data were also obtained for the 
same period from the SFE.  STACS data are compiled from the hard-copy trade 
records (trading chits) completed by traders.  These data include accurate price and 
volume fields, as well as buyer and seller broker identifications, however they are 
time-stamped to the nearest minute.  Data for the overnight electronic market is 
obtained from the SYCOM trading system and is a complete and accurate list of price 
and volume fields for both quotes and transactions, all time-stamped to the nearest 
second. 
  
Market crossings are identified as trade records with the same buyer and seller broker 
identifications in the STACS data.  Half crossings are identified as market crossings 
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with the same time-stamp, price and volume as another trade involving the crossing 
broker. 
 
C.4.2 Method 
Two sets of analysis are developed to determine whether traders: (i) preference certain 
client orders; and/or (ii) time the execution of crossing trades.  Descriptive statistics 
are calculated for crossing and regular trades.  The sample of crossing trades is then 
compared to a sub-sample of ‘matched’ regular trades.  This sub-sample is created by 
matching each crossing trade to a regular trade occurring within a 20-minute window 
centred on the time of the crossing, on the following day and with the closest trade 
size to the crossing.  Finally, each set of analysis is replicated using a ‘clean’ sample 
whereby control observations with other crossing trades occurring within a 20-minute 
window centred on the observation are removed.132  SYCOM data is partitioned into 
two sub-samples based on the 24 September 1997, when the rule for executing 
crossings was changed. 
 
The first set of analysis determines whether market crossings are executed on the 
same side of the bid-ask spread as surrounding trades or whether one side of the trade 
is being forced to pay the bid-ask spread where normally they would not expect to.  
Each market crossing is matched with the market quote in effect 5 seconds prior to the 
crossing trade to determine whether it was executed at the bid or offer.133  The number 
                                                 
132 Results for the overall analysis are presented in this appendix, as the results are consistent with those 
found for the ‘clean’ sample. 
133 Hill (1997) finds that the quote in effect 5 seconds prior to the trade is, on average, the most 
accurate for determining whether trades are buyer- or seller-initiated for the SFE. 
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of trades that occur on the same side of the spread (bid or offer) in the minute of the 
market crossing is then calculated as a proportion of the total number of trades 
occurring in that minute (excluding the crossing trade itself).134  This ratio is then 
calculated for the sub-sample of regular trades and is also replicated using trade 
volume (number of contracts traded).  The second set of analysis examines whether 
brokers are discretionary in the timing of market crossings.  The number of trades 
occurring within 5-minute intervals for 20 minutes either side of crossings is 
calculated (excluding the trade itself).  This analysis is replicated for the sub-sample 
of regular trades in order to provide evidence on whether traders select intervals with 
relatively lower trading frequency to execute crossings. 
 
C.5  Results 
Table C-1 presents descriptive statistics on the size and frequency of regular and 
crossing trades for the overall and matched sub-samples.135  Market crossings account 
for 5.72% of floor trades, with approximately 19% of crossings being hit when 
brought to the market.  Although crossings account for a slightly lower percentage of 
trades on SYCOM, it is noteworthy that this proportion increased after the crossing 
rule change from 3.66% to 4.16%.136  Crossing trades are larger relative to regular 
trades on the floor when looking at both mean and median statistics for the overall 
                                                 
134 Several observations were lost from this analysis due to observation intervals with only one trade 
rather than the inability to classify trades as buyer- or seller-initiated. 
135 Results for SPI futures are not included as they are consistent with those for the 3-Year Bond futures 
analysis.  Descriptive statistics are also calculated for sub-samples of crossing and regular trades 
occurring at the bid and ask and on an intraday basis.  As no distinct patterns are evident for either 
robustness check, these results are not reported.   
136 These frequency statistics are consistent with those obtained from the SFE for the calendar year of 
1996, where crossing trades accounted for 5.82% of floor trades and 3.16% of SYCOM trades.  This 
performs an important check that the sampling criteria for determining market crossings are accurate. 
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and matched samples.  Half crossings are smaller in size relative to full crossings, 
which is not surprising given that brokers can cross twice the amount shown to the 
market when a crossing is not hit.  SYCOM crossing and regular trades appear to be 
of a similar size when comparing the overall samples.  However, there is some 
evidence that the crossing rule change has led to a larger crossing size relative to the 
sub-sample of matched regular trades.  
  
Table C-1: Descriptive statistics: Size and frequency 
 Regular Trades Crossing Trades 
 All Matched Full Crossing Half Crossing 
Panel A: Floor Trading 
Mean 18.94 16.64 36.59 22.23 
Median 10 10 20 11 
Std. Dev. 27.35 31.36 68.12 25.55 
n 97011 4207 4935 944 
% Frequency 94.29%  4.80% 0.92% 
     
Panel B: SYCOM     
 Regular Trades Crossing Trades 
 Pre Post Pre Post 
 All Matched All Matched   
       
Mean 28.78 32.25 28.22 24.25 30.58 28.45 
Median 20 18 20 14 20 16 
Std. Dev. 34.31 37.41 35.41 33.16 36.74 36.92 
n 6220 130 7310 138 236 317 
% Frequency 96.34%  95.84%  3.66% 4.16% 
 
Table C-2 documents the proportion of trades that are executed on the same side of 
the market (bid or offer) and occur within the same minute as crossing (regular) 
trades.137  For the floor trading sample, both full and half crossings are accompanied 
by a significantly larger percentage of trades occurring on the same side of the bid-ask 
spread than regular trades.  This suggests that there is little evidence of preferencing 
certain customer orders in a crossing.  For SYCOM trading, prior to the rule change, 
market crossings are accompanied by a smaller percentage of trades on the same side 
                                                 
137 The trade volume analysis is not presented as it yields results consistent with the trade frequency 
ratios. 
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of the bid-ask spread than regular trades, although this is not significant.  Following 
the rule change, however, crossings are accompanied by a significantly larger 
percentage of trades occurring on the same side of the bid-ask spread than regular 
trades.  This provides some evidence that the rules governing the execution of market 
crossings can impact on the quality of execution of constituent orders on electronic 
trading systems. 
  
Table C-2: Proportion of trades on same side of bid-ask spread as crossing 
Trade Type 
Regular n Full Crossing n  Half Crossing  n 
Panel A: Floor Trading 
Proportion 0.728 2011 0.731 4431  0.761  944
Paired Difference   0.021    0.064   
t-statistic   (2.08) **   (2.73) *  
      
Panel B: SYCOM 
Trade Type  Paired Difference  
Regular n Crossing n    
Proportion Pre 0.931 60 0.914 137  -0.002   
t-statistic     (-0.27)   
Proportion Post 0.810 64 0.912 206  0.126   
t-statistic      (2.20) **  
* Significant at the 0.01 level  
** Significant at the 0.10 level  
 
Table C-3 documents the difference in trading frequency between paired crossing and 
regular trades in 5-minute intervals, for 20 minutes either side of the respective trades.  
Trading activity is significantly higher in each 5-minute interval surrounding both full 
and half crossings on the floor relative to intervals surrounding regular trades.  In 
addition, for full crossings, abnormal trading frequency is significantly higher in each 
successive 5-minute interval up until (and including) the interval which contains the 
market crossing.  This suggests that traders do not time market crossings to occur 
during relatively less active trading periods.  Table C-3 also provides evidence that 
the interval associated with the trade has a similar level of abnormal trading frequency 
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for both full and half crossings, relative to regular trades.  This is inconsistent with the 
argument that crossings in periods of higher trading activity are more likely to be 
associated with a partial fill.   
 
Table C-3: Trading activity around crossing trades 
 Intervals (minutes) 
 -20 to –16  -15 to –11  -10 to -6  -5 to -1  0 to 3  4 to 9  10 to 14  15 to 19  
Panel A: Floor Trading 
Full Crossings 
Abnormal 2.105 2.983  4.236 7.003 10.371 4.305  4.264  3.899
t-statistic (5.896) * (8.177) * (11.363) * (17.937) * (24.729) * (10.620) * (10.815) * (10.311) * 
Change  0.877  1.253 2.767 3.368 -6.066  -0.041  -0.365
t-statistic  (2.308) ** (3.292) * (6.880) * (7.357) * (-13.128) * (-0.096)  (-0.926)
       
Half Crossings 
Abnormal 2.189 2.613  5.440 6.689 9.485 4.198  4.558  6.046
t-statistic (2.321) ** (2.905) * (5.328) * (6.876) * (8.756) * (3.939) * (4.517) * (6.646) * 
Change  0.423  2.828 1.249 2.795 -5.287  0.360  1.488
t-statistic  (0.441)  (3.054) * (1.192) (2.531) * (-4.484) * (0.329)  (1.537)
       
Panel B: SYCOM 
Pre       
Abnormal -0.169 0.138  0.162 1.438 -0.038 -0.300  0.354  -0.469
t-statistic (-0.531) (0.499)  (0.590) (4.731) * (-0.092) (-1.086)  (1.381)  (-2.283) ** 
Change  0.308  0.023 1.277 -1.477 -0.262  0.654  -0.823
t-statistic  (0.858)  (0.074) (3.234) * (-3.136) * (-0.588)  (2.042) ** (-3.063) * 
       
       
Post       
Abnormal 0.125 0.382  0.331 1.176 0.919 0.404  0.044  -0.029
t-statistic (0.362) (1.278)  (0.962) (3.148) * (2.008) ** (1.364)  (0.147)  (-0.099)
Change  0.257  -0.051 0.846 -0.257 -0.515  -0.360  -0.074
t-statistic  (0.585)  (-0.118) (1.822) ** (-0.431) (-1.054)  (-0.938)  (-0.179)
* Significant at the 0.01 level 
** Significant at the 0.10 level 
Note: ‘Abnormal’ represents the mean difference in trading frequency between each paired crossing and regular 
observation across 5-minute intervals.  ‘Change’ measures the difference between each successive ‘Abnormal’ 
calculation. 
 
 
 182
-1.000
-0.500
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
-20 to -16 -15 to -11 -10 to -6 -5 to -1 0 to 4 5 to 9 10 to 14 15 to 19
Minutes relative to crossing
A
bn
or
m
al
 tr
ad
in
g 
ac
tiv
ity
Pre
Post
 
Figure C-1: Abnormal trading activity around crossing trades on SYCOM 
  
Both Table C-3 and Figure C-1 illustrate the distinct differences in the pattern of 
abnormal trading activity around crossings following the change in the rule governing 
crossing trades on SYCOM.  For the period prior to the rule change, abnormal trading 
activity is significantly higher in the 5-minute interval prior to the crossing and lower 
in the interval including the crossing relative to the corresponding intervals 
surrounding regular trades.  Further, when looking at the change in abnormal trading 
activity, it is apparent that the interval prior to the crossing has a significantly higher 
level of abnormal trading activity whereas the interval including the crossing has a 
significantly lower level of abnormal trading activity relative to the preceding 
intervals.  This suggests that traders may use their discretion in choosing to cross 
orders on SYCOM when trading activity falls.  This is not surprising given the risk to 
traders that one side of the crossing may be hit when required to allow at least 10 
seconds between entering the two sides of the cross.   
 
 183
For the period following the change in the crossing rule, when the ‘10-second’ 
requirement was dropped, the pattern in abnormal trading activity more closely 
resembles that on the floor.  That is, there is significantly higher trading frequency in 
both the 5-minute interval prior to and including the crossing, relative to regular 
trades, indicating that traders do not withhold orders to cross during relatively less 
active periods.   
 
C.6  Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research 
This study analyses market crossings executed on the floor of the SFE and on the 
overnight, electronically traded SYCOM, including various aspects of their execution.  
The results suggest that crossings on the floor: (i) are significantly larger than regular 
trades; (ii) are accompanied by a similar percentage of trades occurring on the same 
side of the spread (bid or offer) relative to regular trades; and (iii) occur during 
periods of relatively high trading activity.  This implies that the constituent orders of 
market crossings are not subject to poor quality of execution through either order 
preferencing or withholding of orders with the intention to cross. 
 
Prior to the change in the rule governing crossing trade execution on SYCOM, market 
crossings were of a similar size and accompanied by a similar number of trades 
occurring on the same side of the bid-ask spread relative to regular trades.  However, 
there is some evidence that they were executed during periods of relatively lower 
trading activity.  Following the removal of the ‘10-second’ rule, constituent orders of 
crossing trades on SYCOM appear to have had an improvement in the quality of 
execution.  That is, crossing trades after this rule change appear to be of a larger size 
and accompanied by a larger number of trades occurring on the same side of the bid-
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ask spread relative to regular trades.  Further, they appear to be accompanied by 
relatively higher trading activity than regular trades.  Hence this analysis provides 
some evidence that brokers on electronic trading systems may time the execution of 
market crossings to occur during relatively quiet periods dependent on the trading 
rules. 
 
Future work could model the quality of execution of crossings.  In addition, a 
comparison of the effects of different crossing trading rules across exchanges could 
lead to greater awareness of the effects of these rules on trade execution. 
 185
 References 
Abhyankar, A., 1995, Trading-round-the-clock: Return, volatility and volume 
spillovers in the Eurodollar futures markets, Pacific Basin Finance Journal 3, 75-92. 
 
Admati, A., and P. Pfleiderer, 1988, A theory of intraday patterns: Volume and price 
variability, Review of Financial Studies 1, 3-40. 
 
Aitken, M., and G. Ferris, 1991, A note on the effect of controlling for transaction 
costs on the small firm anomaly: Additional Australian evidence, Journal of Banking 
and Finance 15, 1195-1202. 
 
Aitken, M., Frino, A., McCorry, M., and P. Swan, 1998, Short sales are almost 
instantaneously bad news: Evidence from the Australian Stock Exchange, Journal of 
Finance 53, 2205-2223. 
 
Aitken, M., Garvey, G., and P. Swan, 1995, How brokers facilitate trade for long-term 
clients in competitive securities markets, Journal of Business 68, 1-33.  
 
Al-Suhaibani, M., and L. Kryzanowski, 2000, An exploratory analysis of the order 
book, and order flow and execution on the Saudi stock market, Journal of Banking 
and Finance 24, 1323-1357. 
 
 186
Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson, 1980, Dealership market: Market-making with 
inventory, Journal of Financial Economics 8, 31-53. 
 
Amihud, Y., and H. Mendelson, 1987, Trading mechanisms and stock returns: An 
empirical investigation, Journal of Finance 3, 533-555. 
 
Angel, J., 1996, How best to supply liquidity to a small-capitalisation securities 
market, Working paper, Georgetown University. 
 
Bamber, L., 1986, The information content of annual earnings releases: A trading 
volume approach, Journal of Accounting Research 24, 40-56. 
 
Battalio, R., Greene, J., and R. Jennings, 1997, Do competing specialists and 
preferencing dealers affect market quality?, Review of Financial Studies 10, 969-993. 
 
Becker, K., Finnerty, J., and J. Friedman, 1995, Economic news and equity market 
linkages between the U.S. and U.K., Journal of Banking and Finance 19, 1191-1210. 
 
Becker, K., Finnerty, J., and K. Kopecky, 1996, Macroeconomic news and the 
efficiency of international bond futures markets, Journal of Futures Markets 16, 131-
145. 
 
 187
Benston, G., and R. Hagerman, 1974, Determinants of bid-asked spreads in the over-
the-counter market, Journal of Financial Economics 1, 353-364. 
 
Benveniste, L., Marcus, A., and W. Wilhelm, 1992, What’s special about the 
specialist?, Journal of Financial Economics 32, 61-86.  
 
Bessembinder, H., 2000, Tick size, spreads, and liquidity: An analysis of securities 
trading near ten dollars, Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 213-239. 
 
Bessembinder, H., and P. Seguin, 1992, Futures-trading activity and stock price 
volatility, Journal of Finance 5, 2015-2034. 
 
Biais, B., 1993, Price formation and equilibrium liquidity in fragmented and 
centralised markets, Journal of Finance 48, 157-185. 
 
Biais, B., Hillion, P., and C. Spatt, 1995, An empirical analysis of the limit order book 
and the order flow in the Paris Bourse, Journal of Finance 50, 1655-1689. 
 
Blennerhassett, M., and R. Bowman, 1998, A change in market microstructure: The 
switch to electronic screen trading on the New Zealand Stock Exchange, Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 8, 261-276. 
 
 188
Bloomfield, R., and M. O’Hara, 1999, Market transparency: Who wins and who 
loses?, Review of Financial Studies 12, 5-35. 
 
Bloomfield, R., and M. O’Hara, 2000, Can transparent markets survive?, Journal of 
Financial Economics 55, 425-459. 
 
Board, J., and C. Sutcliffe, 1995, The effects of trade transparency on the London 
Stock Exchange: A summary, Working paper, Financial Markets Group, London 
School of Economics. 
 
Board, J., and C. Sutcliffe, 1996, The proof of the pudding: The effects of increased 
trade transparency in the London Stock Exchange, Working paper, Financial Markets 
Group, London School of Economics. 
 
Bollerslev, T., and I., Domowitz, 1993, Some effects of restricting the electronic order 
book in an automated trade execution system, in Friedman and J. Rust (eds.), Double-
Auction Markets: Theories, Institutions and Evidence, Addison-Wesley. 
 
Breedon, F., and A. Holland, 1998, Electronic versus open outcry markets: The case 
of the Bund futures contract, Working paper, Bank of England. 
 
Brock, W., and A. Kleidon, 1992, Periodic market closure and trading volume, 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 16, 451-489. 
 189
 
Chan, K., 1992., A further analysis of the lead lag relationship between cash market 
and stock index futures market, Review of Financial Studies 5, 123-152. 
 
Chan, K., Christie, W., and P. Schultz, 1995a, Market structure and the intraday 
pattern of bid-ask spreads for NASDAQ securities, Journal of Business 68, 35-60. 
 
Chan, K., Chung, P., and H. Johnson, 1995b, The intraday behaviour of bid-ask 
spreads for NYSE stocks and CBOE options, Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 30, 329-346. 
 
Chang, E., Jain, P., and P. Locke, 1995, Standard and Poor’s 500 index futures 
volatility and price changes around the New York Stock Exchange close, Journal of 
Business 68, 61-84. 
 
Chow, E., Lee, J., and J. Shyy, 1996, Trading mechanisms and trading preferences on 
a 24-hour futures market: A case study of the floor/GLOBEX switch on MATIF, 
Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 1695-1713. 
 
Chowdhry, B., and V. Nanda, 1991, Multimarket trading and market liquidity, Review 
of Financial Studies 4, 483-511. 
 
 190
Chung, K., Van Ness, B., and R. Van Ness, 1999, Limit orders and the bid-ask spread, 
Journal of Financial Economics 3, 255-287. 
 
Cohen, K. and R. Conroy, 1990, An empirical study of the effect of rule 19c-3, 
Journal of Law and Economics 33, 277-305. 
 
Comerton-Forde, C., 1999, Do trading rules impact on market efficiency? A 
comparison of opening procedures on the Australian and Jakarta Stock Exchanges, 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7, 495-521. 
 
Copeland, M., and T. Copeland, 1998, Leads, lags, and trading in global markets, 
Financial Analysts Journal 54, 70-80. 
 
Copeland, T., and D. Galai, 1983, Information effects on the bid-ask spread, Journal 
of Finance 38, 1457-1469. 
 
Coppejans, M., and I. Domowitz, 1996, Automated trade execution and open outcry 
trading: A first look at the GLOBEX trading system, Working paper, Northwestern 
University. 
 
Coppejans, M., and I. Domowitz, 1999, Pricing behaviour in an off-hours 
computerized market, Journal of Empirical Finance 6, 583-607. 
 191
 
Coppejans, M., and I. Domowitz, 2000, Noise in the price discovery process: A 
comparison of periodic and continuous auctions, in R.A. Schwartz (ed.), Building a 
Better Stock Market: The Call Auction Alternative, Kluwer Publishing. 
 
Crain, S., and J. Lee, 1995, Intraday volatility in interest rate and foreign exchange 
spot and futures markets, Journal of Futures Markets 15, 395-421. 
 
de Jong, F., Nijman, T., and A. Röell, 1995, A comparison of the cost of trading 
French shares on the Paris bourse and on SEAQ International, European Economic 
Review 39, 1277-1301. 
 
Domowitz, I., 1990, The mechanics of automated trade execution systems, Journal of 
Financial Intermediation 1, 167-194. 
 
Domowitz, I., 1993a, A taxonomy of automated trade execution systems, Journal of 
International Money and Finance 12, 607-631. 
 
Domowitz, I., 1993b, Equally open and competitive: Regulatory approval of 
automated trade execution in futures markets, Journal of Futures Markets 13, 93-113. 
 
 192
Domowitz, I., and B. Steil, 1999, Automation, trading costs, and the structure of the 
trading services industry, Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services. 
 
Ederington, L., and J. Lee, 1993, How markets process information: News releases 
and volatility, Journal of Finance 48, 1161-1191. 
 
Ederington, L., and J. Lee, 1995, The short-run dynamics of the price adjustment to 
new information, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 30, 117-134. 
 
Ekman, P., 1992, Intraday patterns in the S&P 500 futures market, Journal of Futures 
Markets 12, 365-381. 
 
Eun, C., and S. Shim, 1989, International transmission of stock market movements, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 24, 241-272. 
 
Ferris, S., McInish, T., and R. Wood, 1997, Automated trade execution and trading 
activity: The case of the Vancouver Stock Exchange, Journal of International 
Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 7, 61-72. 
 
Fleming, M., and E. Remolona, 1997, Price formation and liquidity in the U.S. 
Treasury market: Evidence from intraday patterns around announcements, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 27.  
 193
 
Fleming, M., and E. Remolona, 1999, Price formation and liquidity in the U.S. 
Treasury market: The response to public information, Journal of Finance 54, 1901-
1915. 
 
Flood, M., Huisman, R., Koedijk, K., and R. Mahieu, 1999, Quote disclosure and 
price discovery in multiple-dealer financial markets, Review of Financial Studies 12, 
37-59.   
 
Foster, F., and S. Viswanathan, 1993, Variations in trading volume, return volatility, 
and trading costs: Evidence on recent price formation models, Journal of Finance 48, 
187-211. 
 
Foster, F., and S. Viswanathan, 1994, Strategic trading with asymmetrically informed 
traders and long-lived information, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 
29, 499-518. 
 
Franke, G., and D. Hess, 1995, Anonymous electronic trading versus floor trading, 
Working paper, Universität Konstanz. 
 
Freund, W., Larrain, M., and M. Pagano, 1997, Market efficiency before and after the 
introduction of electronic trading at the Toronto Stock Exchange, Review of Financial 
Economics 6, 29-56. 
 194
 
Frino, A., McInish, T., and M. Toner, 1998a, The liquidity of automated exchanges: 
New evidence from German Bund futures, International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money 8, 225-241. 
 
Frino, A., Stevenson, M., and M. Duffy, 1998b, An analysis of intraday quoted bid 
ask spreads in futures markets: Evidence from the Sydney Futures Exchange, 
Australian Journal of Management 23, 185-202. 
 
Gemmill, G., 1996, Transparency and liquidity: A study of block transactions in the 
London Stock Exchange under different publication rules, Journal of Finance 51, 
1765-1790. 
 
George, T., Kaul, G., and M. Nimalendran, 1991, Estimation of the bid-ask spread 
and its components: A new approach, Review of Financial Studies 49, 623-656. 
 
Gerety, M., and J. Mulherin, 1992, Trading halts and market activity: An analysis of 
volume at the open and the close, Journal of Finance, 47, 1765-1784. 
 
Gerety, M., and J. Mulherin, 1994, Price formation on stock exchanges: The evolution 
of trading within the day, Review of Financial Studies 7, 609-629. 
 
 195
Glosten, L., 1994, Is the electronic open limit order book inevitable?, Journal of 
Finance 49, 1127-1161. 
 
Glosten, L., 1999, Introductory comments: Bloomfield and O’Hara, and Flood, 
Huisman, Koedijk, and Mahieu, Review of Financial Studies 12, 1-3. 
 
Goldstein, M., and K. Kavajecz, 2000, Eighths, sixteenths, and market depth: 
Changes in tick size and liquidity provision on the NYSE, Journal of Financial 
Economics 56, 125-149. 
 
Grammatikos, T., and A. Saunders, 1986, Futures price variability: A test of maturity 
and volume effects, Journal of Business 59, 319-330. 
 
Grünbichler, A., Longstaff, F., and E. Schwartz, 1994, Electronic screen trading and 
the transmission of information: An empirical examination, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 3, 166-187. 
 
Gwilym, O., Buckle, M., Foord, T., and S. Thomas, 1996, The intraday behaviour of 
European bond futures, Journal of Fixed Income 6, 49-66. 
 
Gwilym, O., Buckle, M., and S. Thomas, 1997, The intraday behaviour of bid-ask 
spreads, returns, and volatility for FTSE-100 stock index options, Journal of 
Derivatives 4, 20-32. 
 196
 
Gwilym, O., and S. Thomas, 1998, The influence of electronic trading on bid-ask 
spreads: New evidence from European bond futures, Journal of Fixed Income 8, 7-19. 
 
Hamao, Y., and J. Hasbrouck, 1995, Securities trading in the absence of dealers: 
Trades and quotes on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, Review of Financial Studies 8, 849-
878. 
 
Harris, L., 1986, A transaction data study of weekly and intradaily patterns in stock 
returns, Journal of Financial Economics 16, 99-117. 
 
Harris, L., 1990, Liquidity, trading rules, and electronic trading systems, Monograph 
Series in Finance and Economics, Salomon Brothers Center, New York University. 
 
Harris, L., 1994, Minimum price variations, discrete bid-ask spreads, and quotation 
sizes, Review of Financial Studies 1, 149-178. 
 
Harvey, C., and R. Huang, 1991, Volatility in the foreign currency futures market, 
Review of Financial Studies 4, 543-569. 
 
Hasbrouck, J., 1991, Measuring the information content of stock trades, Journal of 
Finance 46, 179-207. 
 
 197
Hausman, J., 1978, Specification tests in econometrics, Econometrica 46, 1251-1271. 
 
Hill, A., 1997, Inferring trade direction from futures data: Evidence from the Sydney 
Futures Exchange, Working paper, University of Sydney. 
 
Huang, R., and R. Masulis, 1999, FX spreads and dealer competition across the 24-
hour trading day, Review of Financial Studies 12, 61-93. 
 
Jain, P., and G. Joh, 1988, The dependence between hourly prices and trading volume, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23, 269-283. 
 
Jennings, R., 1994, Intraday changes in target firms’ share price and bid-ask quotes 
around takeover announcements, Journal of Financial Research 17, 255-270. 
 
Jones, C., Kaul, G., and M. Lipson, 1994, Transactions, volume, and volatility, 
Review of Financial Studies 7, 631-651. 
 
Jordan, J., Seale, W., Dinehart, S., and D. Kenyon, The intraday variability of soybean 
futures prices: Information and trading effects, Review of Futures Markets 7, 97-108. 
 
Kavajecz, K., 1999, A specialist’s quoted depth and the limit order book, Journal of 
Finance 54, 747-771. 
 198
 
King, M., and S. Wadhwani, 1990, Transmission of volatility between stock markets, 
Review of Financial Studies 3, 5-33. 
 
Kofman, P., and J. Moser, 1997, Spreads, information flows and transparency across 
trading systems, Applied Financial Economics 7, 281-294. 
 
Kumar, R., Sarin, A., and K. Shastri, 1998, The impact of options trading on the 
market quality of the underlying security: An empirical analysis, Journal of Finance 
53, 712-732. 
 
Laux, P., and A. Senchack, 1992, Bid-ask spreads in financial futures, Journal of 
Futures Markets 12, 621-643. 
 
Lease, R., Masulis, W., and J. Page, 1991, An investigation of market microstructure 
impacts on event study returns, Journal of Finance 46, 1523-1536. 
 
Lee, C., Mucklow, B., and M. Ready, 1993, Spreads, depths, and the impact of 
earnings information: An intraday analysis, Review of Financial Studies 2, 345-374. 
 
Lehmann, B., and D. Modest, 1994, Trading and liquidity on the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange, Journal of Finance 44, 951-984. 
 199
 
Leng, H., 1996, Announcement versus nonannouncement: A study of intraday 
transaction price paths of Deutsche Mark and Japanese Yen futures, Journal of 
Futures Markets 16, 829-857. 
 
Lockwood, L., and S. Linn, 1990, An examination of stock market return volatility 
during overnight and intraday periods, 1964-1989, Journal of Finance 45, 591-601. 
 
Lyons, R., 1996, Optimal transparency in a dealer market with an application to 
foreign exchange, Journal of Financial Intermediation 5, 225-254. 
 
Madhavan, A., 1992, Trading mechanisms in securities markets, Journal of Finance 
47, 607-641. 
 
Madhavan, A., 1995, Consolidation, fragmentation, and the disclosure of trading 
information, Review of Financial Studies 8, 579-603. 
 
Madhavan, A., 1996, Security prices and market transparency, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation 5, 255-283. 
 
 200
Martens, M., 1998, Price discovery in high and low volatility periods: Open outcry 
versus electronic trading, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money 8, 243-260. 
 
Massimb, M., and B. Phelps, 1994, Electronic trading, market structure and liquidity, 
Financial Analysts Journal 50, 39-50. 
 
McInish, T., and R. Wood, 1990a, A transactions data analysis of the variability of 
common stock returns during 1980-1984, Journal of Banking and Finance 14, 99-
112. 
 
McInish, T., and R. Wood, 1990b, An analysis of transactions data for the Toronto 
Stock Exchange: Return patterns and end-of-the-day effect, Journal of Banking and 
Finance 14, 441-458. 
 
McInish, T., and R. Wood, 1991, Hourly returns, volume, trade size, and number of 
trades, Journal of Financial Research 14, 303-315. 
 
McInish, T., and R. Wood, 1992, An analysis of intraday patterns in bid/ask spreads 
for NYSE stocks, Journal of Finance 47, 753-763. 
 
Miller, M., 1990, International competitiveness of U.S. futures exchanges, Journal of 
Financial Services Research 4, 387-408. 
 201
 
Milonas, N., 1986, Price variability and the maturity effect in futures markets,  
Journal of Futures Markets 6, 443-460. 
 
Morse, D., 1981, Price and trading volume reaction surrounding earnings 
announcements: A closer examination, Journal of Accounting Research 19, 374-383. 
 
Naidu, G., and M. Rozeff, 1994, Volume, volatility, liquidity and efficiency of the 
Singapore Stock Exchange before and after automation, Pacific-Basin Finance 
Journal 2, 23-42. 
 
Naik, N., Neuberger, A., and S. Viswanathan, 1999, Trade disclosure regulation in 
markets with negotiated trades, Review of Financial Studies 12, 873-900. 
 
Neal, R., 1992, A comparison of transaction costs between competitive market maker 
and specialist market structures, Journal of Business 65, 317-334. 
 
Newey, W., and K. West, 1987, A simple positive semi-definite, heteroskedasticity 
and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix, Econometrica 55, 703–708. 
 
 202
Niemeyer, J., and P. Sandas, 1993, An empirical analysis of the trading structure of 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 3, 
63-101. 
 
O’Hara, M., 1995, Market Microstructure Theory, Basil Blackwell, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Pagano, M., and A. Röell, 1992, Auction and dealership markets: What is the 
difference?, European Economic Review 36, 613-623. 
 
Pagano, M., and A. Röell, 1996, Transparency and liquidity: A comparison of auction 
and dealer markets with informed trading, Journal of Finance 51, 579-611. 
 
Parkinson, M., 1980, The extreme value method for estimating the variance of the rate 
of return, Journal of Business 8, 61-66. 
 
Pirrong, C., 1996, Market liquidity and depth on computerised and open outcry 
trading systems: A comparison of DTB and LIFFE bund contracts, Journal of Futures 
Markets 16, 519-543. 
 
Porter, D., and D. Weaver, 1997, Tick size and market quality, Financial 
Management 26, 5-26. 
 
 203
Porter, D., and D. Weaver, 1998, Post-trade transparency on Nasdaq’s national market 
system, Journal of Financial Economics 50, 231-252. 
 
Roll, R., 1984, A simple measure of the effective bid-ask spread in an efficient 
market, Journal of Finance 39, 1127-1139. 
 
Sandmann, G., and A. Vila, 1995, Floor trading versus electronic screen trading: An 
empirical analysis of market liquidity and information transmission in the Nikkei 
stock index futures market, Financial Markets Group, London School of Economics. 
 
Saporta, V., Trebeschi, G., and A. Vila, 1999, Price formation and transparency on the 
London Stock Exchange, Working paper, Bank of England. 
 
Shah, A., and S. Thomas, 1996, How competition and automation have changed the 
Bombay Stock Exchange, Working paper, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development 
Research.  
 
Shyy, G., and J. Lee, 1995, Price transmission and information asymmetry in bund 
futures markets: LIFFE vs. DTB, Journal of Futures Markets 15, 87-99. 
 
Smith, D., and R. Webb, 1993, The volatility of Eurodollar futures prices around Fed 
time, Journal of Fixed Income 2, 58-73. 
 204
 
Smith, T., and R. Whaley, 1994, Estimating the effective bid/ask spread from time 
and sales data, Journal of Futures Markets 14, 437-455. 
 
Stoll, H., 1978, The pricing of security dealer services: An empirical study of 
NASDAQ stocks, Journal of Finance 33, 1153-1172. 
 
Stoll, H., 1989, Inferring the components of the bid-ask spread: Theory and empirical 
tests, Journal of Finance 44, 115-134. 
 
Stoll, H., and R. Whaley, 1990, Stock market structure and volatility, Review of 
Financial Studies 3, 37-71. 
 
Subrahmanyam, A., 1991, A theory of trading in stock index futures, Review of 
Financial Studies 4, 17-51. 
 
Thompson, S., and M. Waller, 1988, Determinants of liquidity costs in commodity 
futures markets, Review of Futures Markets 7, 110-126. 
 
Venkatesh, P., 1992, Empirical evidence on the impact of the bid-ask spread on the 
characteristics of CRSP daily returns, Journal of Financial Research 15, 113-125. 
 
 205
Vila, A., and O. Bacha, 1996, Multi-market trading and patterns in volume and 
mispricing: The case of the Nikkei stock index futures markets, Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 6, 1-37. 
 
Wang, J., 1999, Asymmetric information and the bid-ask spread: An empirical 
comparison between automated order execution and open outcry auction, Journal of 
International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 9, 115-128. 
 
Wang, G., Michalski, R., Jordan, J., and E. Moriarty, 1994, An intraday analysis of 
bid-ask spreads and price volatility in the S&P 500 index futures market, Journal of 
Futures Markets 14, 837-859. 
 
Webb, R., and D. Smith, 1994, The effect of market opening and closing on the volatility 
of Eurodollar futures prices, Journal of Futures Markets 14, 51-78. 
 
Wiggins, J., 1992, Estimating the volatility of S&P 500 futures prices using the 
extreme-value method, Journal of Futures Markets 12, 265-273. 
 
Wilcoxon, F., 1945, Individual comparisons by ranking methods, Biometrics 1, 80-83. 
 
Wood, R., McInish, T., and J. Ord, 1985, An investigation of transactions data for 
NYSE stocks, Journal of Finance 40, 723-739.  
 
